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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. A Statement of the Problem 
Early Christian thought produced a vivid image to 
express the divergencies between Hebraism and Hellenism: 
What has Jerusalem to do with Athens? The system of every 
Christian thinker since has been partially shaped by his 
answer to this problem. 
This dissertation is an attempt to set a similar 
question for the fields of philosophy and economics: What 
has philosophy to do with economics? Here, too, thinkers 
in both fields determine their lines of thought by the ways 
in which they confront this question, Historically the 
answers have ranged from a belief in the complete antith-
esis of the two fields to a belief in a close and inevitable 
association. 
J. R, Seeley, history professor at Cambridge and 
colleague of Henry Sidgwick (one of the last men to do 
significant workl in both fields) gave a lecture series pub-
lished posthumously as Introduction to Political Science. 
lThe 1926 edition of Pal rave's Dictionar of Po-
litical Economy, Henry Higgs vols.; London: Macmillan 
and Company, [1899] 1926), still retains three of the 
articles by Henry Sidgwick, including his helpful article 
on "The Scope of Political Economy." 
1 
Some of Seeley's students and friends wondered what business 
a history professor had giving a lecture series "outside his 
field," so he opened his lectures with these words: 
Certainly I am going to lecture on Political Science, 
but when did I say that I was not going to lecture on 
history •••• In my opinion, to lecture on political 
science is to lecture on history •••• 
History without political science has no fruit; 
Political science without history has no root. 
To establish the truth of this aphorism will be the 
object of this present lecture. 1 
2 
This older concept of the breadth and inter-relatedness 
of the social sciences is lacking in much of modern social 
science as each scholar strives to mimic the stringent limi-
tations of area which were thought to be essential to the 
physical sciences until a very recent date. Such strict 
delineation caused no less an economist than J. N. Keynes 
to regard the work of Sidgwick somewhat wistfully, saying: 
In addition to the science of political economy, 
Sidgwick recognises, in the Introduction to the 
Principles, an art of political economy, which he 
describes as concerned mainly with the theory of what 
ought to be done by governments to improve production 
and distribution, and to provide for governmental 
expenditures; the art includes also the consideration 
of the general principles of distributive justice, in 
economic matters •.•• In weighing judicially the 
advantages and disadvantages of a given course of action, 
Sidgwick was unrivalled; and the whole discussion is 
marked in a high degree by practical wisdom. 2 
lJ. R. Seeley, Introduction to Political Science 
(London: Macmillan and Company, 1896), pp. 3-4. 
2J. N. Keynes, "Henry Sidgwick," in Palgrave's 
Dictionary of Political Economy, III, pp. 758-759. 
The major thesis of this dissertation will be to try 
to relate the fields of economics and philosophy in a way 
similar to that of Professor Seeley as he related history 
and political science. The very fact that the older name 
for economics was political economy1 bears witness to the 
relationship at least in terms of their historical devel-
opment. The question is, Should this relationship be out-
grown, or does economics lose something when it ceases to 
find its setting within the larger sciences of man? The 
fact that there has developed recently in this country 
(specifically in such schools as the University of Pennsyl-
vania and the Harvard Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration)a growing sense of the social responsibilities of 
businessmen gives evidence of a return to a more philosoph-
ical approach to economics. 
2. The Purpose and Plan of This Dissertation 
In order to narrow the scope of this dissertation it 
has been decided to investigate the problem of "The Relation-
ship of the Economic Order to the Moral Ideal" in the 
writings of four men--Jacques Maritain, Emil Brunner, John 
Dewey, and William Temple. Each man began his work in 
aspects of philosophy quite removed from economic thought. 
Yet each man, as he matured, gave increasing attention to 
lJohn Hopkins University has seen fit still to 
retain this broader title for its department of economics. 
3 
the problems of social justice and economic values.l 
Jacques Maritain was selected because of his leader-
ship in the nee-Scholastic movement and in order to have an, 
authority within the general position of Catholic philos-
ophy. His selection also represents the great stream of 
French thought from Descartes to Marcel. 
Emil Brunner was selected as one who vigorously 
defends, with considerable finesse regarding philosophical 
problems, the position in theology known as "crisis theology" 
or nee-orthodox thought. Brunner has moved a long way from 
his earlier association with Karl Barth, but his contri-
bution to this dissertation is from the perspective of 
German and Swiss thought. Karl Barth now repudiates Brunner 
and identifies him with the long line of heresy springing 
from Zwingli's controversy with Luther. However, Brunner is, 
in my opinion, a good synthesis of the Lutheran and Calvin-
istic traditions. 
John Dewey was selected as the third philosopher 
because he represents the position of humanistic naturalism. 
His desire to make philosophy deal with the real problems of 
men and his belief that the social sciences can use the 
methods of the exact sciences to solve these problems make 
his thinking significant for our subject. He also represents 
the line of thought of American pragmatism. 
lFor a discussion of this point see page4C6 in the 
final chapter of this dissertation. 
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Finally, the selection of William Temple is a partic-
ularly important key to this dissertation. He not only 
gives the theologically moderate position of the Anglican or 
"bridge church," but his personal leadership in social ques-
tions and his lifetime concern to bring the churches closer 
together through the ecumenical efforts demonstrate what 
might be done within philosophy proper as we seek to move, 
without compromise of our basic metaphysical positions, into 
the realm of cooperation and united efforts in the areas of 
social reform. Philosophy, the life of reason, should be 
reminded that social reform for our generation has become an 
urgent question of social survival. 
The next chapter of this dissertation will deal with 
previous work in the areas of philosophy, political economy, 
economics, and religious ethics which has sought to clarify 
the relationship of economics and philosophy. Two brief 
chapters will attempt to probe some basic definitions and 
critical problems pertinent to this discussion. 
The main body of this dissertation is the descriptive 
analysis of the work of the four men in this field. One 
chapter each will be devoted to Jacques Maritain, Emil 
Brunner, John Dewey, and William Temple, with a first hand 
exploration of their writings. 
Finally, the concluding chapter will present a 
critical comparison of these four thinkers and my own 
conclusions regarding the possibility of a philosophy of 
5 
economic value built upon the foundations of a Christian 
personalism. 
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CHAPTER II 
PREVIOUS TREATMENTS OF THIS PROBLEM 
l. Previous Analyses of the Economic Ideas 
of These Four Philosophers 
A number of years ago Jerome Davis wrote a preface 
to J. A. Hobson's Ethics and Economics commending it "as a 
pioneer work, " saying: 
There are no American textbooks available on the 
subject. To be sure there is a brief pamphlet by 
C. E. Ayres on The Nature of the Relationship between 
Ethics and Economics, and in England J. A. R. Marriott 
has written a volume on Economics and Ethics, ... 
while H. F. Ward has recently written a volume bearing 
the title Our Economic Morality and the Ethics of Jesus. 
Aside from these studies this is a virgin field. l 
Actually a considerable body of literature has 
accumulated through the years, yet very little of it has 
attempted seriously to relate economics to the field of phi-
losophy proper. In the newly found freedom of economic sci-
ence from its philosophical mother, no one in recent years 
has appeared anxious to inquire too closely into its heritage. 
Certainly as far as an attempt to deal directly with 
the thought of the four men who are the subject of this 
dissertation, there is a dearth of any treatment of this 
aspect of their thought. 
lJ. A. Hobson, Economics and Ethics (New York: 
D. C. Heath and Co., 1929), Preface, p. i. 
7 
An attempt to single out the economic writings of 
Jacques Maritain has been made only in Selected Readings in 
the Social and Political Philosophy of Jacgues Maritain, 
edited by Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward. 1 This volume in-. 
eludes a chapter on ''Person and Property'' which is taken 
from Freedom in the Modern World. 2 It also contains one or 
two page selections from Maritain's Humanisme integral3 which 
cover subjects of "Economic Pluralism" and"The Person and 
the Economic Community." However, all of this material 
consists merely of brief excerpts from Maritain's own writ-
ings, without any comment which would attempt to delineate 
its philosophical principles. 
Maritain's recent biographer, Charles A. Fecher, has 
included no section of Maritain's economic thought. The 
nearest point of comment occurs when he turns, in chapter 
xviii, "The Life of the State (2)," to what he calls "the 
application of these principles to the concrete realms of 
social and political life."4 Yet, even here, we find him 
1Joseph W. Evans and Leo R. Ward (eds.), Selected 
Readin s in the Social and Political Philoso h of Jac ues 
Maritain New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955 . 
Hereafter this volume will be cited as SPPM. 
2Jacques Maritain, Freedom in the Modern World, 
trans. Richard O'Sullivan (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1936), pp. 193-214. 
3Jacques Maritain, Humanisme integral (Paris: 
Fernand Aubier, 1947), p. 169 et. passim. 
4charles A. Fecher, The Philosophy of Jacques 
Maritain (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1953), 
p. 212. This work will hereafter be cited as PJM. 
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dealing almost wholly with the political aspects of 
Maritain's thought in terms of the problems of equality and 
authority as set forth in Maritain's Man and the State. 1 
This is all the more strange, as it is in this very writing 
that Maritain introduces some of his most specific sugges-
tions concerning the economic order. 
Emil Brunner's writings on economic value are more 
readily accessible than Maritain's, being found principally 
in three of his works: 
(1) The Divine Imperative, Book III, section 3: 
"The Community of Labour. 112 
(2) Justice and the Social Order, chapter xviii 
"Justice in the Economic Order."3 
(3) The second volume of his recent Gifford Lectures, 
Christianity and Civilisation. 4 
The forthcoming volume on Brunner in Macmillan's 
"The Library of Living Theology" will surely treat some 
aspect of his social and economic thought, but it has not 
lJacques Maritain, Man and the State (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1951). 
2 Emil Brunner, The Divine Im erative A Stud in 
Christian Ethics, trans. Olive Wyon Philadelphia: The 
Westminister Press, 1947), pp. 384-439. 
3Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, 
trans. Mary Hottinger (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1945), pp. 148-183. 
4Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation, II 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949). The Gifford 
Lectures given at St. Andrews University in March, 1948. 
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yet appeared and what it will contain remains to be seen. 1 
The only detailed study of his economic views ap-
peared in a dissertation written by Howard Arthur Bourne for 
the Economics Department of the University of Chicago. 2 This 
work of 139 pages makes no pretense of treating the philo-
sophical implications of Brunner's economic ideas, and the 
whole examination is limited to two works of Brunner, The 
Divine Imperative and Justice and the Social Order. Since 
it was microfilmed in 1945 it could not include any mention 
of Brunner's 1947-1948 Gifford Lectures. Bourne's disser-
tation is a conservative defense of classical economics 
against the rise of religious socialism, yet it is a good 
example of what can be done by an economist in probing 
basic economic concepts as used by two living theologians. 
This treatment of Brunner will seek to go beyond his 
economic concepts in an attempt to relate them to his total 
philosophical position. In spite of the numerous studies 
made of Brunner's theology, to my knowledge there is no 
specific treatment of this social philosophy as culminating 
in economic theory. This lack is what this dissertation 
lA letter from the publishers dated January 11, 1958 
states that the next volume in this series will be on Henry 
Nelson Wieman with no prediction of a date for the work on 
Brunner to appear. Previous volumes in this series include 
works on Paul Tillich and Reinhold Niebuhr. 
2Howard Arthur Bobrne, ''The Economic Concepts of 
Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr" {microfilmed Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Economics, University of 
Chicago, 1945). 
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hopes to be able to fill. 
In the case of John Dewey greater attention has 
certainly been paid already by previous investigators into 
his social philosophy and economic ideas. Yet even in these 
there is found no specific analysis of his economic thought 
from the standpoint of philosophy. George Raymond Geiger 
has perhaps explored this aspect of Dewey's system more 
fully than anyone. John Dewey wrote the Introduction to 
Geiger's The Philosophy of Henry George. 1 Geiger frankly 
uses Dewey's social philosophy as his central unifying point 
in constructing his later Philosophy and the Social Order. 2 
Probably for this reason Geiger was selected to do the 
article "Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy" in Paul 
Arthur Schilpp's first volume of ''The Library of Living 
Philosophers,'' The Philosophy of John Dewey.3 
Joseph Ratner recognized the need for more specific 
handling of Dewey's economic thought when he edited Intelli-
gence in the Modern World, 4 and he secured an original 
11 
laeorge Raymond Geiger, The Philosophy of Henry George 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. 
2aeorge Raymond Geiger, Philosophy and the Social 
Order (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947). 
3paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John 
Dewey ("The Library of Living Philosophers, 11 Vol. I; 
Evanston: Northwestern University, 1939). Hereafter this 
volume will be cited as Schilpp (ed.), PJD. 
4 Joseph Ratner {ed.), Intelligence in the Modern 
World John Dewe •s Philoso h (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1939 . Hereafter this volume will be cited as 
Ratner (ed.), IMW. 
article from the pen of Dewey for inclusion in the volume. 
The article is entitled "The Economic Basis of the New 
Society." 
Among the many studies of Dewey's thought two unpub-
lished dissertations at Boston University Graduate School 
probe different aspects of his philosophy. Bishop Francis 
Gerald Ensley of the Iowa Area of the Methodist Church did 
a dissertation in 1938 on "The Naturalistic Interpretation 
of Religion by John Dewey." 1 He criticized Dewey's social 
philosophy as inconsistent in that it posits interaction of 
persons even though the existence of other selves cannot be 
experimentally verified. Neither Dewey's faith in progress 
nor his belief in the sole efficacy of the scientific method 
can be verified to the satisfaction of Dewey's own standards 
of pragmatic truth. 
In 1940 Pearl Beatrice Fosnot did a similar disser-
tation on John Dewey's social Philosophy. 2 She commends 
Dewey for his emphasis upon the role of intelligence and 
the need for social change, but she accuses him of incon-
sistency in his disclaiming ideals while still selecting 
"the desirable." 
1Francis Gerald Ensley, ''The Naturalistic Interpre-
tation of Religion by John Dewey" (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Department of Philosophy, Boston University, 1938). 
2Pearl Beatrice Fosnot, "Tradition and Change in 
John Dewey's Social Philosophy'' (unpublished Ph.D. disser-
tation, Department of Philosophy, Boston University, 1940). 
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The most specific treatment of Dewey"s economic 
thought, however, is found not in a philosophical writing 
but in a recent microfilmed dissertation done by Marcus R. 
1 Tool. Tool traces a link between Thorstein Veblen, whom 
he calls the founder of Institutionalism, and John Dewey, 
the chief exponent of Instrumentalism. The union of these 
two concepts is achieved by Clarence Ayres, Professor of 
Economics at the University of Texas. Tool approaches his 
problem using the categories of philosophy, and he sees 
Dewey primarily as the philosopher who lays the foundation 
for Ayres" economic concepts. Thus there is very little 
exploration, as such, of the more specific economic concepts 
of Dewey. Tool does have a chapter on ''The Theory of Social 
Value" in which he explores Dewey's idea of "economy-effi-
e iency" and his concern with the general or common welfare. 
However, he admits that what was a general social philosophy 
in Dewey becomes a specific economic idea in Ayres. Thus his 
whole treatment stresses Dewey as a logician and social 
philosopher concerned with freedom and democracy. Where 
Bourne is too specific and narrow in dealing with economic 
concepts in Brunner, Tool is too general and broadly philo-
sophical in his use of Dewey as part of the nee-Institutional 
movement. This dissertation will attempt to explore Dewey 
1Marcus R. Tool, "The Philosophy of Nee-Institu-
tionalism: Veblen, Dewey, and Ayres" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Economics, University of 
Colorado, 1953). 
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not merely as a philosopher usable by economic theorists, 
but to discover the economic ideas which Dewey himself used, 
and to relate them critically to his philosophical system. 
Mention hardly needs to be made of a brie~ biased 
attack of Dewey by Sid Okun of the Revolutionary Workers 
League. In a small booklet1 Mr. Okun criticizes Dewey's 
essay "Why I Am Not a Communist," published in The Meaning 
of Marx, A Symposium, by Bertrand Russell, John Dewey et a1. 2 
Dewey's liberal social democracy furnishes the back-
drop for a whole generation of critics of his views. In a 
sense both Maritain and Brunner are attacks upon the posi-
tion not only of the older idealism but also of the newer 
secular faith in science and progress. William Temple may 
be regarded as one who approached a synthesis between the 
positions of Dewey and of neo-Scholasticism and neo-ortho-
doxy. 
It is odd that in spite of the fact that the late 
Archbishop Temple gained some of his greatest fame in con-
nection with his social views, there has been practically 
no attempt to deal with this aspect of his thought in any 
systematic fashion. His official biographer, F. A. Ire-
monger, has given us the best picture in certain of his 
lsid Okun, John Dewey--A Marxian Critigue (New 
York: Demos Press, 1942). 
2Bertrand Russell, John Dewey et al., The Meaning 
of Marx, A Symposium (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1934). 
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chapters dealing with crucial periods of Temple's life, such 
as the Copec and the Malvern Conferences, in William Temple, 
Archbishop of Canterbury.l Yet the one chapter in this vol-
ume specifically dealing with Temple's philosophy contains 
no treatment of the economic aspect of his thought. 2 
An article by W. G. Peck, entitled "William Temple 
as Social Thinker", is an excellent introduction to the work 
of William Temple in social ethics, but it, too, ignores the 
special field of Temple's economic thought.3 
Comparable to the Evans and Ward volume of selected 
readings in Maritain, there is a little book edited by A. E. 
Baker, William Temple's Teachings,4 which is only a diction-
ary of materials arranged under certain topics and is in no 
way a systematic or critical approach to his thought. 
Aside from a rash of criticisms of the Malvern Con-
ference by such men as Rev. M. Stockwell, 5 Hartley Withers, 6 
lF. A. Iremonger, William Temple, Archbishop of 
Canterbury (London: Oxford University Press, 1948). 
2Dorothy Emmet, "The Philosopher," Ibid., pp. 521-
539. 
3w. G. Peck, "William Temple as Social Thinker," 
William Tern le: An Estimate and an A reciation, 
ed. W. R. Ma thews London: James Clarke and Co., 1946), 
pp. 59-75. 
4A. E. Baker (ed.), William Temple's Teachings 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1951). 
5Fortnightly Review, November, 1941. 
6Hartley Withers, Archiepiscopal Economics 
("Post-War Questions," No. 18; London: The Individualist 
Bookshop, 1942). 
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T. S. Eliot,l and J. Stevenson,2 there is very little atten-
tion paid directly to a consideration of his economic views. 
Yet as prominent an economist as J. M. Keynes could compli-
ment him on his publication of Christianity and Social Order3 
and defend his right and duty to declare his views and the 
conscience of the Church in this realm of life. 
The paucity of material on the economic views of a 
leader as authoritative as Archbishop Temple--a man who was 
instrumental not only in awakening his church and nation to 
the economic needs of his people, but also welded together 
Christians from all countries and communions--makes this 
present study desirable. 
This, then, is the meager amount of material that 
has been accumulated on the concept of the economic order 
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in the four philosophers whom we seek to treat. What is there, 
though, of previous research on the wider problem of the 
relationship of the economic order to the moral ideal in 
the systems of other thinkers? 
lT. s. Eliot, et al., "Criticism of the Malvern 
Conference," The Times (London), January 14, 1941. See also 
The Church Times, January 17, 1941. 
2J. Stevenson, The Christian Social Order 
("Post-War Questions," No. 13; London: The Individualist 
Bookshop, 1942). See especially pp. 8-10. 
3william Temple, Christianity and Social Order 
(New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1942). 
2, Growth of Interest in Economic Problems 
as Reflected in Recent Ethics 
There seems to be a growing awareness of the need 
for grappling with the philosophic problems underlying 
economic theory today. Evidence of this is found within 
philosophy itself in the present trend for introductory 
textbooks to include sections on "Economic Philosophy." 
An example of this is the chapter in the recent text by 
Archie Bahm, Philosophy, An Introduction,l Almost without 
exception textbooks in ethics published since 1950 include 
specific sections on "Economic Ethics." 2 
As early as Friedrich Paulsen's Ethik3 we find this 
problem of economic value treated in a separate chapter. 
Paulsen's treatment still remains among the very best. An 
American textbook that ranks high is William Kelley Wright, 
lArchie Bahm, Philosophy, An Introduction (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953), chap. xxviii, 
"Economic Philosophy," pp, 398-408, 
2For example: Thomas E. Hill, Ethics in Theory and 
Practice (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1956), 
chap. xvii, "The Ethics of Economic Activity"; Charles H. 
Patterson, Moral Standards (New York: Ronald Press, 1949), 
chap. xvi, "Professional Codes of Ethics," and chap. xvii, 
"Business Ethics." The most outstanding example of all is 
the recent Gifford Lectures of Ralph Barton Perry~ Realms of 
Value (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954J with its 
incisive study of economic value in chap. xv. 
3Friedrich Paulsen, A System of Ethics, trans. 
Frank Thilly from 2nd. German ed. (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1899), Bk. III, chap. iv, "The Economic 
Life," pp. 529-542. 
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General Introduction to Ethics {New York, 1929), 1 chapter xvi, 
"Distributive Justice," and chapter xvii, "The Professions 
and Business." A more recent American treatment is found in 
Radoslav A. Tsanoff, Ethics (New York, 1947) which devotes 
chapter xiv to "Moral Problems of Our Economic System." 
Bertrand Russell's new book, Human Society in Ethics and 
Politics (New York, 1955) also illustrates the current sensi-
tivity to this problem. 2 
Similarly all the recent manuals of Christian ethics 
have included one or more chapters on this problem. Emil 
Brunner's Divine Imperative has already been mentioned and 
will be further explored in chapter vi of this dissertation. 
Among some of the many others which can be cited are the 
late Albert c. Knudson's The Principles of Christian Ethics 
lcitation of the publisher will be omitted in future 
references occuring in the text for the purpose of greater 
conciseness. However, the date and place of publication 
will always be given. 
2Most older works in ethics, unlike Paulsen's, tend 
to treat economic ethics in a few brief pages on "Economic 
Values," classifying them as one of the instrumental values. 
Edgar s. Brightman, Moral Laws (New York: The Abingdon 
Press, 1933) in the midst of a world-wide depression devotes 
only pp. 136-138 to "Values as Instrumental" and calls 
"economic values ••• purely instrumental" (p. 136). Even 
the monumental tome by Wilhelm Wundt, Ethics, trans. E. B. 
Tichener et al. (3vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 
1914) devotes only pp. 197-205 and 258-260 of Vol. III to 
this subject. His 2nd German ed., from which this trans-
lation was made, was published in 1892. James Seth, A Study 
of Ethical Principles, (3rd ed.; New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1898) suggests ''it is for the State to substitute for 
the mob-rule of unethical economic forces the steady 
rational control of ethical insight" (p. 307). Yet his total 
treatment is confined to a few pages. Likewise W. G. 
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(Nashville, 1943), chapter xiii, "The Economic Order," from 
which the phrasing of the title of this dissertation is 
taken. George F. Thomas' Christian Ethics and Moral Philos-
~ (New York, 1955) gives chapter xiv to "Christianity and 
the Economic Life." Miss Georgia Harkness in Christian 
Ethics (New York, 1957) devotes chapter viii to ''The Ethics 
of Economic Life." She draws much of her material from 
Brunner's extended treatment in The Divine Imperative. Paul 
Ramsey in Basic Christian Ethics (New York, 1950), although 
not treating economic ethics in a separate chapter, refers 
to the problem in sections on "Disinterested Love for Neigh-
bor" and "Christocentric Vocation." His illustrations, how-
ever, are habitually drawn from sexual problems and the area 
Everett, Moral Values (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1918) 
gives his treatment of instrumental values in a sec. called 
"Economic Values" pp. 188-192. 
A great difference is noted in the more recent works 
of men like Wilbur Marshall Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics 
(New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1930) where he devotes 
chap. xii to "The J;!:conomic Life: Property." Many recent 
texts assign two chaps. to the problem. Philip Wheelwright 
in his rev. ed. of A Critical Introduction to Ethics 
{New York: The Odyssey Press, 1949) gives pp. 251-331 to 
"The Problem of SOcial Justice" and "Our Business Civili-
zation." Melvin Rader, Ethics and Society (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1950) and Wayne A. R. Leys, Ethics for Policy 
Decisions (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952) both lift 
up economic problems in the field of ethics in extended 
treatments. H. H. Titus, Ethics for Today (2nd ed. rev.; 
New York: American Book Co., 1954) treats economic ethics 
in chaps. xxii and xxiii. Tsanoff's rev. ed. of his Ethics 
{New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955) steps up his treat-
ment from one chap. in the 1947 ed. to chaps. xiv and xv 
in the new ed. 
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of war and peace rather than specifically economic problems. 
Once again, most of his thinking is reflective of Brunner 
and his analysis of these problems. 
3, The Religious Concern With Economic Values 
In recent years there has grown up a considerable 
body of literature expressing the religious concern for 
social and economic justice, Charles Ryider Smith's The Bib-
lical Doctrine of Wealth and Work (London, 1924) is an anal-
ysis by a competent Biblical scholar of the role of property 
and material goods in the Hebrew and early Christian cul-
ture.1 The greater social values assigned to property in 
all Semitic cultures are probably a needed corrective for 
our more individualistic nineteenth century notions in the 
West. 
The sources of man's reflection concerning economic 
injustice go even further back than the Hebrews, however. 
Professor A. E. Avey finds evidence that the ancient Egyp-
tian Book of the Dead (3500 B.C.) believes that the immor-
tality of the soul is inseparably bound up with economic 
justice, The Priest of Seneferu (c. 2900 B.C.) was perhaps 
the first in recorded history to complain about the economic 
and ethical folly in the world. 2 The Code of Hammurabi and 
1cf. also the article by G. A. Cooke, "Old Testament 
Economics," Econ •. Dev,. XIX (1909), pp. 388-399, 
2Albert E. Avey, Handbook in the History of Philo-
sophy (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc,. 1954). pp. 4-5. 
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other early Semitic and Hittite law codes show a keen sense 
of property rights and the control of slaves, women, and 
inheritance rights. 
The Babylonian flood stories, which influence the 
Hebrew epics and myths, showed the displeasure of deity over 
economic exploitation. The Joseph stories in Genesis have 
their roots in the Egyptian "Tale of Two Brothers" (1200 B.C). 
Dr. Elmer Leslie has traced the influence of the 
Canaanite fertility religions upon Hebrew life and culture. 1 
It is interesting to read, as one modern theologian has done, 
the whole Biblical concept of salvation as rooting in these 
early primitive struggles for fertility and survival.2 
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The Hebrew prophets of the creative eighth century B.C. 
will always stand in the history of social thought as the 
finest conscience in the Hebrew desire for economic justice 
and ethical religion.3 Their teachings finally received 
codification in the Deuteronomic Code (650 B.C.) and show 
their mark on the Exilic and Post-exilic literature. 
E. F. Scott, The Ethical Teachings of Jesus (New 
York, 1924), chapter xiii, "Possessions," and Miss Georgia 
lElmer A. Leslie, Old Testament Reli 
Light of Its Canaanite Background New York: 
bury Press, 1936), pp. 20-21. 
ion in the 
Abingdon-Cokes-
2William J. Wolf, No Cross, No Crown (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1957), especially chap. i, "Security and 
Salvation." 
3see Charles Foster Kent, The Social Teachings of 
the Prophets and Jesus (New York: Charles Scribner's ~S~o=n~s~,~l~9~1~7~)r.~~~~~ 
Harkness, The Sources of Western Morality (New York, 1954), 
relate this problem to the emerging New Testament ethic. An 
unpublished thesis of Joseph Hubbard, "Economic Thought in 
Patristic Literature" (Harvard University, 1923), advances 
this study to the early church fathers and St. Augustine. 
Attention will be given to the medieval and Refor-
mation economic thought in subsequent chapters on Maritain 
and Brunner. Kathleen Walker MacArthur made a study of 
The Economic Ethics of John Wesley (New York, 1936). Pro-
fessor E. A. J. Johnson, with his continuing interest in 
early American economic ideas, has tried to trace their 
rootage back to European religious ancestry. He claims that: 
Franklin's economic ideas were ••• the outgrowth of 
previous philosophical and economic reasoning •••• The 
economic thought of the American seventeenth century is 
important in itself as one of the last outposts of medi-
eval economic thought •••• Puritan leaders hoped that, 
in the new world, all economic activity could be made to 
conform to a moral pattern. 1 
More recent examples of the economic concerns of 
religion are found in such excellent treatments as Robert 
Lowry Calhoun, God and the Day's Work (New York, 1943), long 
out of print but now available in an Association Press paper-
back. A recent study sponsored by the World Council of 
Churches views the problems of economics through the per-
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lE. A. J. Johnson, American Economic Thought in th~ 
Seventeenth Century (London: P. S. King and Sons, Ltd., 1932), 
p. ix. 
spective of divine vocation. 1 Included are studies by 
Pauls. Minear on "Work and Vocation in Scripture," Robert L. 
Calhoun on "Work and Vocation in Christian History," and 
Robert s. Michaelsen, "Work and Vocation in American Indus-
trial Society." The concluding "Bibliography on Work and 
Vocation," pages 213-224 was prepared by Professor Michaelsen 
and is a very helpful, brief introduction to this whole 
literature from the standpoint of the Christian faith. 
Another important collection of essays on this ques-
tion is edited by Joseph F. Fletcher, Christianity and Prop-
erty (Philadelphia, 1947). 2 Its eight essays examine the 
concept of property from the standpoint of theology much as 
did Bishop Gore's earlier work, Property, Its Rights and 
Duties (New York, 1922). However, the volume edited by 
Bishop Gore approaches the concept of property more from the 
point of view of philosophy, as a list of its contributors 
would indicate. 
The most ambitious undertaking in many years in 
religious circles has been the excellent series of study 
manuals put out under the auspices of the Federal Council 
of Churches and summarized at the time of the Evanston Con·-
ference of the World Council of Churches in a Mentor edition, 
Ethics in a Business Society (New York, 1954). This whole 
lJohn Oliver Nelson (ed.), Work and Vocation, A 
Christian Discussion (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954). 
2see also Spencer Miller, Jr. and Joseph F. Fletcher, 
The Church and Industry (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 
1930). 
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study parallels the work of William Temple and the British 
churchmen who, during the Great Depression, published the 
study Men Without Work.l The finest feature of both studies 
was the collaboration of professional economists, trained 
sociologists, and competent churchmen in examining the over-
all effects of economic distress upon human beings. 
One of the earliest studies of this problem made by 
a churchman in America was the short treatise by Rev. Wil-
liam Riley Halstead, Christ in the Industries (Cincinnati, 
1898). A more scholarly approach was made by Francis J. 
McConnell in Christian Principles and Industrial Recon-
struction (New York, 1919). 2 The same year Harry F. Ward 
published The New Social Order (New York, 1919). The next 
year Roger W. Babson wrote Religion and Business (New York, 
1920) and the following year Miss Georgia Harkness published 
her first book, The Church and the Immigrant (New York, 1921). 
A study manual edited by Kirby Page, F. Ernest Johnson, 
et al., Christianity and Economic Problems (New York) ap-
peared in 1922. In the So~th Nolan B. Harmon, Jr., while 
teaching ethics, published his text, Is It Right or Wrong? 
(Nashville, 1928) with a helpful chapter on ''A Christian 
Man's Goods." 
lwilliam Temple (ed.), Men Without Work (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 193 • 
2see also his Evan elicals Revolutionists and 
Idealists (Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 19 2 • 
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E. Stanley Jones, who, with his interpretation of 
the "strenuous teachings" of Jesus, is the opposite of Emil 
Brunner, brought out his Christ's Alternative to Communism 
(New York, 1935). Harris Franklin Rall edited the volume, 
Religion and Public Affairs (New York, 1937). About this 
same time there began appearing the penetrating volumes of 
John C. Bennett related to this theme. 1 F. Ernest Johnson, 
in addition to the 1922 volume edited with Kirby Page, has 
written The Church and Society (New York, 1935) and The 
Social Gospel Re-examined (New York, 1940). 
Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam's books have attempted to 
examine economic questions in the light of Christian person-
alism. His Labor and Tomorrow's World (1945) and Personal-
ities in Social Reform (1950), both published by the 
Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, are stimulating discussions of 
basic issues. Henry F. May's study, Protestant Churches in 
" Industrial America (1949) and Nels F. S. Ferre's Christi-
anity and Society (1950), both Harper and Brothers publi-
cations, are also important. Ferre devotes chapter viii, 
"The Christian Perspective on Property,'' to a serious dis-
1cf. Social Salvation (1935) and Christian Ethics 
and Social Policy (1946), both published by Charles 
Scribner's Sons. More recently have appeared Bennett's 
Christianity and Communism (New York: Association Press, 
1952) and the volume he edited for the Federal Council study, 
Christian Values and Economic Life (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1954). The two most valuable articles in this 
latter volume are Howard R. Bowen's "Ethics and Economics," 
and "Christian Ethics in Economic Life" by John c. Bennett. 
25 
cussion of this problem. 
Herbert W. Schneider, Religion in Twentieth Century 
America (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952), has a good section 
on the "History of the Social Gospel" in chapter iii. 
Three general studies of economic and wider social 
problems are J. Richard Spann (ed.), The Church and Social 
Responsibility (Nashville, 1953); John A. Hutchison (ed.), 
Christian Faith and Social Action (New York, 1953); and the 
recent report on the World Council of Churches by Edward 
Duff, The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches 
(New York, 1956). 
In America there is also the leadership of 
Dean Walter G. Muelder in this field. His Boston University 
Lecture for 1954, The Idea of the Responsible Society (Boston, 
1954); Religion and Economic Responsibility (New York, 1953); 
and such articles as "The Ethics of the Right to Work," in 
The Machinist (1954), set forth his views concerning the role 
of religion and economic life. Muelder, although showing 
greater respect for historical religion, shares much of 
Dewey's view of "economy-efficiency" and technological ad-
vances. Both strive for adjustment of human relations and 
industrial potential to social values. 
From England the writings of Vigo Auguste Demant and 
Maurice B. Rickett are recent contributions to the study of 
this field. v. A. Demant (ed.), Our Culture (London, 1947), 
includes an article by M. B. Rickett entitled "Work and the 
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Crisis of Our Culture." V. A. Demant wrote Religion and the 
Decline of Capitalism (London, 1952) which gives a partial 
answer to the thesis that Protestantism gave rise to modern 
capitalism. The history of the movement of Christian social-
ism was written by Maurice B. Rickett, From Maurice to 
Temple (London, 1947). One of the very best studies of the 
solution of economic problems through the application of the 
doctrine of Christian vocation is the little volume by J. H. 
Oldham, Life Is Commitment (New York, 1952). Dr. Oldham was 
long a close friend and associate of the late Archbishop 
William Temple. 
4. The Philosophical Concern With Economic Values 
i. Ancient and Medieval Period 
The earliest Greek philosophers were only indirectly 
concerned with economic values. Greek philosophy arose as 
a criticism of Greek religion and mythology, in an attempt 
to make the gods rational. Until the ancient mind was freed 
from the need of practical control over nature and the gods, 
the disinterested love of wisdom could not arise. Ancient 
medicine was a technique handed down as a secret art, guarded 
jealously and surrounded by ritual, 
Thales brought an interest to nature which aimed not 
so much at control as understanding. His attempt to explain 
the variations within nature by one common cause was the 
beginning of the speculative school of the Milesian phys-
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icists. Windelband described their work as follows: 
From such conditions of fermentation [dissatisfaction 
with the Homeric myths and religions] the science of the 
Greeks to which they gave the name philosophy was born. 
The independent reflection of individuals, aided by the 
fluctuations of religious fancy, extended itself from 
the questions of practical life to the knowledge of 
Nature, and there first won that freedom from external 
ends, that limitation of knowledge to itself, which 
constitutes the essence of science. 1 
Whether Socrates is to be viewed as a part of the 
Sophistic rejection of this cosmo~gical speculation of the 
Milesian school in the interests of the "proper study of man-
kind," or whether we see in his work the desire to reject 
the extreme relativism of the Sophist~ for a philosophy of 
man based on the knowledge of man's highest good, depends 
upon whether we view Socrates through Xenophon 1 s eyes or 
Plato's. 
Xenophon's prosaic picture of Socrates emphasized 
his practical wisdom. Nothing was found in his teachings 
which would oppose the Sophists• concern with the technique 
of governing both state and estate. Xenophon contributed to 
early economic literature with his essay, "On the Means of 
Improving the Revenues of the State of Athens."2 He saw 
Socrates as interested in the material prosperity of their 
beloved city. 
lw, Windelband, A History of Philosophy, trans. 
James H. Tufts (2nd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 
[1893) 1901), p. 25. 
2This essay is 
Earl} Economic Thought 
1924 , pp. 31-49. 
included in Arthur Eli Monroe (ed.), 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
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On the other hand, Plato saw Socrates as teaching 
that Wisdom was to be preferred to riches. According to 
Plato's version in the Apology, Socrates said: 
And this activity [his service 
without leisure either to take 
affairs or to care for my own. 
infinite poverty. 1 
to the god] has left me 
any real part in civic 
Instead, I live in 
Socrates refusal to accept money for his teaching is in keep-
ing with his indifference to economic values. His true 
mission and concern is best expressed in this summation of 
his attitude toward the economic realm: 
Good friend, you are a citizen of Athens, the 
greatest of all cities and the most renowned for power 
and learning, and yet you feel no shame at giving your 
mind to money so that you may get as much as possible, 
and to your reputation and to honor; but for insight, 
for the truth, for your soul and how it shall be at its 
best, you do not care nor trouble. 2 
James V. Miller has made a recent study of Plato's 
treatment of economic values, and makes a successful defense 
of Plato against charges of communism and totalitarianism. 
His main theses may be summarized as follows: 
(1) Plato's treatment of the problems of economics 
forms a part of his ethical and political theories. 
(2) The place of wealth in the life of the individual 
must be that of supporting the rule of reason in the 
soul so that justice, courage, wisdom, and temperance 
will be expressed in all actions. 
Plato: 
Cooper 
p. 56. 
lplato Apology 23 (Lane Cooper translation). 
On the Trial and Death of Socrates, trans. Lane 
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1941), 
2Ibid., 29 (p. 64). 
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(3) Wealth has a valid supporting role in the state, 
but must never be considered the primary social value or 
the end of all human activity. 
(4) All the citizens and the metics possess the 
wealth of the society. 
(5) The limitations on the production, ownership, 
and uses of wealth are not designed to subjugate the 
individual, but are designed to further the welfare of 
the individual and the state and to make sure that 
wealth functions properly, nurturing the body and soul 
of man. 1 
Plato gives careful attention to the wise governing 
of the state with a view to each man's doing that for which 
he is best fitted by nature. These native skills are to be 
further developed by education. Perhaps Plato's greatest 
contribution to economic thought is his concept of speciali-
zation, for he believes each man should do only that for 
which he is best suited. 
Ernest Barker calls attention to the "inductive 
habit of mind" and "scientific outlook'' of Aristotle in the 
Politics. 2 Book I of the Politics, as it relates the po-
litical association with the household, deals with economic 
problems at every turn. Even the institution of slavery is 
condoned as necessary in providing the goods of life for the 
free man. The slaves were the machines of the Greek and 
Roman world. Commenting on the improved economy in the 
lJames V. Miller, "An Inquiry into Plato's Treatment 
of Wealth" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston Uni-
versity, 1955), Abstract. 
2Ernest Barker, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1946), p. xxviii. 
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United States through industrial and technological advances, 
the 1922 study book of the Federal Council of Churches 
states: 
A bulletin of the Smithsonian Institution contains 
this startling information: "To accomplish the work 
done annually in the United States, or at least the 
equivalent in such kind as men could perform, would 
require the labor of three billion hard-working slaves. 
The use of power gives to each man, woman, and child 
in this country the service equivalent to fifty 
servants." 1 
Aristotle viewed the proper management of the house-
hold as management for the good of all. According to him 
"the goodness of the slave is a matter of his relation to 
his master." 2 The Greek viewed economic welfare as depend-
ent upon the degree to which men governed their households 
or polis with reason. 
St. Augustine advanced the idea that economic well-
being depended upon the degree to which a city is faithful 
to God. He could argue, for instance, that Rome fell not 
through neglect of the Roman deities (for did not previous 
periods of Roman history witness similar neglect), but that 
the fall was the result of unfaithfulness to the Christian 
God. 
At most points it is impossible to separate philos-
ophy from economics in these early periods. Even during the 
lKirby Page, F. Ernest Johnson, et al., Christianity 
and Economic Problems (New York: Association Press, 1924), 
p. 56. 
2Politics, I, xiii, 12 (Barker translation). 
"other worldly," medieval centuries, there was still lively 
speculation by st. Thomas and others concerning interest, 
private property, and the relationship between economic 
practice and ethics. Most Roman Catholic thought goes back 
to these writings of st. Thomas Aquinas for its direction 
today, as will be seen in the dependence of Maritain upon 
Thomistic principles in his own writings. 
ii. Economic Interest During the 
Rise of Modern Philosophy 
Perhaps the real stimulus to the quickening of 
economic thought was caused by the development of commercial 
classes at the end of the Middle Ages. This growth of trade 
and money economy took place as a practical necessity, in 
spite of the lack of official sanction by the Church. As 
will be seen, Aquinas' prohibition of interest taking (usury) 
was based on a non-monetary concept of economics. His work 
(d. 1274) marks the close of the period when the Church 
succeeded in keeping its absolute checks upon the rise of 
commercial and money power. 
The emergence of the merchant classes coincides 
approximately with a surge of utopian literature which has 
very definite economic suggestions. These writers include 
Raymond Lully (d. 1315); John Wycliffe (1320-1384), who pro-
tested against the system of papal taxation and declared 
"Peter's pence" was charity and could be withheld in cases 
of national need; John Huss (1370-1415), who criticized the 
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corruption of the Church and the selling of indulgences; 
Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), who succeeded in proving the 
Donation of Constantine to be a forgery, and thus destroyed 
the key document giving temporal power to the Pope; Machia-
velli, who analyzed the economic foundations for military 
power in The Prince (1513); and, of course, Sir Thomas More 
and Campanella. 
The differences in Christian thought between the 
work of Aquinas in the 13th century and Calvin in the 16th 
century are indicative of the triumph of the economic vir-
tues. Thomas Mun in 1621 wrote one of the first of many 
subsequent studies of the importance of the East Indian 
trade for England's whole economy. This work, A Discourse 
on Trade, from England unto the East Indies, was followed by 
Mun's England's Treasure by Forraign [sic] Trade. Francis 
Bacon followed his Novum Organum (1620), which became the 
stimulus to the inductive method eventually adopted by eco-
nomics, with an essay ''Of Plantations" in 1624. 1 The dream 
of his The New Atlantis is that of a society geared to 
science as a means to human happiness and economic well-
being. 
Hugo Grotius in his On the Law of War and Peace 
(1625) gave a natural law basis for the organization of 
lReprinted in Alexander Brown, Genesis of the United 
States (Boston, 1891), pp. 799-802. 
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governments. His defense of the freedom of the seas was a 
necessary premise for the growth of a healthy world trade. 
The ethics and social philosophy of Thomas Hobbes expressed 
in The Leviathan (1651) are rife with implications for po-
litical economy, which had undoubted influence on the work 
of the classical economists in the next century. James 
Harrington's Oceana (1656) was a protest against large land-
holdings, which he thought should be limited by law, for he 
held to the concept that property, especially land, is the 
basic determiner of power. 
As in ethics, so in economic thought, the work of 
Hobbes furnished a watershed for subsequent thought. Where-
as Harrington feared power in the hands of any man or group 
for any length of time, Hobbes gave a philosophical defense 
of the British absolute monarchy. Later men like Richard 
Cumberland (d. 1718), a Cambridge Platonist, denied the 
egoism explicit in Hobbes's et~ics, and most British idealism 
upheld the social nature of man. 
Baruch Spinoza in his Ethics (1677), published in 
the year of his death, attempted to give the egoism of Hobbes 
a more thorough psychological and philosophical setting. 
According to Spinoza, each man seeks to preserve the law of 
his own nature and thus all action is motivated by self-
interest. Since Spinoza finds no metaphysical basis for any 
ultimate individuality, it is easily apparent that his egoism 
is not ultimate and final like Hobbes's. Spinoza in his 
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social and political writings shows a concern for democracy 
and religious freedom, Although a man may be materially 
coerced, his spirit is never sUbject to any pressure. He 
believes that reason is the ultimate guide for life and 
favors the control of human action by reason rather than 
passion. 
In 1662 Sir William Petty published in London A Trea-
tise of Taxes and Contributions, the first of a number of 
significant economic studies,l Before the end of the seven-
teenth century Sir Josiah Child had also published A New 
Discourse of Trade (London, 1693). These works, with their 
facts of tons shipped, began the literature which eventually 
supplied the statistics for the raw material of a mathe-
matical approach to economics. However, at this stage the 
science of economics was still in its philosophical infancy; 
indeed, the very name was as yet unknown. 
John Locke (1632-1704) had perhaps the widest in-
fluence upon economics of any philosopher of his century. 
His concern was practical and social, and except for his 
epistemological interests, most of his writings were attempts 
to underscore the freedom of the individual. Unlike Hobbes 
he believes that the social compact results not from fear 
of anarchy but from the need for an organized society, Hence, 
the ruler derives his power from those he governs. The role 
lsee also Charles Henry Hull, The Economic Writings 
of Sir William Petty, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1899), 
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of property is forcibly recognized by Locke and the respect 
for property rights by law is one of the keystones in Locke's 
writings, 
A recent Christian philosopher, George F. Thomas, 
has stressed that Locke's plea for property rights did not 
intend, however, to justify the absolute right which later 
developed in laissez-faire economics of the Manchester 
School in England and the "Gospel of Wealth" in America. 
At the end of the seventeenth century, the new 
middle class found their most effective spokesman in 
John Locke. His theory of property was a turning point 
in Christian thinking on the subject, The right of 
private property, he maintained, rests upon the law of 
nature. Every person has a natural right to that with 
which he mixes his labor, This right belonged to men 
before they established civil government. Indeed, the 
purpose of government was to protect the right to life, 
liberty and property. Locke gualified this natural 
right of property in two ways [italics mine]: a man 
could appropriate only as much land as he could use, and 
only where "there was still enough and as good left" for 
others (John Locke, Second Treatise on Civil Government, 
Ch. V, pp. 30, 32). For Locke assumed that the indi-
vidual would be a responsible member of the community 
and would not assert his property rights in such a way 
as to injure others. However, by stressing the origin 
of property rights in natural law and by conceiving the 
state as an instrument for the protection of these 
rights, Locke prepared the way for the modern theory 
that property rights are absolute. 1 
Thomas goes on to say that this concept of property 
void of any social responsibilities, although held by many 
Christians in the nineteenth century, stands in contra-
diction to the New Testament spirit and the main stream of 
lGeorge F. Thomas, Christian Ethics and Moral 
Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), 
p. 310. 
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the social teachings of the Church. "There are scarcely any 
outstanding social thinkers in our time who would defend it. nl 
Even Locke's successor in the growth of British em-
piricism was not without contributions to the work of phi-
losophy in economics, a science as yet unborn. Young George 
Berkeley in Ireland was to write in 1721 An Essay Towards 
Preventing the Ruine [sic] of Great Britain. In Dublin, 
.between 1735 and 1737, he published The Querist in three 
parts. Part I, The Irish Confederation, was later included 
in the Irish Political Economy edited by John Mitchell in 
Dublin in 1847. Another part of The Querist was a series of 
Queries Relating to a National Bank, printed in 1737. James 
Harvey in 1872 published a study, Bishop Berkeley on Money, 
which reprinted these essays. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau contributed an article on "Eco-
nomie Poli tique" to the famous Encyclopedia (Paris, 1755), 
Vol. V, p. 260. Rousseau's concern is with the protection 
of the freedom of individual action, and this has impli-
cations for economic action as well. Ernest Cassirer corn-
menta on this article, saying: 
At this point Rousseau's protest begins and his will 
to reform is incited to action. The social contract--he 
now replies vigorously to Hobbes--is nothing in itself; 
it is absurd and unreasonable if, instead of uniting in-
wardly the individual wills, it compels them to unite by 
the use of external physical coercive measures. Such a 
bond is actually unstable and ethically worthless. For 
authority has moral value only when the individual is 
libid., p. 311. 
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not simply subject to it but subjects himself to it. 1 
This attitude cuts across all those organic philosophies 
that would regulate the economy of a nation by authority 
from the state. 
iii. The Philosophical Influence 
on the Rise of Classical Economics 
Today there seems to be a growing appreciation of 
the contribution of David Hume to the rise of economics, for 
his association with Adam Smith is well known. Eugene 
Rotwein bas recently edited David Hume, Writings on Economics. 2 
This work on philosopher Hume by an economist was recently 
reviewed by a British philosopher, T. E. Jessop, who says: 
The entire Introduction [Rotwein's] is a solid 
piece of work. I cannot be sure whether it is in-
tended for students of economics or of philosophy, 
perhaps in parts for one and in parts for the other, 
which would be no ground for disparagement. 3 
Some twenty-five years before the appearance of Adam 
Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776) there bad appeared David 
Hume's Essays, Moral and Political (1748) and his Political 
Discourses (1752). This latter work has particular economic 
interest. Professor Jessop says: 
lErnest Cassirer, The Pbiloso b of the Enli btenment, 
trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove Princeton 
University Press, 1951), p. 260. 
2Eugene Rotwein (ed.), David Hume, Writings on 
Economics (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1956). 
3T. E. Jessop, Review of David Hume, Writings on 
Economics, ed. by Eugene Rotwein, Philosophy, XXXII, 180. 
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Besides their intrinsic worth, the Political Discourses 
have the biographical interest of being one of the chief 
grounds of Hume's quick and extraordinary fame in France. 
In his autobiography he mentions it with restraint as 
''the only work of mine that was successful on the first 
appearance: it was well received at home and abroad." 
The first person to discuss it was surely Adam Smith, 
for he read a paper on "Some of David Hume's Essays on 
Commerce" to the Literary Society of Glasgow as early as 
January 1752, the very month of publication. 1 
This work of Hume was a part of the flowering of the 
literature which dealt with the idea of money and the purpose 
of trade in a nation. The roots for this literature are as 
early as 1360 when a French clergyman by the name of Nicole 
Oresme composed in Latin a treatise On the First Invention 
of Money. Oresme not only summarized the best thought of the 
Scholastics on the role of money (Aristotle had seen its use 
solely to equalize goods and labor), but also "shows unmis-
takable beginnings of the secular, detached point of view 
which was later to transform economic discussion.'' 2 
In 1613 an Italian writer, Antonio Serra, while in 
prison on a charge of coining, wrote and published A Brief 
Treatise on the Causes which make Gold ::md Silver abound in 
Kingdoms where there are no Mines. Professor L. H. Haney 
calls attention to Serra as the first to develop the doctrine 
known as mercantilism, which maintained that the chief end 
libid. 
2John Kills In~ram and William A. Scott, A History 
of Political Economy, (2nd ed. rev.; London: A. and c. Black, 
Ltd., [1888) 1915), p. 80. 
of the state was to build up money and control precious 
metals. Trade was thus viewed for the sole purpose of 
acquiring money, not goods. 1 Therefore, they enjoined 
foreign trade. In England the chief mercantilist of the 
eighteenth century was Sir James Steuart whose An Enquiry to 
the Principles of Political Oeconomy [sic] appeared in Lon-
don in 1767 in two volumes. 
The French Physiocrats (1756-1778) also were vigorous 
writers at this time and laid the foundations for economics 
as a science. Professor Charles Gide says: 
The age of forerunners is past. Quesnay and his dis-
ciples must be considered the real founders of the 
science •••• But for the death of Quesnay in 1774--two 
years before the publication of the Wealth of Nations--
Smith would have dedicated his masterpiece to him. 2 
Another of the Physiocrats, M. Turgot, a friend of Adam 
Smith, published his Reflexions sur la formation et la 
distribution des richesses in 1769-70, while l'Abbe de 
Condillac published his study of the problem of trade in Le 
Commerce et le gouvernement in Amsterdam in 1776. The Physio-
crats viewed all economics as centering around landed prop-
erty, saw value produced solely from the agricultural prod-
ucts, favored a limitation of the function of the state, and 
discouraged foreign trade as a necessary evil. To them mer-
lLewis Henry Haney, History of Economic Thought 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), p. 106. 
2charles Gide and Charles Rist, A History of 
Economic Doctrines, trans. R. Richards (2nd ed. rev.~ 
London: George G. Harrap and Co., Ltd., [1915] 1948;, 
p. 23. 
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chants were interlopers who pretended to increase the value 
of a commodity, but actually did not. 
Paradoxically, the Physiocrats in their theories of 
direct taxation on land and free trade helped to prepare the 
way for many of the doctrines of Adam Smith. 
Another influence upon Adam Smith was Francis Hutch-
eson under whom he studied philosophy at the University of 
Glasgow and later succeeded in the Chair of Moral Philosophy 
at the same institution. 
The divisions of the subject are almost identical with 
those given by Hutcheson, and many of Smith's best-known 
theories can be traced in the System of Moral Philosophy 
published by Hutcheson in 1775, but which we know was 
written long before. Hutcheson laid great stress upon 
the supreme importance of division of labour, and his 
views on such questions as the origin and variations in 
the value of money and the possibility of corn or labour 
affording a stable standard of value closely resembles 
those of the Wealth of Nations. 1 
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A final influence upon Adam Smith was no less a person 
than Bernard de Mandeville whose poem of 1704 was revised in 
1714 as The Fable of the Bees; or, Private Vices Public 
Benefits. Smith adopted the idea of selfish motives but 
doesn't call them vices. 
Another of the classical economists whose reputation 
has grown in recent years is Jeremy Bentham. 2 Bentham's 
recently of Werner Stark's 
vols. (London: 
Royal Economic 
Defense of Usury (2nd ed., 1790), his Manual on Political 
Economy, and his Proposal of New Paper Currency (with govern-
ment monopoly) are major links in forging a commercial econ-
omy. One of the most interesting problems he dealt with was 
the problem of making money. At that time most minted money 
was fraudulently below its stated value. He outlined in 
detail how a stable coin and paper money could be established 
by the government taking over the sole right to coin money. 
Three more important writers in classical economic 
thought are inescapable in any study of the period. These 
are pessimistic notes in contrast to the optimism of 
Hutcheson, Hume and Smith. In 1798 the Reverend Thomas 
Robert Malthus published An Essay on the Principle of Popu-
lation. Its effect was instantaneous and sensational. 
Harold A. Boner has recently written an evaluation of the 
effects of Parson Malthus after 150 years. 1 The problems of 
over-population have continued to haunt the minds of world 
leaders in our own day, although the recent Economic Essays 
of the British economist, R. F. Harrod, concerns itself with 
various schemes for stimulating the birth rate by some means 
of state subsidies which would allow a combination of mother-
hood and career by provisions for domestic service, espe-
1Harold A. Boner{ Hungry Generations (New York: 
King's Crown Press, 1955J. 
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cially for mothers of large families.l Robert Heilboner 
says, ''Indeed, the famous description of economics as the 
'dismal science' was the result of the English author Carlyle 
reading Malthus' works."2 
In 1803 a French disciple of Adam Smith, J. B. Say, 
published his two volume, Traite d'Economie Politique in 
Paris. In this work he succeeds in the task of overcoming in 
France the land-bias of the Physiocrats. Not in agriculture 
alone, but everywhere "nature is forced to work along with 
man. "3 
Between 1776, the date of the appearance of the 
Wealth of Nations, and the year 1803, when Say's treatise 
appeared, the Industrial Revolution had taken place •••• 
While Smith gives agriculture the premier place, Say 
accords the laurels to manufacturing. 4 
His cure for economic ills is increased production. 
The third thinker who followed Adam Smith was David 
Ricardo whose essay, The High Price of Bullion, appeared in 
1817. Smith was a philosophy professor and private tutor; 
Say was a factory manager and owner; Ricardo was a successful 
lR. F. Harrod, Economic Essays (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1952). 
2Robert L. Heilboner, The Story of the Economists 
(New York: Birk and Co., Inc., 1954), p. 7. This is a 
pamphlet condensation of Heilboner's Worldly Philosophers 
published in 1953. 
3J. B. Say, Traite, 1st ed., p. 39 (quoted in Gide 
and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, p. 124). 
4Gide and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, 
p. 127. 
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banker, reared a Jew. His theories concerning the depreci-
ation of value of bank notes occasioned by the great panic 
of February 26, 1797 resulted in our present practice of 
keeping bullion in reserve equal to the declared value of 
the paper money. The policies of the Bank of England were 
largely influenced by Ricardo's theories. However, he is 
probably more widely known for his theories of rent and wages. 
The latter bas been called "The Iron Law of Wages." His 
study of a glutted labor market causes him to be classed with 
Malthus as a pessimist in economic theory. 
We have traced up to now three of the influences 
upon Adam Smith (Hutcheson, the Pbysiocrats, and Hume) and 
have examined his three successors (Say, Malthus, and 
Ricardo). There is one more aspect of Adam Smith's system 
which is of major interest for students of philosophy. This 
is his relationship to German thought. 
iv. German Philosophy and 
Economic Thought 
The metaphysical German mind looks with disfavor 
upon much that passes for American and British philosophy. 
The most harsh of German critics have suggested that the 
history of philosophy would be none the poorer if the whole 
of British philosophy could be erased. 
Yet there have been serious attempts to trace the 
relationship of Adam Smith to Kant and German philosophy. 
Professor Lewis H. Haney says, 
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When it comes to placing him [Smith] in one or the 
other of the two great groups, Idealists and Materialists, 
the matter is not so simple. A well-known German econ-
omist, for instance, declares Adam Smith and Kant to be 
at one. According to this view, he might be rated as an 
idealist. 1 
This German economist was Onchen who wrote Adam Smith and 
Immanuel Kant (1887). 
On the whole, however, where English thought favored 
laissez faire and foreign trade, German thinkers advocated 
mercantilism and nationalism. Haney lists among German 
thinkers who led the rebellion against English political 
economy the following: Sartorius (1806), Jakob (1809), 
Rau (1826-1832), and especially Hermann (1832). Nationalism 
rested upon an idealistic and purposive concept of the state 
as an organized whole. Since Germany was largely agricul-
tural, she was more isolated economically than England. 
J. H. Fichte(l794) taught that individuals are not 
isolated atoms but organically interrelated parts of society. 
To more practical effect, in Der gescblossene Handels-
Staat (1800) Fichte held that nations must be essentially 
independent, each supplying its own needs in so far as 
possible. Each nation should control its own economic 
life, and assign to its several "estates" or classes 
their respective functions. Foreign trade seemed to him 
to be apt to upset the internal balance. 2 
Fichte•s Vocation of Man (1800) and his Addresses to the 
German Nation (1808) both have made definite contributions 
lHaney, History of Economic Thought, p. 232. 
2Ibid., p. 405. 
to economic thought. Indeed, it is impossible to conceive 
of the religious rise of the Social Gospel apart from the 
influence upon a whole generation of teachers in America and 
England who were affected by German idealism. 
In this sense Adam Smith might almost be called a 
theologian, for he conceives of the whole of economic law 
as a fulfillment of a natural law. 
In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, moreover, he 
[Smith] makes virtue for its own sake a primary consid-
eration. Though, together with the Physiocrats, Smith 
was instrumental in bringing about a formal separation 
of Political Economy from so-called Moral Philosophy and 
Jurisprudence,--and this was one of his services,--bis 
philosophy and that of his successors has an ethical 
element.* The assumed naturalness of perfect competition 
was the criterion. As a general proposition, if freedom 
to compete were encroached upon, the encroachment would 
be wrong, Their philosophy is in this regard, then, not 
unlike the just-price idea, "natural law" being substi-
tuted for the law of the clergy or state. 1 
Gide remarks that Say and Ricardo, rather than Smith, 
are better examples of the removal of political economy from 
moral or religious purposes. 
Smith bad already tried to approach economic pheno-
mena as a scientist, but there was always something of 
the reformer in his attitude •••• In his [Say's] 
radical separation of politics and economics, in avoiding 
the "practical" leanings of Adam Smith, he bas succeeded 
in giving the science a greater degree of harmony. But 
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it has also acquired a certain frigidity which his less 
gifted successors have mistaken for banality or crudity. 
Rightly or wrongly, the responsibility is ascribed to Say. 2 
libid., p. 234. *Indeed it is not free from tbeo-
logica 1 premises. Cf. Cliffe Leslie's Essay on the "Poli t-
ical Economy of Adam Smith," Fortnightly Review, Nov. 1, 
1870; republished in Essays in Political Economy and Moral 
Philosophy. ' 
2Gide and Rist, A History of Economic Doctrines, p. 126. 
For much of this information that economists today 
have on Adam Smith we are indebted to another Scotsman, 
Dugald Stewart, who succeeded to the Chair of Moral Philos-
ophy at Edinburgh in 1785. His Principles of Moral and 
Political Science in two volumes appeared in 1792, and a 
year later he gave us our first biography of Adam Smith. 
For a long time the only life of Smith we possessed was 
the memoir written by Dugald Stewart, Account of the Life 
and Writings of Adam Smith, and read by him in 1793 before 
the Royal Society of Edinburgh. It appeared in the 
Transactions of the Society for 1794, and was published 
in volume form in 1811 along with other biographies, 
under the title of Biographical Memoirs of Adam Smith, 
William Robertson, and Thomas Reid. 1 
v. The Modification of Classical 
Economics (John Stuart Mill from 
1819-1848) 
After Hume, Smith, Say,and Ricardo came the social-
istic critics of the classical economists. The greatest 
single influence in the nineteenth century upon the joint 
fields of philosophy and political economy was, without 
question, that of John Stuart Mill. His first training in 
this subject was given by his father, James Mill, during their 
walks together. John Fred Bell describes this unique course 
in political economy as follows: 
Mill says that in 1819 his father took him ''through 
a complete course in political economy." Ricardo's book 
("which would never have been published or written but 
for the entreaty and strong encouragement of my father") 
came out in 1817 and this book, together with Adam Smith's 
lrbid., p. 69. 
Wealth of Nations, provided the essentials. On their 
walks the father would expatiate on the subjects of 
political economy. The son would present a written 
account of the materials on the day following the lec-
tures. In this manner the outline and notes were pre-
pared which James Mill used to write his own Elements of 
Political Economy (1821). The book was in large measure 
the work of the son. 1 
The Mill family was intimately connected with the 
East Indian Company. In 1817 was published James Mill's 
History of British India for which young John, then only 
eleven years of age, corrected proof sheets. The fruit of 
this book was the appointment of the elder Mill to an office 
in the East Indian Company, where John later worked under 
his father's direction. 
In 1848 John Stuart Mill's Principles of Political 
Economy was published. Estimates of the abiding value of 
this work are mixed. The older economists tended to rate it 
higher than do more recent economists. Lewis H. Haney, for 
example, in 1911 said: 
If Adam Smith may be called the Father of Political 
Economy, John Stuart Mill was his chief heir in the 
direct line. He it was who, about the middle of the 
last century, combined, restated, and modified the 
teaching of Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo, and so success-
fully that his work has had an effect upon English 
thought second to none. 2 
Contrast this 1953 evaluation by Professor Bell: 
The best known disciple of the classical tradition 
was John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Some prefer to place 
lJohn Fred Bell, A History of Economic Thought 
(New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1953), p. 257. 
2Haney, History of Economic Thought, p. 443. 
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him along with Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo in the front 
ranks of classicism. For many years his Principles was 
the standard textbook. It was a synthesis of the best 
in classical economics, presented in an orderly, scien-
tific arrangement and with an assurance of finality. 
Mill's influence in perpetuating the so-called classical 
tradition can scarcely be overemphasized. It was only 
the criticisms of classical economy in general (notably 
those of the socialists and the historical school), and 
the developments in marginal analysis which came toward 
the end of the century, that reduced Mill's work to 
negligible importance. In the modern economic analysis, 
classical economics is no more or no less important 
than if John Stuart Mill had not written his Principles 
of Political Economy in 1848. 1 
One cannot help but notice that after making this statement 
Professor Bell goes on to devote some twenty-three pages to 
Mill, suggesting an interest in one who was able to bridge 
the fields of philosophy and economics as late as the middle 
of the nineteenth century. 
Mill's later revisions of his Principles show an 
increasing modification of classical economics in the 
direction of socialism. His drift toward socialism was not 
as extensive as that of others, including his own wife, 
although according to the testimony of his step-daughter, 
Miss Helen Taylor, he was projecting another work on 
socialism at the time of his death. 2 
lBell, A History of Economic Thought, p. 256. 
2cf. John Stuart Mill Socialism (New York: The 
Humboldt Publishing Co., 1891). The title page of this 
volume bears these words from his Autobiography, chap. vii: 
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"The social problem of the future we consider to be, how to 
unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common 
ownership in raw material of the globe and an equal parti-
cipation of all in the benefits of combined labor.'' 
Ruth Borchard has recently written: 
It was mostly through the Political Economy that 
he acquired his large following among the working class. 
Sidney Webb paid tribute to it when he called Mill's 
~itical Economy one of the main causes of socialism 
in England. He was referring to the third and final 
edition of the book, which had been radically altered 
from the first. 1 
There is some question as to Mill's own misgivings 
about the application of socialism beyond its mere statement 
as an ideal. Miss Borchard, who has traced especially the 
influence of Mrs. Harriet Taylor upon Mill, says: 
Harriet had suddenly insisted upon this change 
[in the direction of socialism] in the whole orientation 
of the book--to Mill's utter surprise. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
His and Harriet's professed aim was "the union of the 
greatest liberty of action for the individual with common 
ownership"; but there was no explanation how this could 
be achieved while at the flame time avoiding "the tyranny 
of society over the individual which most socialistic 
systems are supposed to involve." Harriet's answer to 
this was education. But Mill himself repeatedly queried 
this solution as too facile and asked her who was to 
educate the educators. 2 
The interest in political economy which James Mill 
stimulated during his peripatetic course of instruction soon 
had more result than just that of his son's Principles of 
1848. A whole literature in this subject developed between 
James Mill's Elements of 1821 and John Stuart Mill's 
Principles of 1848. 
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1Ruth Borchard, John Stuart Mill, the Man (London: C. A. 
Watts, 1957), p. 100. 
2Ibid., pp. 100-101. 
Here in America Daniel Raymond published Thoughts 
on Political Economy (Baltimore, 1820}, and three years 
later a two volume study called The Elements of Political 
Economy. J. R. McCullock's The Principles of Political 
Economy appeared in Edinburgh in 1825. Harriet Martineau's 
nine volume Illustrations of Political Economy was printed 
in London in 1835. Other works included Senior, An Outline 
of the Science of Political Economy (London, 1836); 
Francis Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy (New York, 
1837}; and William Atkinson, Principles of Political Economy 
(New York, 1843). An earlier work of John Stuart Mill was 
his Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy 
(London, 1844). Thomas DeQuincy wrote The Logic of Political 
Economy which was published in Edinburgh in 1844. Patrick 
James Stirling's The Philosophy of Trade appeared also in 
Edinburgh two years later in 1846, and M. de Sismondi's 
Political Economy and the Philosophy of Government was pub-
lished in London in 1847. 
Many of these authors were acquainted with the Mill 
family, 1 and John Stuart Mill visited the home of Say while 
in France as a young boy. 
Two recent treatments of this period of thought are 
found in Max Beer, Early British Economics (London, 1938) 
lThe close friendship of Ricardo for James Mill has 
already been noted in the quotation from John Stuart Mill's 
Autobiography on page 47 of this chapter in a quotation from 
John Fred Bell. 
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and his larger A History of British Socialism, 2 vols. (New 
York, 1921). 
vi. From Mill's Principles (1848) 
to Sidgwick's Principles (1883) 
Mill's brilliant synthesis of the classical econ-
omists, even with its modification in the direction of social-
ism, did not halt the attacks upon their conclusions. The 
effects of these criticisms brought political science into 
disrepute. 
Shortly after the opening of the second half of 
the nineteenth century ••• the classical economics 
sank into some disrepute because of the narrowness and 
dogmatism which developed in it: it failed to adjust 
itself to times and places ••.• Socialist attacks 
with their illogical appeals to the classical theory 
of value stimulated economic thought to a deeper 
analysis: Marx• theory needed recognition of the part 
played by utility for its refutation. Finally psycho-
physics showed the way. 1 
Charles Devas mentions in 1883 this decline in 
respect for political economics and lists as one who is 
revolting against the bleak conclusions of Ricardo and 
Malthus the book by Dillon, The Dismal Science. 
The French economist, Sismondi, had been the first 
to react against Smith and Ricardo, and in 1819 he published 
his Nouveaux Principes d'Economie Politique which was revised 
in 1827. Later his Etudes sur ~'Economie Politigue (1837-
1838) reiterated these same criticisms. Sismondi was a 
' 
reformer and emphasized state r~gulation of wealth in the 
lHaney, History of Econpmic Thought, p. 446. 
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interest of consumption.l 
Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer emphasized the 
evolution of various forms of life and society. Spencer's 
Social Statics (1850) gave further impetus to the histor-
ical approach. 
Richard Jones (1790-1855) through the publication 
of his Literary Remains in 1859 influenced this revolt as he 
attacked Ricardo's theory of rent. Walter Bagehot (1826-
1877) was the first to define economics as a study of the 
science of business in the exchange of commodities. His 
appreciation for the idea of evolution in the social sciences 
is seen in his Physics and Politics (1872). 
Two notable Irish economists in this movement of 
reform of classical economics were Cliffe Leslie (1825-1882) 
and John Kells Ingram(l824-1907). Leslie in his Essays in 
lcf. a footnote in the dissertation by Bourne, which 
draws the following parallels between Brunner and Sismondi: 
"Professor Earl Hamilton has called my attention to the 
similarity between Brunner and Sismondi at many points. In 
Sismondi's Nouveaux Princi es de l'Economie oliti ue (Paris: 
Chez Delaunay, 1 1 , e stressed the moral nature of politi-
cal economy. Distribution was viewed as the central problem 
as a matter of justice. He believed that capital was concen-
trating in the hands of a few and that two classes were 
emerging, rich and poor. He held to an underconsumption 
theory of economic crises, as does Brunner, and believed the 
solution was to pay workers more. He opposed the depopu-
lation of farms and objected to rapid progress in industry 
if it meant hardship. Again he is close to Brunner. He 
condemned competition, but rejected communism." Bourne, 
"The Economic Concepts of Emil Brunner and Reinhold 
Niebuhr,'' p. 69. 
53 
Moral and Political Philosophy (1879) attacked the arbi-
trarily deductive method of the earlier school and goes so 
far as to deny any validity to economic "laws." Ingram's 
A History of Political Economy (London, 1878) was first 
published as an article on that subject in the Encyclopedia 
Britannica. It has been a standard text for years. Ingram 
stressed the hopeful growth in moral progress and the role 
of social institutions in the field of distribution. Hence, 
each thinker in his own way denies the premises of the 
"dismal science" and either moves in the direction of a 
limited skepticism (Leslie) or a cautious optimism (Ingram). 
Another author who was critical of Mill's idea of 
"equality" and any suggestion of socialism was James Fitz-
gerald Stephen, who wrote Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Lon-
don, 1873). There is a good deal of economic philosophy in 
chapter v where he takes exception to all ideas of equality. 
He wrote this just after he returned to England from having 
served the British government in India. 
William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), like Sismondi, 
emphasized consumption as the end of economic activity. He 
helped develop the marginal utility theory and helped to 
show the value of statistics for economics. To him mathe-
matics is what makes economics a science. 
vii. From Sidgwick to the Present 
It is possible to treat all the previous authors not 
as economists in the strictly modern sense, but as political 
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economists or philosophers. This was, indeed, the way most 
of them thought of their work, and from the days of David 
Hume to Henry Sidgwick no one thought it strange that a 
philosopher should jump from a study of consciousness to 
commerce. 
No better indication of this is needed than noting 
the late date in both England and American when combined 
chairs of Moral and Political Philosophy, or Moral and 
Political Economy were held. 
In the latter years of the nineteenth century sepa-
rate chairs for political economy were established, many of 
them by the very philosophers who had held the unified chairs 
but who now saw the need for greater specialization. Thus 
Edward Caird was happy to turn over his lectures on political 
economy to William Smart in 1896. Smart thereby became the 
first full time professor of that subject at Edinburgh. Just 
as psychology emerged from mental philosophy, so economics 
arose from moral and political philosophy. As if to identify 
this new independence, the term "economics" was slowly 
adopted to replace "political economy." 
One of the last thinkers to write in both fields was 
Henry Sidgwick who in 1883 published his first edition of T.le 
Principles of Political Economy. He tells how he grew 
interested in this subject in the "Introduction'' to the 
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second edition of this book in 1887. 1 Sidgwick, too, sought 
to reform classical economics in the direction of a more 
humane science. He quotes Emerson's poem on his title page 
of his Principles: 
'Tis the day of the chattel 
Web to weave and corn to grind: 
Things are in the saddle, 
And they ride mankind. 
His desire is to transform the bleak picture given by the 
dismal science into an enlightened utilitarianism. 
His later book, The Elements of Politics (1891), 
continues this interest in political economy, for he devotes 
three of its chapters to ''Property,'' ''Contract,'' and "Inher-
itance." 
Sidgwick contributed several of the articles in 
Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Economy (London, 1899); 
these were all retained in the 1926 revision edited by 
Henry Higgs. 
The work of Darwin and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) 
may be viewed in some ways as an attempt to adapt classical 
economics to an evolutionary naturalism--the scheme of the 
survival of the fittest. Spencer's Social Statics (1850) 
1
"After J. s. Mill's book, from which I first learned 
politt.cal economy, and on which the present work must be 
primarily founded, I believe I owe most to Jevon's Theory of 
Political Economy, the leading ideas of which have been 
continually in my thought." Henry Sidgwick, The Principles 
of Political Economy (2nd ed., London: Macmillan and Co., 
Ltd., 1887), Preface, p. v. Sidgwick also mentions indebt-
edness to the Cairds and Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Marshall. 
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has already been mentioned as having given impetus to the 
historical approach as a corrective to the rigidity of the 
classical school. But in 1884 Spencer wrote in The Man 
versus the State: "Speaking broadly, every man works that 
he may avoid suffering. Here, remembrance of the pangs of 
hunger prompts him; and there, he is prompted by the sight 
of the slave•driver's lash.''l 
His belief in the law of struggle gives support to 
the spirit of capitalism. Competition is the law of life. 
He writes in one of his typically involved sentences: 
"Though the many who revile competition strangely ignore the 
enormous benefits resulting from it; though they forget that 
most of the appliances and products distinguishing civili-
zation from savagery, and making possible the maintenance of 
a large population on a small area, have been developed by 
the struggle for existence; though they disregard the fact 
that while every man, as producer, suffers from the under-
bidding of competitors, yet, as the consumer, he is immensely 
advantaged by the cheapening of all he has to buy. n2 He adds, 
however: "Let it not be thought, then, that in saying what 
I have said above, I underestimate those vices of our compet-
itive system which thirty years ago, I described and de-
lHerbert Spencer, The 
by Albert Jay Noch (New York: 
1940), p. 58. 
2 Ibid., p. 57. 
Man versus the State, rev. ed. 
D. Appleton and Co., [1884] 
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nounced."l Spencer defends the system as inherently based 
on the law of survival, and sees it slowly evolving to a 
higher scientific social order. 
For a criticism of Spencer from the standpoint of 
personal idealism a philosopher near his own generation, 
Borden Parker Bowne (1847-1910), can be cited. Bowne was a 
severe critic of Spencer and evolutionary naturalism, writing 
in a chapter on ''The Ethics of Society'': 
Society must refuse to be bound by anything but the 
common weal. Whatever conflicts with this, supposed 
natural rights, constitutions, words and verbal exegeses 
of verbal formulas, must be set aside •••• 
The abstractions referred to as causing confusion 
have appeared especially in the field of economics 
[italics mine]. Here the moral foundation and meaning 
of the social structure have been largely overlooked, 
and a single aspect of life has been taken for the 
whole. The production of material wealth has been set 
up as the supreme aim, and an economic man with only 
selfish interests has been invented. 2 
So much for the indictment. What is Bowne's remedy? 
His suggestion lifts him out of the slough of the dismal 
science. 
Happily we are getting beyond this to some extent, 
and are coming to see both its wickedness and its folly. 
Humanity, not material production, is the aim; and any 
cheapening of production secured by a cheapening of 
humanity is unlawful morality, and economically it 
defeats itself in the long run. With this in sight a 
moralizing and humanizing of the conditions of production 
are slowly setting in. 3 
1 Ibid., p. 58. 
2Borden Parker Bowne, The Principles of Ethics 
(New York: American Book Company, 1892), pp. 25d-259. 
3rbid., p. 259. 
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With the growth of idealism in both England and 
America during the last half of the nineteenth century it 
is not surprising to find much of the work in philosophy 
which affects economics coming from men who were idealists. 
J. S. Mill had followed the Benthamite pleasure theory, with 
certain important qualitative modifications, and the outcome 
of his political economy was to enhance the utilitarian 
values for all men. 
In England the criticism of the whole movement of 
empiricism and naturalism was developed from the idealistic 
roots in Cambridge Platonism and the religious heritage 
stimulated by the introduction of Hegelianism. J. H. 
Muirhead has, successfully we think, defended this thesis 
in The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy (London, 
1931). An excellent summary of the rise of neo-Kantian or 
Hegelian philosophy in England is stated by Muirhead to have 
arisen in the sixties of the last century. It had in the 
course of its development three "fairly definitely marked 
phases, represented by groups of men separated in age by 
some ten years." 1 
In the first group of British idealists Muirhead 
includes the pioneering work of J. Hutchison Stirling, whose 
Secret of Hegel, 2 vols. (London, 1865), helped to create 
lJ. H. Muirhead in a "Foreword" to John Stuart 
Mackenzie, ed. by H. Millicent Mackenzie (London: Williams 
and Norgate, Ltd., 1936), p. 5. 
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the first real interest in Hegel in England. Stirling never 
held a teaching position but his interest affected the 
younger generation largely through the works of T. H. Green 
(1836-1882), 1 Edward Caird (1835-1908), 2 William Wallace, and 
R. L. Nettleship. "Their work was the liberation from the 
narrowness of the philosophies, whether empirical or intu-
itional, which from the time of Coleridge and in spite of 
his powerful advocacy of another had held the field in this 
country." 3 
The second group Muirhead mentions includes F. H. 
Bradley (1846-1924) and Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923). 
Muirhead says of them: ''On the basis of their work [the 
first group], but with striking differences of spirit, the 
two younger writers, Bradley and Bosanquet, went boldly for-
ward to the development of Hegelianism on fresh lines. While 
holding to the same tradition, they sought particularly to 
do more justice to feeling and immediate experience than had 
lsee T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of 
Political Obligation, ed. A. D. Lindsay (2nd ed.; New 
York: Oxford University Press, [1895] 1942). Section N 
is especially pertinent, "The Right of the State in Regard 
to Property,'' pp. 211-229. 
2Edward Caird was the philosophy teacher of William 
Temple. It is inescapable that the Platonic idealism woven 
into Temple's thinking through his beloved teacher remained 
with him even when in later years he erupted into open 
rebellion against Hegelian excesses, especially in its 
epistemology. cr. Edward Caird, The Social PhilosophS and 
Religion of Comte (Glasgow: J. Maclehose and Sons, 1 93). 
3Muirhead, "Foreword," p. 6. 
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hitherto been done."l F. H. Bradley, who has been called 
the "Zeno of Modern Philosophy," did not deal as directly 
with social problems as did Bosanquet, but his dialectical 
logic affected economic thinking as it pointed always to the 
wider whole for an understanding of any given phenomenon. 
Perhaps Bradley's chief value was his relentless attack upon 
hedonistic ethics and the pleasure theory which had grown 
out of Bentham and Spencer. 
Bernard Bosanquet was more interested in social 
philosophy. His logic emphasizes the reality of the whole 
structure of being. The individual is unique in his own 
individuality yet finds his meaning in the total will. In 
1895 Bosanquet edited a volume called Aspects of the Social 
Problem which showed the transitional state of social 
thought at that time. Some of the essays in the volume, 
particularly by certain clergymen, seem very contemptuous of 
the economic problems of the masses, advocating, for example, 
that poor people simply exercise a little more restraint and 
not marry so young so that their financial problems would 
be lessened. 
One of Bosanquet•s own contributions to this volume 
is an ar-ticle, "The Principle of Private Property," in which 
he says, "It [private property] rests on the principle that 
the inward or moral life cannot be a unity unless the outward 
libid., p. 6. 
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life--the dealing with things--is also a unity, 
Private property, then, is the unity of life in its external 
or rna terial form. "1 Bosanquet is a Hegelian, however, when 
he limits private property, 
Clearly the principle does not demand unlimited 
acquisition of wealth, if we disregard the definite 
mischief which may attach to the means adopted to limit 
it. It rests on the conception of a common good, to 
be realised in individuals as moral and rational agents, 
and subject to this, all means for its realisation must 
be treated as a practical problem, turning on what is 
best in the long run for society as the external 
embodiment of character. 2 
His Companion to Plato's Republic (London, 1895) further 
shows a recognition of the need of a rational social order. 
The writings of Sir Leslie Stephens about this same 
period also have significance for economic philosophy. His 
Essays on Free Thinking and Plain Speaking (1873) is critical 
of Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees," as are what is Materi-
alism? (1886) and the essay, "The Morality of Competition," 
in Social Rights and Duties, 2 vols. (New York, 1896). 
L. T. Hobhouse, one of the last of the British 
Hegelians (1864-1929), was one whose writings attempted to 
relate philosophy to economic and social problems, In-
fluenced, perhaps, most by Herbert Spencer, he wrote in turn 
Mind in Evolution, Morals in Evolution, and Development and 
Purpose. A. E. Avey has said, ''Hobhouse described the high-
lBernard Bosanquet (ed.), Aspects of the Social 
Problem (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1895), pp. 310-311. 
2Ibid., pp. 311-312. 
est type of society as one which is based on co-operation 
not on competition. "1 William A. Orton calls him "one of 
the wisest of modern liberals."2 Orton particularly approves 
Hobhouse•s basic premises that social and political insti-
tutions are not ends in themselves but that persons are ends. 
In 1893 Hobhouse wrote The Labour Movement (3rd ed.; 
London, 1912) which is a pioneer work in this field. His 
chief contribution to economic thought is found in The Ele-
ments of Social Justice which he wrote in 1922. 
The subject of this book is the social application 
of the ethical principles explained by the writer in 
The Rational Good .••• To promote unity of aim among 
men of' good will and lay a basis of co-operation between 
those attacking different sides of the social problem 
is a practical problem of the highest importance. 3 
Especially the chapters on "Property and Economic Organi-
zation," "Social and Personal Factors in Wealth," and 
''Industrial Organization" are of significance in this work. 
Hobhouse also contributed the article entitled "The His-
torical Evolution of Property'' to the volume edited by 
Bishop Charles Gore, Property: Its Duties and Rights, (New 
York, 1922). 
Muirhead says there is yet a third group which 
stemmed from the Hegelian movement in England. He describes 
lAvey, Handbook in the History of Philosophy, p. 233. 
2william A. Orton, The Liberal Tradition (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1945), pp. 32-33. 
3Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, The Elements of Social 
Justice (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1922), p. iii. 
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it thus: 
A third group ••• found themselves faced with a 
problem rather of reconciling what they still felt to 
be true in the older idealism with what seemed of 
essential value in the so-called "new realism" than of 
carrying further with the "absolutism" with which it 
had become identified with Bradley. It was not so much 
that they were willing to desert what they learned from 
Kant and Hegel as that they sought to bring it more into 
line with the still older tradition at the head of which 
stood the great name of Plato. 1 
This group would include the names of A. S. Pringle-
Pattison, W. R. Sorley, J. S. Mackenzie, and, in some inter-
pretations, Archbishop William Temple also. 
W. Tudor Jones, considering the influence of Sorley 
and Mackenzie on the social vision of the clergymen of South 
Wales, wrote: 
The late Professor W. R. Sorley, who had himself 
succeeded A. S. Pringle-Pattison, was at this time 
leaving Cardiff for Aberdeen, and Mackenzie was elected 
his successor. Sorley had exercised a great influence 
on many of the theological students of my denomination, 
and Mackenzie was destined to follow in his footsteps. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
A new note was heard in the pulpits of the 
Non-Conformist bodies in South Wales. Sir Henry Jones, 
his [Mackenzies]old teacher and friend, had been doing 
the same kind of work at the University College of North 
Wales, in Bangor, and it was not too much to say that 
Sorley, Jones and Mackenzie between them changed the 
matter of the preaching at the time. The solution of 
the fundamental problems of religion were shown by them 
to rest not on any ready-made credal basis, but on 
lMuirhead, ''Foreword," p. 7. This seems to be 
an apt description of William Temple's idealism, at least 
in intent. He moves away, especially in his Gifford 
Lectures, from the Hegelian idealism of Bradley and 
Bosanquet to a modification in the direction of what he 
calls ''dialectical realism.'' 
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scientific, historical, and philosophical grounds.l 
The work of J. S. Mackenzie is exceptional. His 
wife says: 
It was due mainly to his efforts that the Chair of 
Economics was finally established. He helped to found 
a lectureship in this subject, which later developed 
into a full professorial Chair. Town planning also 
interested him, and he worked for some tine on a local 
committee formed to promote this work. He was often 
invited to give lectures and addresses in the mining 
villages of Glamorgan. 2 
Mackenzie's chief contributions to economic philos-
ophy are found in the section "Respect for Property" in his 
Manual of Ethics where he argues that respect for property 
is but tracing the commandment against theft back to the 
commandment against murder, for one can kill another person 
by damage to his character or by depriving him of his goods. 
He follows Hegel's admonition, "Be a person, and respect 
others as persons" (Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts, Sec. 36). 
Mackenzie says: 
The development of a man's personality involves the 
use of instruments; and the right of an individual to 
appropriate these involves the obligation on the part of 
all others of leaving his possession of them inviolate. 
The commandment to respect property ought, however, to be 
regarded as involving something more than the mere 
condemnation of theft. It involves regard for our own 
property as well as others. It condemns, therefore, any 
lw. Tudor Jones, "The Life and Work of Professor 
J. S. Mackenzie," John Stuart Mackenzie, ed. H. Millicent 
Mackenzie (London: Williams and Norgate, Ltd., 1936), 
pp. 158-159, 162. 
2Ibid., pp. 79-80. Another example of a philosopher 
encouraging the specialization of economic science. 
neglect or abuse of the instruments which an individual 
has appropriated. It may also be regarded as condemning 
all forms of idleness that implies living on the work 
of others, and so appropriating what belongs to them. 1 
Mackenzie also wrote An Introduction to Social Philo-
sophy (2nd ed.; Glasgow, 1895). He later published a volume 
called Outlines of Social Philosophy in which he also has a 
section on "Property." 
How far their ownership should extend is a difficult 
question. • • • In general, it may be affirmed that 
the absolute ownershi of an thin is exce tional 
italics mine , whether it be of raw material, of 
capital, or of labour. The State at least usually 
reserves some right of control over the possessions 
of its citizens. 2 
The section on "Justice in Exchange" in this same volume is 
also very good. In it Mackenzie seems to favor a limited 
capitalism, yet he recognizes that "sometimes the things of 
greatest value are very little in demand."3 
Sir Henry Jones, Mackenzie's teacher in philosophy 
at the University of Glasgow, discusses economic problems in 
the last part of The Principles of Citizenship (1919). 
Jones applied to the problem of private property his principle 
that the raison d'etre of the State is the securing of the 
best life for its citizens. He thought that the chief error 
is to regard economic goods as ends in themselves. Apart 
1John S. Mackenzie, A Manual of Ethics (5th ed.; 
London: W. B. Cleve, [1893] 1914), p. 362. 
2J. S. Mackenzie, Outlines of Social Philosophy 
(New York: The Macmillan Co.,· 1918), p. 117. 
3 Ibid., p. 162. 
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from the satisfaction of human wants and needs there is no 
value in anything. He tried to keep the polarity of both 
private and social values in property. 
Wealth is a social product, and where society bas 
developed into a State, the State is responsible for it. 
It is responsible for it,--for its production, distri-
bution, security, and use--even as it is responsible for 
the life and liberty of its citizens. 1 
Still there is no such thing as public property. 
Property is always personal, and is rightly called 
private •••• In insisting on the social conditions of 
wealth, I do not in the least deny its privacy, But 
privacy of property is only one of its aspects. 2 
Similarly David G. Ritchie, Professor of Logic and 
Metaphysics at the University of St. Andrews, develops the 
themes of "Equality" and "The Right of Property" in his 
Natural Rights (1894). Later his Studies in Political and 
Social Ethics (1920) explores equality as a part of what be 
prefers to call "a Social Ideal." 
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The work of Bertrand Russell has already been cited, 
C. E. M. Joad has touched on these problems in his numerous 
ethical writings and especially in his Introduction to 
Modern Political Theory (Oxford, 1924). 
Finally, there should be mentioned the work of 
Hastings Rashdall and A. D. Lindsay, both of whom contri-
buted articles to Bishop Gore's volume on Property, Rashdall 
lHenry Jones, The Princi les of Citizensbi 
(London: Macmillan and 
2Ibid., p. 164. 
wrote on "The Philosophical Theory of Property," pp. 35-68; 
Lindsay's article is entitled "The Principle of Private 
Property," pp. 69-86. Rashdall's article is particularly 
valuable for its treatment of the role of property in the 
history of philosophy, while Lindsay tries to discuss the 
attacks upon private property from various communistic and 
socialistic positions. Lindsay recognizes that private 
property tends to greater efficiency when properly used, but 
be believes that we still must attempt to combine efficiency 
with control in the interests of society as a whole. 
viii. Continental Philosophers 
of the Present Interested in 
Economic Values 
The late Ernst Cassirer of Germany concerned himself 
with the role of the State in man's political and economic 
affairs. Rejecting the analyses of Oswald Spengler Der 
~tergang des Abendlandes (Muncben, 1918) and Martin 
Heidegger's Sein und Zeit, Vol. I, (1927), Cassirer believes 
that the future of man's attempts to solve his growing socio-
economic problems lies neither in the pessimism of Spengler 
nor the individualism of Heidegger's existentialism. Rather, 
Cassirer says, these approaches share in common the fact of 
having ''given up all hopes of an active share in the con-
struction or reconstruction of man's cultural life. Such 
philosophy renounces its own fundamental theoretical and 
ethical ideals. It can be used, then, as a pliable instru-
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ment in the hands of political leaders.••1 
Man will never escape his myth-making nature, 
Cassirer believes, but he can find and use creative myths 
instead of destructive or clannish ones. He would have man 
recognize the myths that have grown up around economic insti-
tutions with the view of redirecting these in more socially 
creative paths. Cassirer seeks to balance the reason of the 
Enlightenment with the romanticism of the German idealists. 
Aesthetic values may yet be the key to a solution of our 
economic excesses. 
In Italy the work of Benedetto Croce probably over-
shadows that of any recent philosopher in that nation. There 
has been a recent study made by Henry S. Harris, "The Social 
Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile.'' 2 Also the political leader 
and Catholic philosopher Amintore Fanfani has published his 
doctoral thesis, Catholicism, Protestantism, and Capitalism 
(New York, [1935] 1955). But the writings of Croce, from 
his Philosophy of the Practical: Economics and Ethics 
(trans. Douglas Ainslie, 1913) to his Conduct of Life (trans. 
Arthur Livingston, 1924), have exhibited what can be worked 
out by a thoroughgoing metaphysician and idealist who recog-
nizes the sphere of the practical as one part of human 
1Ernst Cassirer, The Myth of the State (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1946), p. 293. 
2Henry S. Harris, "The Social Philosophy 9f Giovanni 
Gentile" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Illinois, 1954). 
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existence. In Croce's system Spirit is " a universal im-
manent 'mind' of which the individual 'mind' is only a 
phase." 1 Croce distinguishes three spheres for the Spirit's 
activity: 
the intuitional 
aesthetics 
imagination 
image 
the logical 
logic 
thought 
concept 
the practical 
ethics 
will 
action 
"The word •practical' relates to the whole sphere of action, 
including its ethical bearing; the word •economics' relates 
to action apart from ethical concerns, but with reference to 
material or physical welfare or volition of the race at 
large."2 Croce wishes to sever economics from the ethical, 
for at no time could an instance of economic action be 
immoral per se,--it is an act of will for some desirable end. 
At most it will be amoral. 
Croce urges that we retain our individuality and 
freedom in our economic life. In such delightful essays in 
the Conduct of Life as "Attachment to Things," where he 
denounces both the ascetics who fear attachment to things 
(lest they lose them), and romanticists who so identify them-
selves with the objects of their love that the loss of them 
drives them to suicide, Croce calls for the recognition of 
possession and loss as an inevitable cycle of life. When 
lBenedetto Croce, The Conduct of Life, trans. Arthur 
Livingston (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924), 
translator's ''Preface'', p. x. 
2 Ibid., p. xi. 
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we die we yield our place to another and thus the Spirit 
continues. 
Even his little essay on ''Nefarious Professions" 
shows his firm grasp on the economic aspects of all of life. 
When money from such ill-gotten gains is bequeathed to some 
worth cause Croce urges that "money has no smell . . • only 
a fantastic mind could think it has; but a concentration of 
economic power, innocent as such and in the case in point 
moreover devoted to a worthy purpose [is without taint].'' 1 
Croce views the clashing and striving interests of 
all peoples as being ultimately woven together in the plan 
and through the efforts of the Absolute Spirit for the high-
est good of the race. 
ix. American Philosophers and 
Economic Values. 
American philosophy has long had a tradition of 
concern with social and economic values. Even though 
Professor John Dewey believed he had to call for a 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1920} geared to more 
practical ends, the fact remains that even before the days 
of New England Transcendentalism there were serious efforts 
to deal with socio-economic problems. 
Herbert Schneider makes this clear in A History of 
American Philosophy where he claims that early economic 
1rbid., pp. 82-83. 
71 
interest was an assertion against the older Calvinism in New 
England Congregationalism. On the Continent Peter Ramus 
(1515-1586), who lost his life in the Massacre of St. 
Bartholomew, used his humanism and Platonism to attack 
Aristotelian scholasticism and "at the Synod of Nimes (1572) 
attained some notoriety for defending a pure congregational 
theory of the church against the Presbyterians, who denounced 
his theory as too 'democratic' and hence 'completely absurd 
and pernicious' . "1 
However, in Jonathan Edwards this combination of 
Platonism and pietism ran into opposition with the New 
England Congregationalists' "Halfway Covenant," and his 
attempts to impose a stricter clergy on the people met with 
signal failure. Thus American thought began with a strong 
lay movement in its religion, and the business and practical 
concerns have had a hold here they could never have had in 
Europe. 
Ralph Barton Perry's Puritanism and Democracy (New 
York, 1944) is an excellent study of Puritan social philos-
ophy, and Joseph Dorfman's The Economic Mind in American 
Civilization (New York, 1946) is the best source for a 
specific tracing of Puritan economic ethics and the secular 
aspects of Puritan ''corporations.'' Schneider praises the 
latter work as an essential link in American philosophy: 
lHerbert Schneider, A History of American Philosophy 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 5. 
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Dorfman's work, particularly, should be regarded 
as an essential part of an adequate history of American 
philosophy. It is already clear that political, eco-
nomic, theological, and metaphysical principles have been 
more closely associated in American thought than we have 
hitherto been led to suppose. 1 
One needs only to mention the writings of John 
Woolman and Benjamin Franklin to indicate the impact of 
economic ideas upon early American philosophy. The Transcen-
dentalists' utopian schemes such as Brooks Farm and Henry David 
Thoreau's Walden with its antislavery feelings served to 
continue this concern with economic philosophy. 
Harvard. Professor Franc is Bowen's work, American 
Political Economy (1856), was the first written by an 
academic philosopher in America on this subject. His 
emphasis upon trade and a protecting tariff was but an 
expansion, though, of the ideas of the Irish immigrant, 
Mathew Carey, who a half century earlier was editing in 
Philadelphia The American Museum and maintaining that 
progress leads through differentiation towards industrial-
ization. Carey's economic teachings became the ideology 
upon which the Whig program of public works and economic 
expansion were founded. 
The first systematic treatise on political economy 
in America was written by a Baltimore lawyer, Daniel Raymond, 
who published Thoughts on Political Economy (Baltimore, 1820). 
This was quickly followed by Thomas Cooper's Lectures on 
1 Ibid. ' p. X. 
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Political Economy (1826). Cooper, who was a friend of Thomas 
Jefferson, argued against foreign trade. Cooper was heavily 
influenced by the agrarian economics of the Physiocrat, Jean 
Baptiste Say. These views were vigorously attacked by a 
German exile, Friedrich List, who came to America to live 
with Mathew Carey. The year following the appearance of 
Cooper's book List published his Outlines of American Economy 
(1827) in which he reflected the theories of Alexander 
Hamilton and Whig nationalism. 
Philosophically the most interesting of these early 
works was that of Raymond, Thoughts on Political Economy, 
which ran to four editions. "Raymond's work provides an 
excellent philosophical orientation for what has recently 
come to be known as •welfare economics.• For Raymond 
political economy is a moral science in the fullest sense. "1 
The Hegelian influence, with its sense of unity amid 
diversity, came to American just at the time she was seeking 
some healing philosophy--in the days of discord during the 
Civil War. Schneider discovers the Hegelian influences in 
the democratic and social teachings of \'ialt Whitman. Whit-
man's optimistic idealism is a part of the faith of the 
American economic spirit in contrast to the "dismal science" 
interpreters on the Continent. 2 
lrbid., p. 107. 
2cf. Hiram Weld, ''Personalism in Walt Whitman'' 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Philosophy, 
Boston University, 1945). 
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The St. Louis Hegelians (Henry Brokmeyer, Denton J. 
Snider, and William Torrey Harris) saw philosophy primarily 
as a means of applying speculative wisdom to practical 
problems, as their own careers illustrate. They launched 
the Journal of Speculative Philosophy (1867) at a time When 
the ravages of divisions caused by the Civil War were needing 
to be breached. Brolaneyer wrote, "That this new phase of 
national life demands to be digested and comprehended, is 
a further occasion for the cultivation of the Speculative.••l 
Denton J. Snider interpreted the American economic 
scene in terms of the Hegelian dialectic. After surveying 
the dialectic of institutions--family (thesis), individual 
(antithesis), and state (synthesis)--he calls the economic 
dialectic a tension between individual ownership (thesis), 
civic communism (antithesis), and state socialism or 
"monocratic democracy" synthesis. 2 Brokmeyer entered 
Missouri politics and Harris attempted to apply these 
Hegelian principles to education.3 This interest in the 
dialectic approach is but a continuation of the older American 
lJournal of Speculative Philosophy, I (1867), p. 1. 
2cf. Denton J. Snider, Social Institutions 
(St. Louis, 1901). 
3cf. Frances B. Harmon, The Social Philosophy of the 
St. Louis Hegelians (New York, 1943). 
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controversy found in the Jefferson-Hamilton disputes, 1 
The controversy over evolution called forth a large 
American literature in defense of the economic ideas of 
various interpreters of Darwin. William Graham Sumner and 
Lester Ward are discussed critically in Richard Hofstadter, 
Social Darwinism (Philadelphia, 1944). Herbert Spencer's 
influence on Sumner is seen in his extreme "root, hog, or 
die" philosophy which was severely challenged by both William 
James and Lester Ward. Ward's philosophy was what he called 
"meliorism, the science of the improvement or amelioration 
of the human or social state."2 Ward wrote numerous essays 
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which dealt with economic problems. These have been collected 
and published in Glimpses of the Cosmos (New York, 1913-1918),3 
lsince sufficient treatment has been given to the 
work of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson on socio-economic 
theories in standard published works, mention need be made 
here only of the study by Joseph Leon Blau, Social Theories 
of Jacksonian Democracy (New York, 1947). E. G. Bourne has 
attempted to consider the economic theories of Alexander 
Hamilton in his article "Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, VIII (1894), 328. Fuller 
treatments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are 
found in Sidney Sherwood( Tendencies in American Economic 
Thou~ht (Baltimore, 1897J, and Ernest Teilhac, Pioneers of 
Amercan Economic Thou ht in the Nineteenth Centur (New York, 
19 • Francis Lieber published his Essays on Property and 
Labor (New York, 1841), and the Columbia University Quarterly, 
XXX (1938), 159-190; 267-293, carried articles by Joseph Dorf-
man and Rexford Guy Tugwell. 
2cf. Lester F. Ward, The Psychic Factors of 
Civilization (1893), quoted by Schneider, A History of 
American Philosophy, p, 385. 
3charles Ellwood, The Story of Social Philoso~hy 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938). Individual c apters 
devoted to both Sumner and Ward are found in this work. 
James Mark Baldwin also wrote a work on Political 
Economy from which Schneider traces a close relationship to 
Josiah Royce. 
James Mark Baldwin, of Princeton and John Hopkins 
universities • • • had been educated in idealist social 
philosophy, but following the new animal psychology and 
evolutionary science he became an enthusiastic genetic 
scientist, who without abandoning his philosophical 
idealism, managed to give it a Darwinian dress. 1 
He saw both economic and military war as expressions 
of man's struggle for survival, yet he predicted that man's 
intelligence draws him into ever increasing social wholes. 
"Mind is a social product.•• 2 
A more enduring contribution to social thought was 
made, Schneider believes, by the Chicago school with such 
men as John Dewey, James H. Tufts, George H. Mead, and 
Thorstein Veblen. Veblen's analysis of "conspicuous con-
sumption" and the role of the leisure class is well known 
in both economic and philosophical circles.3 A later chapter 
in this dissertation will treat John Dewey's economic thought. 
George H. Mead's writings are full of concern for an ade-
quate analysis of man's social and economic problems. In an 
1schneider, A History of American Philosophy, p. 387. 
2Ibid., p. 389. 
3cf. Marcus R. Tool, "The Philosophy of Nee-Insti-
tutionalism: Veblen, Dewey, and Ayres" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Department of Economics, University of 
Colorado, 1953). 
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early journal article he says: 
Nowhere is this point of view more needed than in 
the struggles which fill our industrial and commercial 
life. The individual is treated as if he were quite 
separable from his environment; and still more is the 
environment conceived as if it were quite independent 
of the individual •••• If the community educated and 
housed its members properly, and protected machinery, 
food, market, and thoroughfares adequately, the problems 
at present vexing the industrial world would largely 
disappear. 1 
Schneider's comment on the above is, "This passage, which 
might have been written by any one of the 'Chicago School,' 
formulates admirably the way in which genetic psychology 
became a philosophical orientation for social action and 
2 
reform. 
James H. Tufts, a colleague of John Dewey, was the 
member of this school most interested in the economic 
aspects of philosophy. Tufts wrote the four chapters in 
their Ethics (1908) which deal specifically with this 
problem: chapter xii, "The Ethics of Economic Life," 
chapter xxiii, "Some Principles in the Economic Order," 
and chapters xxiv and xxv, both called "Unsettled Problems 
in the Economic Order." In 1917 Tufts published The Real 
Business of Living (New York) in which he devoted Part II, 
consisting of approximately 150 pages, to "Problems of 
laeorge H. Mead, "The Philosophical Basis of Ethics," 
International Journal of Ethics, XVIII (1908), p. 319. 
Quoted by Schneider, A History of American Philosophy, p. 393. 
2schneider, A History of American Philosophy, p. 393. 
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Cooperation and Right in Business." In addition to these 
two works there are many journal articles which add to his 
achievement in this field.l 
Two of the great monistic idealists showed interests 
in the economic realm. Much has been written on Josiah 
Royce's concept of "the Blessed Community," but large parts 
of both The Philosophy of Loyalty (1908) and his Gifford 
Lectures are concerned with the relation of the individual 
to his economic groups. William Ernest Hocking has given 
even greater attention to the application of absolute 
idealism to the practical arena. In both Man and the state 
(New Haven, 1926) and The Lasting Elements of Individualism 
(New Haven, 1937) Hocking analyzes the problems of economic 
ethics. Mention should be made here of Mary Whiton Calkins, 
a disciple of Royce. Her first book was a little study on 
Sharing the Profits (Boston, 1888), and her ethics text, 
The Good Man and the Good (1929) gives specific attention to 
the economic order. 
Among the pluralistic idealists there is abundant 
material by Francis J. McConnell. He contributed an article 
called "Economic Incentives" to the volume edited by Kirby 
Page, The New Economic Order (1930). He also wrote an 
lAlso by Tufts: The Ethics of Cooperation 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1918); Recent Ethics in 
Its Broader Relations (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1930); America's Social Morality (New York: He~y 
Holt and Co., 1933); and 11 The Community and Economic Groups," 
Phil. Rev., 28 (1919), pp. 589-597. 
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article on "Bowne and the Social Questions" in a volume 
edited by Emil Carl Wilm called Studies in Philosophy and 
Theology (1922). Perhaps the idealistic personalist most 
active in this field has been J. A. Leighton. His main 
works include The Individual and the Social Order (New York, 
1926) and Social Philosophies in Conflict (New York, 1937). 
Attention will be given to the work of George 
Raymond Geiger as we proceed to work with John Dewey. 
Mention should be made here of his article, "The Place of 
Values in Economics," Journal of Philosophy, June 19,1930. 
This article was also used in a chapter called "Economics 
and Ethics" in his major study, The Philosophy of Henry 
George (Grand Forks, N.D., 1931). More recently Geiger has 
written Philosophy and the Social Order (Boston, 1947). 
Recent literature on socialism and communism by 
American philosophers includes Corliss Lamont, You Might 
Like Socialism (New York, 1939) and Max Eastman, The Last 
Stand of Dialectical Materialism; a Study of Sidney Hook's 
Marxism (New York, 1934). Among Hook's own writings are 
Toward the Understanding of Karl Marx (New York, 1933) and 
From Hegel to Marx (New York, 1936). Mention will be made 
in the Dewey chapter of the volume edited by Hook called 
The Meaning of Marx (New York, 1934). David Franklin Cox 
in 1953 wrote on "Karl Marx's Philosophy of Value." 1 
lDavid Franklin Cox, "Karl Marx's Philosophy of 
Value." (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of 
Philosophy, Boston University, 1953). 
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Bishop Bromley G. Oxnam says the best philosophical work on 
communism is Theodore B. H. Brameld, A Philosophical Approach 
to Communism (Chicago, 1933). 
Finally, there is a plethora of material beginning 
to come from the pens of our philosophers as they delib-
erately attempt to work out a philosophy of business and 
labor: E. E. Ericksen, Professor of Philosophy at the 
University of Utah, in 1937 published Social Ethics in which 
he devoted three chapters to the ethics of business; 
Rupert C. Lodge, Philosophy of Business (Chicago, 1945); 
and Stuart Chase (ed.), The Social Responsibilities of 
Management (New York, 1950). Rupert C. Lodge later wrote 
Applied Philosophy (London, 1951). 
Philosophy, too long limited to the traditional 
problems of epistemology and metaphysics, is thus seen 
returning to the social and economic concerns of Plato and 
Aristotle. A similar movement is under way among the 
economists themselves as they seek to broaden the scope of 
their subject and examine the philosophical foundations for 
what they are seeking to do. 
The first step toward a reorientation of economic 
science must be a return to philosophy. Whitehead's 
statement that "if science is not to degenerate into 
a medley of ad hoc hypotheses, it must become philo-
sophical and must enter upon a thorough criticism of 
its own foundations" applies with equal force to 
economics. Indeed, economic theory has to overcome its 
philosophical isolation and bring its fundamental 
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presuppositions in line with the present state of 
philosophical insight. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The ultimate answer to these problems belongs to 
philosophy and political science; economic science 
will be quite helpless in dealing with these issues as 
long as it refuses to abandon its present philosophical 
isolation. 1 
lKarl William Kapp, The Social Costs of Private 
Enter~rise (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), 
pp. 2 4-245; 261. The quotation from Alfred North Whitehead 
is from Science and the Modern World, p. 25. 
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CHAPTER III 
BASIC DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONS 
1. ''Economic Order'' 
The aim of this chapter will be to examine some of 
the basic definitions which will be needed as we move into 
the main body of this dissertation. Since this present 
dissertation makes no pretense of being a study in economics, 
the term "economic order" will be used to suggest more than 
an em pi rica 1 study of economic life. The word "order" indi-
cates some structure to economic life and its institutions. 
As the term "economic order" will be used here it indicates 
the broad web of ideas within the work of each of the four 
philosophers relative to the structuring of economic life 
for the attainment of certain philosophically determined 
goals in the interest of total human values. None of the 
four philosophers attempts to work out in detail the specific 
requirements of an economic system. Their ideas pertinent 
to "economic order" have been suggestive rather than 
exhaustive. 
One would expect philosophy to be vitally concerned 
with the analysis of economic institutions and the struc-
turing of economic activity into an organized pattern. 
Economics has much of illogic, but ~he philosopher's job is 
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to discover the pattern that actually does exist and suggest 
ways of reordering this area of life to achieve the highest 
values. 
This belief that sufficient unity exists in economic 
life to render it definable in terms of an economic order 
is maintained by the late Albert c. Knudson. 
The economic order • • • has to do with the needs of 
the body. It is the process or processes by which the 
material goods of life are produced, distributed, and 
consumed. These processes operate to a considerable 
extent through labor unions but they are not limited to 
such groups. They embrace mankind as a whole. They 
include not only the fields of "industry" and "commerce" 
but all other activities concerned with "wealth," that 
is, with material objects which minister to human wants. 
These economic activities have in the course of human 
history undergone numerous changes and increased greatly 
in complexity. But through all these changes they have 
had a common purpose, that of satisfying human needs • 
• • • They have thus had more or less of unity, and 
hence may properly be spoken of as an economic order. 1 
2. "Mora 1 Idea 1" 
Philosophy that is worthy of the name is more than 
an analytical activity. If the life of reason is to measure 
up to a synoptic view it must reassemble the parts and bring 
them together in a coherent whole. "The mora 1 idea 1" is a 
term suggesting that there is always an idea of perfection 
at work in any creative mind. How does economic life as it 
actually is (any given economic order) measure up to an ideal 
of what ought to be (any hypothesis that might improve or 
illumine what already is)? The terms "economics" and 
lAlbert C. Knudson, The Principles of Christian 
Ethics (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1943), p. 262. 
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"ethics" indicate the polarity of any philosophical view of 
economic life. Yet, the "moral ideal" is broader than mere 
ethics. It is an integrated total life philosophy with 
social goals for a more perfect society. 
3. The Problem of Relations 
i. Physical Science, Social Science and Economics 
It is evident that this matter of definition cannot 
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go further without raising some questions concerning the 
relation of economics to the other sciences, to ethics, and 
to social philosophy. As was seen in the quotation which 
closed chapter ii, some economists are beginning to question 
the isolation of their subject from philosophy and political 
thought. The rise of the term "political economy" can be 
traced from the days of the Physiocrats and Adam Smith to 
the criticisms of this broader term by those who wished to 
isolate their field from all reference to the ethical and 
the social. This was the status of economic thought in this 
country during the first thirty years of the twentieth century. 
With the Great Depression serious misgivings concerning this 
view arose, however, along with a greater interest in the 
problem of business cycles. John Maynard Keynes advocated 
political action and government spending to reduce and 
control these periods of business fluctuation, yet he believed 
that he still acted solely as an economist. A school of 
Welfare Economics developed which questioned the exchange 
theory of value as the only criteria for economic thought. 
This specific problem is a part of the wider problem 
of the social sciences in relation to natural or physical 
sciences. Envious of the success of the latter, the social 
sciences strove to approach their achievements by appro-
priating their methods. 
Professor George A. Lundberg has examined this 
problem as sociology, especially, relates to the physical 
sciences. 
The advance of physical science has been chiefly 
dependent upon the refinement of technique and tools of 
observation and description. In the social sciences 
this technique and these tools are as yet largely 
undeveloped. There is a large number of treatises on 
"Principles" of Sociology, Economics, and Political 
Science. As hypotheses, these Principies are of 
unquestionable value. But the hope for the advancement 
of the social sciences lies in the testing of these 
principles by a patient accumulation of observed data, 
scientifically classified and generalized. 1 
Reflecting upon the relation of economics to the 
other social sciences and the unresolved plight of the 
entire family of social sciences, Julius W. Friend and James 
Feibleman, writing in 1936, believe that the social sciences 
have erred in two directions. They cannot use the same 
methods as the physical sciences, as they have a different 
subject matter. At the same time they stand without foun-
dation, as they have cut themselves loose from metaphysics 
lGeorge A. Lundberg, Social Research (2nd ed., 
New York: Longmans, Green and Co., [1929] 1942), p. vii. 
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and the older frame of reference in which the humanities, 
the forerunners of the social sciences, once stood. 
Friend and Feibleman see in economics the test case 
for social science. No other social science has commanded 
such respect or claimed to be so impersonal (e.g. objective) 
as economics. Yet these two authors show how economics has 
remained very disturbed concerning problems whose only 
solution would seem to lie within a philosophy of value. 
Economics, though in the same logical predicament 
as sociology, is more ambitious and more confident of 
its accomplishments. We may safely say that economics 
is the most elaborate and the most highly developed in 
its abstractions of all the social sciences. If this be 
admitted, then the shortcomings of economics should 
furnish a test case of the limited validity and 
fallaciousness of social science in general. 1 
Economics stands within the framework of the other 
social sciences and the history of their gradual break-away 
from their philosophical mother has been the history of 
adolescence. Our day is seeing a gradual reappraisal of this 
separation and a reunion of efforts for the greater benefit 
of mankind. 
ii. Oeconomy, Political Economy, and 
Economics 
The term "economics" etymologically means the art 
of household management, for the governing of the household 
1Julius W. 
Community (London: 
p. 111. 
Friend and James Feibleman, The Unlimited 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1936), 
87 
was the origin of the Greek term.l But long before the 
Greeks there were accepted ways of according property 
rights, acquiring wealth, and regulating the handling of 
slaves and women. 
The church showed concern during the middle ages 
in its theories concerning usury and the just price. The 
rise of economic theory among the rising commercial and 
middle classes replaced feudal concepts. Economics was born 
in our modern sense of the word. 
"Political Economy" is the term used to describe the 
art of managing a state or nation so as to best improve its 
position of wealth. So far as I can determine the term was 
first used in a book title by Sir James Steuart in London in 
1767 upon the publication of An Enquiry into the Principles 
of Political Oeconomy in two volumes. This was the term 
used to describe this field until the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Perhaps the first author to use the new 
term, "economics," was W. B. Hodgson whose book appeared in 
the third edition in London in 1870. The title of this book 
was On the Importance of Economic Science. 
"Economics" in the most recent use of the term claims 
to be the science of the exchange (production, distribution, 
and consumption) of scarce commodities. It is interesting 
lsee the discussion by Professor Ingram on Xenophon's 
Oeconomicus and the origins of the term in Ingram and Scott, 
A History of Political Economy, p. 13. 
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to notice that the economists themselves have reacted against 
the attempt to narrow their subject down to a purely mathe-
matical science. In 1948 Paul A. Samuelson, Professor of 
Economics of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
wryly prodded this movement by saying: "We must also guard 
against the muddled thinking that results from an attempt to 
reduce all values to ergs or energy units, as retired 
engineers (viz., the short-lived technocrat movement of the 
early 1930's) are so often tempted to do." 1 Yet the 
majority of economists would probably agree with Professor 
Samuelson when he clearly sets the "Boundaries and Limits 
to Economics." He divides the area of economics into four 
main tasks: (1) What commodities shall be produced and in 
what quantities? (2) How shall they be produced? (3) For 
whom are they to be produced? He then suggests that some 
economists would list a fourth fundamental question, (4) When 
are goods to be consumed? 
His interpretation of economics as a science is 
clearly seen in this typical statement: 
When we come to the third question of the desirable 
distribution of wealth and income between individuals, 
we leave the field of science altogether. De gustibus 
non est disputandum: There is no disputing (scientif-
ically!) tastes; and the same goes for ethics. We must 
leave the definition of social ends to the philosopher, 
the theologian, the statesman, and to public opinion. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
Economics cannot try to cover every fact of the 
universe. It must take certain things for granted as 
1Paul A. 
ysis (New York: 
Samuelson, Economics, An Introductory Anal-
McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1948), p. 14. 
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having been established by workers in other scientific 
fields. The institutional framework of society, the 
tastes of individuals, the ends for which they strive--
all these must be taken as being given. These and more. 
For the character and quantity of resources and the 
technological facts about their combinations and 
productive transformations must also be taken as given. 
Economics can, then, pursue the positive task of 
describing, analyzing, and understanding the processes 
that take place within the above framework. More than 
that, economics--and here it becomes "political economy"--
can hope to appraise, and improve, the efficiency with 
which a community mobilizes its means to achieve the 
prescribed ends. 1 
Professor Frank H. Knight2 and Professor Clarence 
Edwin Ayres3 would hardly agree with this divorcing of an 
examination of ends from the science of economics. 
Marcus R. Tool in his recent dissertation has argued that 
such nee-institutionalists as Veblen, Dewey, and Ayres 
believe that economics does have the right and duty to 
examine values, though not with a view to establishing their 
conclusions as something absolute for all time. 
For the purposes of this brief discussion in defi-
nition we will conclude that "economics" is one of the social 
sciences which attempts by the use of the scientific method 
libid., 14-15. 
2Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Comletition (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1935). This vo ume has been re-
printed in 1951 by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., in London. 
Also by Knight, Freedom and Reform· Essa s in Economics and 
Social Philosophy New York: Harper an Brot ers, 1 7 • 
3clarence Edwin Ayres, The Problem of Economic Order 
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1938); The Industrial 
Economy (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952). 
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of observation and analysis to predict and control human 
activities in the exchange of scarce goods. 
iii. Ethics, Social Ethics, Social 
Philosophy, and Christian Ethics 
Immediately we come to one of the premises which 
seem to underlie the thinking of each of our four philos-
ophers. Economic goods and material well-being are not the 
sole end of man. Even Dewey, for all his pleading that 
material technology is the clue to cultural and spiritual 
advancement, would never claim that it was the sole value to 
be acquired. In Reconstruction in Philosophy he dreams of 
an age when 
making a living economically speaking, will be one with 
making a life that is worth living •••• 
Poetry, art, religion are precious things •••• We 
are weak today in ideal matters because intelligence is 
divorced from aspiration •••• When philosophy shall 
have co-operated with the course of events and made clear 
and coherent the meaning of the daily detail, science 
and emotion will interpenetrate, practice and imagination 
will embrace. Poetry and religious feeling will be the 
unforced flowers of·life. 1 
Thus, there is "a moral ideal" which is the other 
pole in this dichotomy of economics and philosophy, material 
goods and human desires and needs, physical things and 
spiritual values. 
Philosophy relates to economics by giving it a 
critical method, a refinement of terms, and the synthesizing 
lJohn Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: 
The New American Library, (1920] 1950), p. 164. 
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of this one science into the whole body of sciences and 
human knowledge. Functioning as an analytical discipline 
one of the chief values of philosophy for economics is just 
this task of examining terms and concepts in order to clarify 
and purify its linguistic tools. Clarence Edwin Ayres 
repeatedly admits his indebtedness to John Dewey as con-
tributing to his concept of method for economics. B. M. 
Anderson, Jr., in an earlier dissertation read by John Dewey, 
says in a section discussing "The Philosophical and Psycho-
logical Presuppositions of Economic Theory": 
The connection between social philosophy, on the one 
hand, and metaphysics and epistemology on the other hand, 
has always been a close one,--a fact not always ade-
quately recognized by writers in the field of social 
science, in economics, especially •••• But in the 
social sciences, where the procedure is so largely 
deductive, and where the data are often principles 
of mind, whose truth is assumed as a starting point for 
investigation, and especially in economic theory, such 
an attitude cannot be justified. For philosophical 
assumptions will creep in, and the scientist has no 
option about~ The only thing he can do is to be 
critical, and know definitely what philosophical assump-
tions he is making,--and most or-Qur treatises on 
economic theory do not bear evidence that this critical 
work has been done. 1 
Ethics is the descriptive and normative study of 
human conduct going beyond the "is" to the "ought" for it is 
a part of the axiological and normative divisions of philos-
ophy. Its goal is the study of "the good man." 
lB. M. Anderson, Jr., Social Value A Study in 
Economic Theory Critical and Constructive tBoston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1911), p. 59. Originally submitted as a Ph.D. 
dissertation at Columbia University and read by John Dewey. 
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Christian ethics is usually thought to be a special 
branch of ethics as it seeks to apply New Testament prin-
ciples and the teachings of the Christian Church to matters 
of moral decision. The nee-orthodox theologians have tried 
to draw a stricter line between Christian and philosophical 
ethics claiming that only a theological ethic can truly 
start from a solid core of absolute commands. George F. 
Thomas has stated the case for Christian ethics in Christian 
Ethics and Moral Philosophy and Peter A. Bertocci has 
countered with the claims of philosophical ethics in an ex-
change of unpublished papers prepared for the American Theo-
logical Society. 1 
Social ethics is the application of ethical principles 
to man's group life. Its goal is "the good society" and 
therefore it has an interest in every aspect of man that can 
be studied in a social context. 
Although it is difficult at times to draw a line 
between social ethics and social philosophy it is possible 
to think of them as extensions of one another. Social ethics 
is aimed at the study of ''the good society''; social philos-
ophy analyzes the whole concept of the relationship between 
lpeter A. Bertocci, "Does Ethics Need a Theological 
Basis?" Mimeographed paper prepared for the American Theo-
logical Society, 16 pages. Cf. George F. Thomas, "Christian 
and Philosophical Ethics," Mimeographed paper prepared for 
the American Theological Society, 14 pages. The paper by 
Thomas was later incorporated into his textbook, Christian 
Ethics and Moral Philosophy. 
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the individual and society. As I would conceive them, social 
philosophy would embrace social ethics and the social sci-
ences as it studies the ordering of man's group experience 
for the purpose of achieving ideal ends. 
One indication of the uncertainty that exists re-
garding the proper role of social philosophy is found in the 
absence of any really adequate textbooks for its study. 
Perhaps no other field of inquiry finds it so difficult to 
discover any book f~und acceptable to any significant 
number of instructors in a discipline. 
Another indication of this confusion is suggested by 
the practice of librarians--the books in social philosophy 
will be found classified (even in such standard libraries as 
the Widener Memorial Library at Harvard University) under 
such scattered fields as sociology, economics, government, 
and even history.l 
Perhaps the best overall treatments of the whole 
scope of the relation of philosophy to economics are found 
in the writings of Henry Sidgwick and George Raymond Geiger. 
Sidgwick's articles in Palgrave•s Dictionary of Political 
Economy are among the cleare.st statements of the whole scope 
lFor example, Adam B. Ulam, Philosophical Foundations 
of E~lish Socialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
195l and Ephraim Edward Ericksen, Social Ethics (Garden City, 
New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1937) are both classi-
fied under "Sociology" in the Widener Library. 
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and method of economics.l A much fuller treatment by 
Sidgwick is found in his famous Principles of Political 
Economy. 
The chapters in Geiger's The Philosophy of Henry 
George that have outstanding merit are chapter i "The Problem," 
chapter v "George and Socialism," chapter vi "George and 
Herbert Spencer," and chapter ix "Economics and Ethics". 
The thesis that Henry George worked on, and reaffirmed by 
both Geiger and John Dewey in the latter's "Introduction" to 
this volume, is that "economics [is] a branch of ethics".2 
John Dewey says: 
The "science of political economy was to him [George] 
a body of principles to provide the basis of policies to 
be executed, measures to be carried out, not just ideas 
to be intellectually entertained. 3 
Although Dewey cannot accept the natural law concepts im-
plicit in George and classical economics, he wholeheartily 
agrees with George that "economic phenomena, as well as legal 
and political, cannot be understood nor regulated apart from 
moral considerations."4 . . 
George Raymond Geiger notes a trend away from eco-
1Henry Hi~gs (ed.), Pal raves Dictionar of Political 
Economy, 3 vols .• {London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 192 • 
The three articles by Henry Sidgwick are: (1) "Economic 
Science and Economics," Vol. I; (2) "Political Economy, Scope 
and Method," Vol. III; and (3) "Political Economy and 
Ethics," Vol. III. 
2Geiger, The Philosophy of Henry George, p. 517. 
3 Ibid., p. x. 
4Ibid., p. xii. 
nomics as a purely descriptive science, 
In fact, it would almost seem that in the last few years 
there is something of a renaissance in economic theory, 
an almost wistful longing again for "principles" and 
"logic," and, at least among those younger economists 
influenced by pragmatic instrumentalism, there appears 
to be a return to ethics. 1 
Geiger supports this claim by reference to the following 
economists who seem to be restudying the relationship be-
tween economics and ethics: Guy Tugwell, J. M. Clark, A. B. 
Wolfe, S. N. Patten, Irving Fisher, J. A. Hobson, and many 
others. 2 The work of Professor Geiger in chapter ix "Economics 
and Ethics" may be considered the best succinct statement of 
the problems in the relation of economics to philosophy in 
all the literature that has been examined for this disser-
libid., p. 482. 
2some of these are listed by Geiger in a footnote as 
follows: "Economics and Ethics, by Sir J. A. R. Marriott 
(London, Methuen, 1923)--this is a conservative plea for 
the retention of the traditional ethical judgments; ••• 
'Moral Valuations and Economic Laws,' Professor warner 
Fite (Journal of Philoso h Ps cholo and Scientific 
Method, XIV, 1 ; 'Economic Values and Moral Values,' 
Professor R. B. Perry (Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXX, 
445) •••• Some of the older treatments may be found in 
articles such as the following from the International 
Journal of Ethics: 'The Relation between Economics and 
Ethics,' J. S. Mackenzie, Vol. III, April, 1893, pp. 281-308; 
'The Restoration of Economics to Ethics,' c. S. Devas, 
Vol, VII, January, 1897, pp. 191-204; and Professor Ellwood's 
'The Sociological Basis of Ethics,' Vol. XX, April, 1910, 
pp. 314-329. See also J. M. Keynes, The Scope and Method 
of Political Economy (London, Macmillan, 3rd. ed., 1904), 
especially Chap. II; and Professor E. C. Hayes, Sociology 
and Ethics (New York, Appleton, 1921). Bonar's classic 
Philosophy and Political Economy is, of course, largely 
historical." Ibid., p, 484. 
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tation. Yet Geiger's prejudice concerning speculative 
philosophy and metaphysics makes his work in many ways less 
satisfying than the earlier treatments by Henry Sidgwick. 
However, both Sidgwick's utilitarianism and Geiger's prag-
matism are unacceptable as a total statement of this rela-
tionship in the view of idealistic personalism. 
JohnS. Mackenzie has reminded us that economics is 
a complex science and one which may be defined as sharing 
in practically every type of science. 
It should also be carefully borne in mind that 
often what is commonly regarded as a single science may 
include elements which, if taken by themselves, would 
refer it alternatively to several, or perhaps all, of 
the above classes. Thus Political Economy is a positive 
science in so far as it deals with the facts of commer-
cial life, and seeks to co-ordinate them--in so far, that 
is to say, as it is dealt with historically and concretely. 
It is, however, an abstract science, in so far as it 
deals with hypothetical conditions, such as that of 
perfectly free competition, and seeks to show what would 
follow from these conditions. It is a normative science, 
in so far as it seeks to establish an ideal standard, such 
as that of industrial freedom, to which the facts of 
commercial life ought to conform. It is a practical 
science when it uses this standard to guide the states-
man, the man of business, the workman, or +he social 
reformer. When, finally, these various people make use 
of it, under the guidance of common sense, it becomes an 
art; and the carrying of it into effect in this way 
involves various other forms of knowledge, as well as 
the knowledge of the particular science in question. 1 
lMackenzie, A Manual of Ethics, pp. 21-22. (Italics 
mine.) 
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CHAPTER IV 
SOME CRITICAL PROBLEMS 
The philosopher seems safe enough in the eyes of his 
contemporaries so long as he remains in his ivory tower and 
confines himself to the theoretical problems of thought and 
being. Jacques Maritain was only another French lay Thomist, 
known to a few within the circles of his own church, until 
the crisis of 1926 erupted with the papal condemnation of 
Action Francaise. The publication of his Things That Are 
Not Caesar's in defense of the pope's action brought Mari-
tain instantaneous recognition. 
What are some of the critical problems which cause 
economics to become a philosophical concern? When economists 
leave their charts and graphs in an attempt to predict trends 
in business, to plan for future growth and expansion, and to 
select which businesses should expand, then economic prob-
lems take on a wider social implication and the solution of 
these problems involves, explicitly or implicitly, an eco-
nomic philosophy. 
The relationship of any given economic order to the 
moral ideal in any given culture presupposes certain basic 
questions. The answers given to these questions constitute 
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major points of departure in differing economic philosophies. 
What are some of these major "hot spots"?1 
1. Live Issues in Economic Philosophy 
In the area under investigation in this dissertation 
we have discovered twelve ''hot spots'' on which to focus as 
we compare the systems of our four philosophers whom we are 
to study in this dissertation. They can be listed as 
follows: 
1 The Problem of Definition 
2 The Problem of Method and Truth 
3 The Problem of Metaphysics 
4 The Problem of Man 
5 The Problem of Value 
6 The Problem of Property and Money 
7 The Problem of Wages and Family Income 
8 The Problem of Freedom and Planning 
9 The Problem of Economic Evil 
~10 The Problem of Consumption 11 The Problem of Aesthetics 
12 The Problem of Vocation 
This list is not definitive but,as the following 
brief discussions will show,it touches on most of the major 
questions confronting any specific economic order as it 
seeks to function in the light of a moral ideal. Further-
more, although none of the four thinkers we are to examine 
have dealt explicitly with each of these problems, our task 
will be to discover those "spots" each one did feel were 
important and what contribution was made in resolving them. 
lDr. William H. Harris used the term "hot spots" in 
private conversation with the author to designate the key 
questions in any field of study. Dr. Harris used the 
expression for many years as he taught Philosophy of Religion 
at the University of Arkansas. 
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2. The Problem of Definition 
One of the most interesting differences of opinion 
within the area of this dissertation is that over the problem 
of definition itself. In the last chapter we observed some-
thing of the change of opinion in regard to the concept of 
economics as the discipline moved from the earlier moral and 
political philosophy to the fields of political economy and 
economics. 
In more recent years the criticism of the more 
limited definition of the scope and delimitation of the field 
has undergone criticism at the hands of such men as 
Clarence Edwin Ayres, who in 1918 did his doctoral disser-
tation on "The Nature of the Relationship between Ethics and 
Economics." Ayres agrees with John Dewey's view that "eco-
nomic phenomena ••• cannot be understood nor regulated 
apart from consideration of consequences upon human values, 
upon human good: that is, apart from moral considerations."l 
Frank H. Knight has contributed notably to this con-
tinuing discussion on definition by his firm insistence upon 
the need of economics for ethics. As early as 1922 Knight 
led in a round table discussion on " The Relation between 
Economics and Ethics," 2 and his later writings continue to 
lJohn Dewey, "Introduction," The Philosophy of Henry 
George, by George R. Geiger, p. xii, 
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2American Economic Review, XII Supplament, pp, 192-193. 
Cf. his Ethics of Com etition (New York, 1935), The Economic 
Order and Religion New York: Harper and Brothers, 19 5 , and 
Freedom and Reform New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947 • 
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lift up his belief in the interdependence of the two fields. 
Yet the school most consistent with philosophy that 
has sought most rigorously to include economics within ethics 
has been the Thomistic interpreters. Such men as C. S. Devas 
of England, who insisted upon the moral law concept within 
economics (he called it the Ethical School), and more recently 
Bertrand de Jouvenel whose The Ethics of Redistribution was 
published by Cambridge University in 1952. Christopher 
Dawson is another thinker who has done much to make respect-
able the historic position of the Medieval Church relative 
to modern social and economic problems. Joseph F. Flubacher 
has written a recent dissertation dealing with this ''hot 
spot" of definition, limiting his materials to the so-called 
recent ''scientific'' economists. 1 
The range of answers to this problem of definition 
has uncovered this ''hot spot'' as the controversy has shifted 
back and forth between those who would seek to include and 
those who would seek to exclude ethics from economics. The 
four philosophers with whom we shall deal have all defined 
economics in such a way as to make its activities come under 
surveillance of ethical considerations. We shall be equally 
interested, however, in why they so define economics. 
Brunner, for example, tends more to isolate economics from 
lJoseph F. Flubacher, The Concept of Ethics in the 
History of Economics (New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1950). 
First submitted as a Ph.D. dissertation, Department of 
Economics, Temple University. 
ethics and to give it a greater degree of freedom within its 
own province. 
3. The Problem of Method and Truth 
The problem of method becomes another "hot spot" in 
any discussion on economics for there is divergence of views 
concerning how one should go about analyzing economic prob-
lems and sifting out the true from the false in hypotheses 
concerning these supposed facts. Economic theory has ranged 
the gamut of philosophical methods from the deductive methods 
of classical economist with their concepts of economic laws 
and the freedom of perfect competition to the inductive 
method of modern market analysis. We have also noted John 
Mackenzie's suggestion that economics is a complex science 
which might well use different methods for different aspects 
of the science. 
From the time of Henry Sidgwick's article on "Polit-
ical Economy, Scope and Method" in Palgrave•s Dictionary the 
debate on method has been going on. Dr. Edwin F. Gay, Di-
rector of the National Bureau of Economic Research says, 
"The scientific method, then, of the National Bureau is 
primarily that of quantitative measurement ••• that of 
cool and disinterested analysis."l Allyn Young in his 
1Frank H. Knight, "The Limitations of Scientific 
Methods in Economic Theory," The Trend of Economics, ed. 
Rexford Guy Tugwell (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1924). 
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article on "Economics" in the Encyclopedia Brittanica (1942) 
includes a section on "The Methods of Economics". Frank H. 
Knight recently published a new book On the History and 
Method of Economics (Chicago, 1956). As early as the Rexford 
Guy Tugwell (ed.) volume, The Trend of Economics (1924), an 
article by Frank H. Knight was included on "The Limitations 
of Scientific Methods in Economic Theory". 
The problem of method is related to the problem of 
clarification and criticism of the linguistic tools of eco-
nomics. W. W. Carlile has written on "The Language of 
Economics"l and Henry Winthrop has contributed an article on 
"Conceptual Difficulties in Modern Economic Theory."2 This 
is precisely the contribution that Clarence Edwin Ayres feels 
John Dewey and American Instrumentalism have made to eco-
nomic thought. While Dewey favored the inductive and scien-
tific method for solving economic problems, Jacques Maritain 
works at these problems through the deductive method of abso-
lute truths which are a part of a total framework of thought. 
Emil Brunner favors with other Continental thinkers a greater 
respect for historical and socio-economic methods, while 
William Temple favored a synoptic method which made room for 
intuition and feeling. 
The problem of truth is also a ''hot spot'' for the 
lJournal of Political Economy, XVII, pp. 434-437. 
2Philosophy of Science, XII (1945). 
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relation of any science to philosophy. If the social sci-
ences are not to give way to a complete relativism they must 
look well to their philosophical rootage. Christopher Dawson 
maintains this in his "Sociology as a Science" written in 
1954. 1 John Dewey was just as anxious to defend the thesis 
that the scientific method as used by the social sciences 
can deliver an ever growing core of truth concerning man. 
Yet the difference between Dawson and Maritain's test for 
truth and that of John Dewey is considerable. So here we 
find a "hot spot" at the very starting point of any inquiry. 
4. The Problem of Metaphysics 
Here we face a problem which many would claim is no 
problem at all for they would imply that they can operate 
within the field of economics without making any metaphysical 
assumptions whatever. It seems to me that this is precisely 
the point at which the basic incoherence of our modern cul-
ture takes root. Much of the literature that probes to the 
heart of the basic insecurity and frustration of modern cul-
ture is coming around to a similar view. 
Charles W. Morris once wrote, "A philosophy of life 
is not simply a luxury granted to professional philosophers, 
but a demand written deep in the very texture of human life, 
1cross Currents, IV (1954). 
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a demand peculiarly urgent today." 1 Charles Beard bas said: 
Every person, whether primitive or highly civilized, 
bas a conception of himself and the universe in which be 
lives and works or idles. This is his idea of the world--
his world-view. His world-view may be dimly formed, 
barely recognized, even somewhat surreptitiously held. 
But a world-view is in the mind of every man and every 
woman. 
An individual may deny that be bas a world-view. He 
may say that be bas not interest in the world. He may 
insist that he is an independent, free-swinging person, 
hedonist or ascetic, choosing his own way of life at his 
own will; but the denial is in itself a world-view--some-
thing on the basis of which independence is asserted, 
whether be is aware of it or not. 2 
One of the main purposes of this dissertation is to 
explore precisely this "hot spot" in this whole area of 
thought. Does it really make any difference to a person's 
economic behavior and ideas whether be is an Idealist, 
Realist, or Naturalist? It is not surprising that both 
Thomism and Idealistic Personalism have consistently claimed 
that it does make a difference, an important difference. 
5. The Problem of Man 
As we come now to a fourth "hot spot" we are not 
surprised that it should be the problem of man himself. For 
economic activity is an activity of human persons in the ex-
change of scarce products. So it is that the interpretation 
of man and his nature assumes a significant role for economic 
lcharles W. Morris, "Opening Address, " in Spinoza, the 
Man and His Thought, ed. Edward L. Schaub (Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1933), p. 1. See Morris' The Open Self 
(New York, 1948) correlating body types with 13 Ways of Life. 
2 Charles Beard and Mary Beard, The American Spirit 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1942). 
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thought as it seeks help from philosophy. The second half 
of the twentieth century has witnessed a remarkable interest 
in probing this basic concept--human personality. 
Standing at mid-century J. B. Coates wrote, The Crisis 
of the Human Person (New York, 1950). In a review of this 
volume by W. R. Inge1 we find the gloomy dean recognizing 
the problem of human nature as older than modern science and 
inventions. Stuart Chase the same year wrote The Proper 
Study of Mankind (London, 1950). Many economists have added 
their efforts to this list of books on man's nature. Peter 
Ferdinand Drucker in 1939 wrote The End of Economic Man (New 
York, 1939) and a few years later The Future of Industrial 
Man (New York, 1942). Personalism has added its continuing 
emphasis upon the metaphysical uniqueness of human personality 
with Ralph Tyler Flewelling's The Person, or The Significance 
of Man (Los Angeles, 1952) as an outstanding example of this 
interest. Thomistic thought has called attention to this 
area and Maritain has been variously classified by fellow 
philosophers as a French Personalist and an Existentialist. 2 
We will look at Maritain's writings in the next chapter. 
Frederick c. Copleston wrote an article called "The Human 
lw. R. Inge, Review of The Crisis of the Human 
Person, by J. B. Coates, Philosophy, XXV (1950), 83-85. 
2Will Herberg, Professor of Judaic Studies and Social 
Philosophy, so classifies Maritain in his recent book, Four 
Existential Theolo ians: Maritain Berd aev Buber an_d __ _ 
Tillich Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 
1958). 
Person in Contemporary Philosophy" 1 which surveys the liter-
ature in this field in recent years. Each of our four philos-
ophers has contributed directly to this problem with sepa-
rate works. For they all agree that the end of economic 
activity is for human welfare and the growth of personality. 
Nowhere is the ethical problem of egoism versus 
altruism more vividly illustrated than in economic theory. 
This is only one of the many problems constantly being hinted 
at in all the relevant literature whose solution hinges upon 
a more adequate philosophy of man. 
6. The Problem of Value 
Many economic theories present differing views con-
cerning value. Communism presents a Marxist theory of surplus 
value; anothel' theory presents a marginal utility theory of 
value; and yet another views values regulated by social 
approval or "conspicuous consumption." Every system of eco-
nomics will have some theory of values. Here again, ethics 
and economics have a close and common interest. 
Some of the relevant literature in this field should 
include the realistic theory of value found in two works by 
Ralph Barton Perry. In 1926 appeared his General Theory of 
Value (New York, 1926) and more recently his Gifford Lee-
tures were published by Harvard University Press under the 
lFrederick C. Copleston, "The Human Person in 
Contemporary Philosophy," Philosophy, XXV (1950), 3-19. 
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title of Realms of Value (1954), Chapter xv of this latter 
volume is on "Ethics and Economics." James Haydon Tufts's 
articlel entitled "The Moral Life and the Construction of 
Values and Standards" gives a pragmatic theory of values. 
Robert s. Lynd raises the question of values for the social 
sciences when he wrote Knowledge for What? {Princeton, 1939). 
In 1944 appeared two volumes concerning values: Ray Lepley, 
Verifiability of Values, and Louise Saxe Eby, The Quest for 
Moral Law, both published by Columbia University Press. In 
1950 the same press brought out a volume edited by Ray 
Lepley, Value: A Co-operative Inquiry. An article by George 
Raymond Geiger, "The Place of Values in Economics," Journal 
of Philosophy, June 19, 1930, applies all this more directly 
to our subject matter. 
There seems to be a growing conviction that standards 
and norms do and must exist if we are to be saved from the 
sea of relativism which has so nearly engulfed us. The ques-
tion will eventually emerge from any study of economics, Is 
this all chaotic and unordered, or does there seem to be some 
natural law or moral standards discoverable in economic 
activity? The Roman Catholic or the philosopher of the 
Enlightenment would hardly be able to conceive of any struc-
ture existing without its reference to natural law. The 
1James Haydon Tufts, "The Moral Life and the Con-
struction of Values," Creative Intelligence( ed. John Dewey, 
et al. {New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1917), pp. 354-408. 
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Biblical belief in an ordered Creation is one way of concep-
tualizing this belief. Yet, even the secular science of 
economics has not been without its interpretation of this 
possibility. 
The ethicist will refer to this aspect of reality as 
a moral law or the possibility of the existence of norms. 
If he is a Platonist he will believe them to be more real 
than any other fact in the universe. Others will claim that 
norms can exist and yet believe that the whole realm of human 
knowledge of them is filled with change and a growing appre-
hension. 
Can any norms be discovered in economics? Certainly 
we will run into another "hot spot" as we attempt to analyze 
our men with this question in view. Dewey is afraid to claim 
any fixed norms while Maritain's natural law bias determines 
his affirmation of norms. While Temple and Brunner both will 
tend to agree to a ''created'' order which makes men''s eco-
nomic activity subject to it. 
7. The Problem of Property and Money 
109 
If the first four "hot spots" have seemed to be the 
age old philosophical quests--Knowledge, Reality, and Mind--
the next five categories will be readily recognized as eco-
nomic ones. We turn in these to the basic concepts that have 
been dealt with in economic theory whose solution determines 
the specific way in which an economist goes about constructing 
his system. 
The first of the problems (really a group of prob-
lems) we choose to deal with under the title "Property and 
Money." Actually, economists have been hard pressed to 
define either of these terms satisfactorily, let alone give 
any ethical reasons why it should assume the particular role 
it does in any given culture. Take "money" for instance, 
why is it usually associated with some precious metal? What 
makes it possible for more advanced cultures to depart from 
the barter system and manufacture their money out of some 
worthless medium such as paper? We recognize at once that 
there is operating here a whole complex system of socially 
approved standards. 
Another concept that has been debated through the 
whole course of economic thought is that of "property." A 
book, now long out of print, that tried to study this prob-
lem from the very points of interest of this present disser-
tation is that edited by Charles Gore, Property: Its Duties 
and Rights. Charles Gore, Bishop of Oxford, says, "We set 
to work to get written a volume of essays on property in 
which the subject should be treated from the standpoint of 
philosophy and religion."l 
The defense of property rights has always been a 
joint task of ethics and economics. The medieval church was 
more tolerant of property than it was of money and usury. 
1charles Gore (ed.), Property: Its Duties and 
Rights (2nd ed.; New York: The Macmillan Co., (1913) 1922), 
p. xiii. 
llO 
The monumental work by Ernst Troeltsch, The Social Teachings 
of the Christian Churches, trans. Olive Wyon (London, 1931) 
ably traces the history of these concepts. An earlier work 
by Thomas Hill Green, Lectures on the Principles of Polit-
ical Obligation (1895) includes a section on "The Right of 
the State in Regard to Property." A recent unpublished 
dissertation by Kristjan Kristjanson in the Economics Depart-
ment of Wisconsin is a study of Taking Private Land for 
Public Purposes (1954). One of the Catholic Truth Society 
pamphlets is The Catholic Church and the Principle of Private 
Property by Hilaire Belloc. A Protestant equivalent to this 
pamphlet is a book edited by Vigo Auguste Demant, The Just 
Price (London, 1930). 1 
However, even if property rights are upheld by 
philosophy and religion, that does not mean that there 
should be no personal of social controls over their use. 
Two books by the great English Christian economist, William 
Cunningham, reveal this concern: The Use and Abuse of Money 
(New York, 1891) and The Moral Witness of the Church on the 
Investment of Money and the Use of Wealth (1909). Harvey 
Reeves Calkins has written, A Man and His Money (New York, 
1914) and all stewardship teaching bears on some aspect of 
this present problem. 
1Also see Joseph F. Fletcher, Christianity and 
Property (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947). This 
is a theological counterpart of the Bishop Gore volume. 
111 
Two last works should be mentioned. William Adams 
Brown, The New Order in the Church (New York, 1943) has 
included a chapter on "The Need of Economic Sharing." John 
Stuart Mackenzie, Outlines of Social Philosophy (New York, 
1918) has included a chapter of "Justice" including both 
distributive justice and justice in exchange. 
8. The Problem of Wages and Family Income 
If ownership of property and investment of capital 
involve ethical and philosophical interests, what about the 
human side of industry? Modern industrial society is the 
fruit of the union of capital and labor. We noticed Paul A. 
Samuelson listing as one of the three or four primary eco-
nomic problems this question: 
For whom are they to be produced? That is, who is 
to enjoy and get the benefit of the goods and services 
provided? Or, to put the same thing in another way, how 
is the total of national product to be distributed among 
different individuals and families? 1 
Philosophy has interested itself in the labor move-
ment almost from its inception. James and John Stuart Mill, 
Henry Sidgwick, and John Stuart Mackenzie--all have been men 
who were sympathetic with the needs of human beings. In 1893 
appeared the first edition of L. T. Hobhouse's little book, 
The Labour Movement. 2 Its first chapter, "Labour and Wealth," 
lsamuelson, Economics, 13. 
2L. T. Hobhouse, The Labour Movement (3rd ed. rev.; 
London: T. Fisher Unwin, (1893] 1912). 
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is an argument for a raising of the minimum standard of in-
come of the laboring man. In subsequent chapters he discusses 
the Trade Unions, Co-operatives, and the Distribution of 
Wealth. The book contains an acknowledgement of the help of 
J. A. Hobson, "this most original and independent of our 
economists." 1 Among Hobson's own works his Poverty in Plenty; 
the Ethics of Income (New York, 1931) bears directly with 
this problem. A recent study has been made by Erwin Esser 
Nemmers, Hobson and Underconsumption (Amsterdam, Holland, 
1956). 
Labor Economics has become an important division of 
economics and there is general agreement that the development 
of the trade unions at least hastened the improvement of 
wages and working conditions. Kermit Eby, long an interested 
Christian social scientist, wrote an article in 1953 on 
"Labor's Emerging Role in the Political Economy."2 E. s. 
Furniss, Labor Problems (Cambridge, 1925), Harry A. Millis, 
Labor's Progress and Some Basic Labor Problems (New York, 
1938), and George Soule, Men, Wages, and Employment (New 
York, 1954) are representative of the literature here. 
Once again Roman Catholic economists have generally 
libid., Preface to 3rd ed., p. 7. 
2Kermit Eby, "Labor's Emerging Role in the Political 
Economy," Freedom and Authorit in Our Time, ed. Lyman 
Bryson, et al. Proceedings of the Twel Conference on 
Science, Philosophy, and Religion, New York City, 1951"; 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953). 
113 
distinguished themselves with an interest in labor. Their 
doctrines of the "living wage" and the "family wage" have 
been consistent with their concept of marriage and the denial 
of birth control. John A. Ryan devotes two chapters to these 
doctrines in an earlier book--chapter xxiii, 11 The Minimum of 
Justice: A Living Wage," and chapter xxiv,"The Problem of 
Complete Wage Justice."l 
Consideration of the population potential of a nation 
and effort made to insure full employment are essential to a 
virile and expanding economy. All four of our philosophers 
are optimistic concerning the future of the world economy 
and believe that a continued raising of living standards can 
be achieved. There are, of course, many points here upon 
which economists may honestly differ. 
9. The Problem of Freedom and Planning 
Is economic activity susceptible to planning or is 
it operating by laws over which we have no control? 
The extreme classical economists, such as Adam Smith, 
assumed the existence of economic laws which they thought 
should be left unaltered by human planning. They developed 
the concept of laissez faire and freedom of market with open 
competition.2 It is generally recognized today that such 
lJohn A. Ryan, Distributive Justice (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1916). 
2some may question whether competition is ever free 
and ideally unrestricted. See Joan Robinson, The Economics 
of Imperfect Competition (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 
1953). 
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freedom would lead to anarchy rather than a healthy economy. 
The real question then is: Who shall exercise control and to 
what degree? Some economists have suggested that all eco-
nomic systems have been planned systems. 
Sir Henry Jones observed near the opening of this 
century: 
The nation's mind is passing gradually a change which 
is nothing less than revolutionary. In the time of Adam 
Smith, and long afterwards, it was assumed that State-
regulation was essentially hurtful. The economic organi-
zation was regarded as a separate organization from the 
political, an affair not of the State but of individuals. 
It had a regulative principle of its own. It was that 
of competition. "A belief in its beneficent effects 
was the mainspring of the movement to 'free' industry 
and commerce from all State-'interference,' and is the 
ground of most opposition to State-regulation today." 
(Henry Clay, Economics, p. 380.) But the expansion of 
the economic resources of the nation has exposed the 
falsity of the negative attitude. 1 
This was written concerning Great Britain. 
In 1951 the editors of Fortune magazine, in collab-
oration with Russell w. Davenport, published u.s.A., The 
Permanent Revolution (New York, 1951) where the case is pre-
sented for "The Transformation of American Capitalism" which 
by this time is an accomplished fact. John Strachey analyzes 
these changes in his Contemporary Capitalism, which serves as 
an appraisal of the changing character of capitalism, 
analyzes its modification in the light of the influence 
of democratic political action, the advancement of 
1sir Henry Jones, The Principles of Constructive 
Citizenship, p. 169. 
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technical processes, with an accompanying increase in 
productivity, and the general rise in the levels of sub-
sistence •••• These changes make necessary a re-exam-
ination of the doctrines of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes •••• The first volume 
of a projected series of studies on the principles of 
democratic socialism. 1 
Many voices in British and American philosophy have 
prophesied this would come about. In 1916 Roy Wood Sellars 
predicted that "the next step in democracy will be a sof-
tening of industrialism, which is already beginning in such 
movements as co-operation and profit-sharing. "2 Bertrand 
Russell listed as one of his New Hopes for a Changing World 
(London, 1951) that which he calls in chapter xiv "Economic 
Co-operation and Competition." John F. Sleeman, Lecturer in 
Social Economics at the University of Glasgow, recently pub-
lished a penetrating study entitled Basic Economic Problems: 
A Christian Approach (London, 1953). After examining "The 
Criteria of an Economic Order Which Fulfils God's Purpose" 
and "The Economic Order as We Have Known It" he turns to his 
twin hopes of planning and personal responsibility. He de-
votes chapter vi "The Nature of Planning" and chapter vii 
"Planning and Efficiency" to this aspect of the solution. 
His final chapter is "Christian Economic Responsibility." 
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Business itself is growing more responsible to society 
lJohn Strachey, Contemporary Capitalism (New York: 
Random House, 1956), Publisher's note. 
2Roy Wood Sellars, The Next SteJ in Democracy 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916 , Publisher's note. 
in many ways. The changing role of management is a part of 
this developed sense of responsibility. In 1953 President 
J. Whitney Bunting of Oglethorpe University edited a volume 
called Ethics for Modern Business (New York, 1953). His 
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own article appears in chapter ii under the title "Develop-
ments of Ethical Standards in Business" where he lists such 
influences as government restrictions, business and service 
clubs, Better Business Bureaus (brought into being by the 
Association of Advertizing Clubs of the World in 1911), 
NationalConsumer-Retailer Council, Inc, (1936), Federal Trade 
Commission, postal regulations, and the National Recovery 
Act of 1933. Another volume edited by Harwood F. Merrill, 
President of the Harvard Business School, appeared in 1949 
under the title, The Responsibilities of Business Leadership 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1949). V. M. Clarke, New Times, 
New Methods, and New Men (London, 1950) discusses under sepa-
rate chapters "The Principles and Purposes of Management" and 
"The Social Obligations of Management". Finally, Stuart 
Chase, et al. published The Social Responsibilities of Man-
agement (New York, 1950) as one in his long series of studies 
concerning economics and public good. 
10. The Problem of Economic Evil 
Hovering overhead through all the optimism of the 
Chambers of Commerce and the social planners is the possibil-
ity of depression and social catastrophe. Just as there are 
118 
mental illness,wars, plagues, famines, and threats of vio-
lence, so there is the possibility of disaster in the indus-
trial scene. Just as there is a demonic side to human nature, 
there seems to be a demonic force in all man's social experi-
ence. V. A. Demant once quoted A. J. Penty as saying, "It is 
becoming a commonplace in intelligent secular literature that 
civilization itself is in danger, and an acute observer has 
asked whether it is not necessary to regard the possibility 
of catastrophe as essential to sociology as the idea of hell 
is to religion." 1 John Baillie has made a vigorous criticism 
of The Belief in Progress (Oxford, 1950). Economics cannot 
escape from dealing with these problems of evil in its own 
realm. 
What are some of the demonic elements that seem to 
defy remedy in our economic life? 
Strangely enough, the very instrument that aided the 
laboring man during the past century seems now to be in need 
of some restraints. Corruption and graft in the labor unions 
have come to light in recent years. The economic actions of 
government have themselves been exploited at times for the 
private benefit of a few. Problems of poverty, industrial 
conflict, inter union fights, and temporary recession con-
tinue to give us concern. Our population boom, itself a 
lv. A. Demant, God, Man, and Society (Milwaukee: 
Morehouse Publishing Co., 1934), p. 27, citing A. J. Penty, 
"Industry in a Revived Christendom," Green Quarterly, June, 
1930. 
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stimulant to business, is in danger of becoming a world-wide 
11 0-Bomb," as Harold A. Boner pointed out !n a recent study 
of overpopulation, a reappraisal of Parson Malthus' theory 
called Hungry Generations {New York, 1955). Modern medicine, 
itself a blessing, has played no small part, especially in 
the Far East, of enabling larger numbers of babies to live, 
thus increasing the threat of overpopulation to world econ-
omy. 
Here are some more "hot spots" in economic thinking 
with which the philosopher cannot but concern himself. 
11. The Problem of Consumption 
We move now to a group of critical problems that 
seem to me to be the personal side of economic ethics. These 
three problems are the problem of consumption, the problem of 
aesthetics, and the problem of vocation. Each of them has 
its social counterpart and certainly involves man in a com-
plex economic system. Yet here are three areas in which 
basic, individual decisions can be made by man in any eco-
nomic order in which he may find himself. 
We are in the age of the consumer. Ahead of the 
producer there moves the salesman creating a market for the 
goods of every industry. In any modern supermarket we are 
confronted with the choice of many possible brands of food. 
In entertainment, in homes, in tools, in every type of prod-
uct or service we must choose among a multiplicity of types. 
Thus, as individuals we could wield ultimate control of the 
economic machinery if we would intelligently made decisions 
affecting the comparative values of products. The business 
man would not manufacture any product for long if he did not 
have a ready market for it. The ultimate censorship of the 
theatre and the marketplace is in the pocketbook. 
In 1934 Robert S. Lynd wrote an article, "The Con-
sumer Becomes a 'Problem,•" as a part of the whole issue of 
the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences devoted to a study of "The Ultimate Consumer: A 
Study in Economic Illiteracy."l Two years later Horace M. 
Kallen wrote The Decline and Rise of the Consumer (Chicago, 
1936). Much of the work of Thorstein Veblen was given to a 
study of the leisure class and its use of "conspicious con-
sumption." Catholic and Protestant social thought both agree 
that consumption of goods without equivalent contribution to 
social values is only another form of theft. Yet, the lack 
of intelligence and self control in the consumption of any 
goods is equally important from an ethical viewpoint. In a 
time of recession the hue and cry is "Buy Now in the Heart 
of America." We have witnessed a transvaluation of values 
as thrift and frugality become not virtues but social 
disasters. 
Indeed, the whole field of advertising is a critical 
lvol. CLXXIII (May, 1934), pp. 1-6. 
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problem of economic ethics. Mary Francesca Kelly did her 
Master's thesis on the "Ethics of Contemporary Advertising" 
(Boston University, College of Business Administration, 1935), 
and more recently a chilling study called The Hidden Per-
suaders (New York, 1957) has been written by Vance Packard. 
Packard makes us believe we have come dangerously close to 
the world visualized by George Orwell in 1984, However, 
advertising has been defended by Earnest Elmo Calkins who 
called it Business, the Civilizer (Boston, 1928). 
Philosophy might aid economics more here than at any 
other point, for the strength of a nation that geared its 
productive potential, not to the goods of "conspicuous 
consumption" nor military stockpiling, but to education, art, 
and a cultivated leisure could change the face of the earth, 
Recent studies in personality and culture can go a long way 
to help us to analyze our own culture and treat Society as 
the Patient as Lawrence K. Frank described it in his 1948 
book published by Rutgers University Press. 
12. The Problem of Aesthetics 
A comparatively neglected area of the relationship 
between philosophy and economics is the problem of aesthetics. 
If beauty is one of the intrinsic values, one which has been 
considered a higher value from Greek times to this day, to 
what extent does our business civilization foster or hinder 
the aesthetic experience? 
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William Aylott Orton has written, "For the modern 
world has bought its material abundance at far too high a 
price, and it is beginning to find that out •• • • All these 
basic ingredients of the good life have become increasingly 
unattainable to increasing numbers."l Henry W. Stuart wrote 
with this same criticism of modern life in mind in an 
article in 1917: 
We are here in fact dealing with the essential mark 
and trait of what is called self-conscious process. If 
there are ultimates and indefinables in this world of 
ours, self-consciousness may as fairly claim the dignity 
or avow the discredit as any other of the list. 
Does our interest in economic goods on occasion 
exhibit the trait of which we are here speaking? Pre-
cisely this is our present contention. And yet it seems 
not too much to say that virtually all economic theory, 
whether classical or the present dominant type that has 
drawn its terminology and working concepts from the 
ostensible psychology of the Austrian School, is founded 
upon the contradictory assumption. • . • First a living, 
then (perhaps) a ''good life.'' Cf. Aristotle's Politics 
(Jowett's trans.), III, 96 ff. and elsewhere; Nicom. 
Ethics, I, Chap. III (end). 2 
Frank Chapman Sharp, who some ten years later co-
authored a volume in Business Ethics, saw fit to include a 
chapter in his earlier text in Ethics on precisely this 
problem. He entitled this chapter "The Best Things in Life" 
and discusses such questions as "Why Business and Social 
Positions are Disappointing" and "Craftsmanship." After all 
lwilliam Aylott Orton, The Liberal Tradition (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1945), p. 28. 
2Henry Waldgrave Stuart, "The Phases of the Economic 
Interest,'' Creative Intelligence, by John Dewey, et al., 
pp. 304-305. 
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it is the whole tone of a culture that determines its 
spiritual worth, and any civilization that neglects the 
aesthetic component soon becomes br~ttle and insensitive. 
Perhaps the writings of some of our modern architects 
comes the nearest in trying to bridge this gap in our civili-
zation. Modern building is purely a technological endeavor, 
and yet architecture is attempting to discover beauty in 
function. Some of our recent city planning is a good example 
of our recognition that utility isn't the only law of life. 
The works of Frank Lloyd Wright, Arnold Toynbee, and Lewis 
Mumford are attempts to bridge these three areas of tech-
nology, aesthetics, and philosophy. 
Once again this is an area where personal experience 
and creative living depend much upon the individual person. 
This is also a ''hot spot'' which should be lifted up as we 
examine our four philosophers. 
13. The Problem of Vocation 
Our final problem is that which concerns the person's 
own conception of his importance and worth as an individual 
worker and the way in which he regards his task as having 
meaning in history and religion. It has long been recognized 
that there are non-material factors in any successful job 
placement. Francis J. McConnell re.cognized this when he 
wrote an article on "Economic Incentives."! Robert L. 
!Francis J. McConnell, "Economic Incentives," in 
A New Economic Order, ed. Kirby Page (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace and Co., 1930), p. 354. 
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Calhoun, God and the Common Life (New York, 1935); William R. 
Forrester, Christian Vocation: Studies in Faith and Work 
(London, 1951); and John Oliver Nelson (ed.), Work and 
Vocation (New York, 1954) each make a contribution to this 
problem and supply excellent bibliographies, the latter 
volume especially on the historical development of the con-
cept of a "Calling." What can philosophy and ethics con-
tribute to our industrial society? Perhaps it can reawaken 
a sense of the dignity of work and of the concept of con-
tribution to society through one's daily vocation. 
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CHAPTER V 
JACQUES MARITAIN'S PHILOSOPHY 
OF ECONOMICS 
1. The Challenge of the Reformation 
and Modernism 
The work of Jacques Maritain may best be understood 
as the work of a modern Thomist seeking to meet the challenges 
hurled by the Reformation and Modernism. The answer Maritain 
gives to both challenges is a return to the thought of 
St. Thomas Aquinas. Maritain might agree that the Roman 
Catholic Church has "no official philosophy," yet he believes 
that theology must work with a true philosophy in order to be 
a system of theology.l 
Both Jacques Maritain and Emil Brunner fell heir to 
an unresolved conflict in the history of Christian thought. 
It is not only the Reformation that separates these two men, 
but differing traditions in philosophy and theology dating 
back to the earliest periods of Christian history. Brunner 
1Mari tain says, "A system of theology could not 
possibly be true if the metaphysics which it employed were 
false. It is indeed an absolute necessity that the theologian 
should have at his disposal a true philosophy in conformity 
with the common sense of mankind." Jacques Maritain, An Intro-
duction to Philosoph}, trans. E. I. Watkin (New York: Sheed 
and Ward, Inc., 1937 , p. 130. 
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follows the spirit of Justin Martyr, Marcion, and Tertullian. 
Marcion conceived of Christian thought as a completely new 
way of thinking and sought to divorce Christianity from 
Judaism, even going to the extreme of severing the entire 
Old Testament. Justin Martyr and Tertullian turned their 
hostility towards the pagan influences of Greece. They 
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sought to rid Christian thought from the Hellenistic influences 
which found supreme examples in Clement of Alexandria, Origen, 
and John Scotus Erigena. The same process had taken place in 
Judaism a century before the time of Clement of Alexandria 
when Philo Judaeus attempted to wed Judaism and Hellenism. 
It is the age-old conflict which H. Richard Niebuhr describes 
in Christ and Culture. Shall the Church identify itself with 
culture, oppose culture openly, or compromise in one of 
several ways? Always this tension results in a two-way 
process. Waldo Beach seeks to show the first real adjustment 
of Christianity to culture in second century Alexandria as 
follows: 
As the church moved farther into the world, it was 
inevitable, as throughout Christian history, that the 
world would move into the church. The life of Christians 
was influenced by thought forms of pagan culture, as pagan 
culture was influence by Christianity. Christians of the 
third century were in the main more eager than those of 
the second to come to terms with the culture in which they 
lived. Although they believed that these terms should be 
Christian, it was inevitable that cultural interaction 
would make the terms both Christian and pagan. 1 
lwaldo Beach and H. Richard Niebuhr, Christian Ethics 
(New York: The Ronald Press, 1955), p. 71. 
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But where Maritain views the development of a 
Christian culture as a work of reason, Emil Brunner emphasizes 
that culture does not produce Christianity--Christianity 
produces the only real and genuine culture. Brunner returns 
to the Reformation theology of Luther and Calvin which, on 
the whole, is hostile to pagan philosophy. Christian theo-
logy can never be wedded to either Plato or Aristotle. 
Brunner is not as extreme as Barth and much Lutheran thought, 
yet he fears any encroachment on the Biblical (Hebrew-Christian) 
tradition by Greek philosophy. Where this takes place it must 
be expelled as a foreign deposit. This point-of-view goes 
back to Luther, who, A. C. McGiffert believes, tried to purge 
theology of all Scholasticism and Aristotelianism. McGiffert 
writes: 
Luther rebelled against Aristotle and the Schoolmen 
and turned to the scriptures and the Fathers, particularly 
Augustine, the founder of Luther's monastic order. In 
May, 1517, Luther wrote Lang, "Our theology and that of 
St. Augustine, by the grace of God, are making excellent 
progress and gaining control in our university. Aristotle 
is gradually declining, and his permanent extinction is 
not far off," Luther did not prefer one form of schol-
astic theology to another, but tried to destroy Thomists, 
Scotists, Albertists, and the Moderns with one stroke by 
destroying the common source of all of them, the author-
ity of Aristotle. Luther w~ote in his Annotations on 
the New Testament, the 1519' edition, "Aristotle is so in 
vogue that there is scarcely time in the church to inter-
pret the gospel." l 
Thus Maritain and Brunner inherited an ancient quarrel. 
Brunner, in finding his chief source of inspiration in the 
lArthur Cushman McGiffert, Martin Luther, the Man 
and His Work (New York: The Century Co., 1914), p. 64. 
Reformation, is prone to follow its example of indifference 
to the Greek roots of the Christian faith. Maritain, the 
man who has become the Commanding General of the twentieth 
century revival of Thomism, readily picked up the challenge 
hurled four centuries before by Luther and seeks to show 
that an intelligent Christian thinker can find time to be 
both an Aristotelian and interpret the gospel. The key to 
this synthesis he finds in St. Thomas Aquinas. 
2. "Back to Aquinas" 
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Maritain discovered the key to his synthesis a few 
years after his conversion to Roman Catholicism. It is not 
generally known that Maritain is a convert to Catholicism 
during his student days in Paris. His conversion was probably 
an outgrowth of his searching for a positive faith in a per~od 
of extreme national cynicism. 
When Jacques Maritain was born in Paris on November 18, 
1882, French Catholicism was at a very low ebb. Internally 
the Church was struggling with its own problem of Modernism 
and externally it was under severe attack by scientific and 
liberal thinkers. 
Maritain's first interest in school seemed to be in 
the field of science. While attending classes at the Sorbonne, 
he met the dark haired young Jewess, Ralssa Oumansoff, who 
later became his wife. During these school years they both 
became thoroughly sickened with the bleak picture which posi-
tivism offered. Maritain later wrote: 
The scientist and phenomenist philosophy of my 
teachers at the Sorbonne at last made me despair of 
reason. At one time I thought I might be able to find 
complete certitude in the sciences, and Felix Le Dantec 
thought that my fianc~e and I would become followers 
of his biological materialism. • . • Bergson was the 
first to answer our deep desire for metaphysical truth 
--he liberated in us the sense of the absolute. 
Before being captured by St. Thomas, I underwent 
some ~reat influences, those of Charles Peguy, Bergson, 
and Leon Bloy. 1 
Bergson, under whom he studied in Paris, gave him 
faith in metaphysics and philosophy, and L{on Bloy converted 
both Jacques and Raissa to Catholicism soon after their 
marriage. After two years of study in Germany under Hans 
Driesch the Maritains returned to France where Jacques' 
first published articles were on Driesch and Bergson. The 
study of Aquinas completed his philosophical training, and 
his first teaching position was at the Coll~ge Stanislas in 
1912. His book on Bergson appeared in 1914, and in 1917 he 
was asked by his bishops to prepare a manual of philosophy 
for use in seminaries. This project was intended to include 
some seven volumes, but only two were produced -- the Intra-
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duction and the Logic. In 1920 appeared his Art et Scholastique 
and finally in 1932 his Les degres du savoir. 
His work on his beloved "Angelic Doctor" did not appear 
until 1930.2 But from the time of his first reading of 
, lJacques Maritain, Confession de foi (New York: 
Editions de la Maison Fran~aise, 1941), reprinted in Joseph 
W. Evans and Leo R. Ward (eds.) The Social and Political 
Philosophy of Jacgues Maritain (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1955, p. 331. 
, 
2Jacq~es Maritain, Le docteur angeligue (Paris: 
Desclee de Brouwer, 1930. 
St. Thomas until the writing of this book he testifies that 
he found in Aquinas the resolution of all his anxieties as 
though one were returning home. Fechner writes: 
Just a short time after their entry into the Church, 
there was the friendship and spiritual guidance of Father 
Humbert Clerissac, a great and learned Dominican at whose 
suggestion they first began to study the Summa Theologica 
of St. Thomas. 
• • • Ra1ssa had preceded him; she had not been in 
good health for some time and long periods of enforced 
idleness had enabled her to read the Summa Theologica 
at length while Maritain was still busy on his editorial 
job. l 
Maritain himself comments on the excitement that 
reading Aquinas gave him. After his conversion he had felt 
that faith would necessitate the laying aside of philosophy. 
My philosophical reflection leaned upon the inde-
structible truth of objects presented by faith in order 
to restore the natural order of the intelligence to 
being, and to recognize the ontological bearing of the 
work of reason. Thenceforth, in affirming to myself, 
without chicanery or diminution, the authentic value 
of reality of our human instruments of knowledge, I 
was already a Thomist without knowing it. When several 
months later, I was to come to the Summa Theologica, 
I would erect no obstacle to its luminous flood. 2 
However, Maritain's discovery of Aquinas was only a part 
of a wider "Back to Aquinas" movement. The return was par-
tially in answer to the various crises which had developed 
in the internal life of the Church. Several Roman Catholic 
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thinkers during the nineteenth century found themselves objects 
of papal censure, not because they opposed the Pope, but be-
lFecher, PJM, pp. 31-32. 
2Preface to the second edition of La Philosophie 
Bergsonienne and quoted by Fecher, PJM, pp. 32-33. 
cause they sought to cut the faith off from any rational 
basis. Some men, such as Lemennais (1782-1854), Father Abb~e 
Bautain (1796-1867), and Father Bonnetty (1798-1879), were 
condemned because they based faith either on authority alone 
or non-rational insights. Traditionalists such as Vicomte 
de Bonald (1754-1840) and Comte Joseph de Maistre (1754-1821) 
reacted against the French Revolution by emphasizing the need 
for the stability of a continuing tradition. Fearing change 
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and disorder, they saw in Latin and Mediterranean civilization, 
supremely culminating in Catholicism, that needed continuing 
tradition. 
Finally the Vatican Council of 1870 settled the 
matter once and for all. Faith was declared to be superior 
to reason, yet reason was held to be absolutely necessary as 
a basis for faith. George Boas explains this action as follows: 
The condemnation of all this friendly propaganda was 
what historians like to call"inevitable." It would 
have played into the enemies' hands, not to condemn 
it. "As if the word of God, who neither errs nor 
causes error, could be incompatible with human reason," 
said the Vatican Council. 1 
Maurice de Wulf, in his excellent, succinct "Outlines 
of the History of Philosophy,"2 views Traditionalism and 
1George Boas, The Ma or Traditions of Euro ean 
Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1929 , p. 3~'-:9. 
2cardinal Desire Mercier, A Manual of Modern Scholastic 
Philosophy, trans. T. L. Parker and S. A. Parker (8th ed. rev.; 
London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 1917), 
II, 473. DeWulf's material appears as a final chapter added 
to this edition. 
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Ontologism as reactions on the part of French Catholics in 
the nineteenth century to materialism and rationalism. 
Ontologism (defended in France by such men as Fabre d'Envieu) 
maintained t.hat we see the object of our ideas directly in 
God. However, both these systems unduly depreciated the 
powers of our intellectual faculties and thus provided an 
extreme, necessitating a return to Thomism. 
The stage for this return was set by Pope Leo XIII'S 
encyclical Aeterni Patris in 1876. Both Maurice de Wulf and 
George Boas think this pronouncement came as a result of the 
need to fill the vacuum left by the condemnation of Tradition-
alism and Ontologism. Boas says: 
The Church's action left the clergy without a philosophy. 
Six years after the Vatican Council, Pope Leo XIII supplied 
this need when his encyclical Aeterni Patris urged the 
study of St. Thomas Aquinas in all Catholic institutions. 
The revival of Thomism in modern times is one of the most 
amazing examples of the intellectual vigor of the Aristo-
telian tradition. Since 1876 Thomism has become the ruling 
philosophy of the Church and has produced a unanimity of 
philosophic opinion which has never before existed, even 
in the time of its originator. 1 
The return to Aquinas is inevitably a return to 
Aristotle in preference to Plato, although John Wild claims 
that Plato laid "the three fundamental theses of realistic 
thought • • . Plato not only explained and defended these 
principles; he also illustrated them by penetrating questions 
and dialogues, and finally developed them into the first great 
lBoas, The Major Traditions of European Philosophy, 
p. 339. 
literary expression of rea listie thought." 1 A. C. Peg is views 
the work of {,quinas in the thirteenth century as basically 
"a systematic critique and elimination of Platonism in 
metaphysics, psychology and epistemology."2 
Aquinas attacked Platonism first by showing the 
limitations that Augustine himself placed on his Platonism, 
thereby indicating the need to go to Plato himself. The 
first critic of Plato was Aristotle and thus Aquinas found 
a comrade in arms for his criticism of Platonism. Yet, 
Pegis says, "St. Thomas was quite aware that Aristotle was 
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not the author of all the doctrines which he attributed to 
him."3 So rather than calling Thomism an Aristotelian-
Thomistic synthesis "it is better to ca 11 it simply a Thomistic 
synthesis."4 The ultimate result of this synthesis was not 
only a judicious and synthetic diagnosis of Greek philosophy 
and incorporation of Greek ideas into Christian thought, but 
Pegis says "it meant also the fina 1 vindication of the human-
ism and the naturalism of Thomistic philosophy. The expression 
and the defense of this Christian humanism constitutes one of 
St. Thomas' most enduring contributions to European thought."5 
1John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philo.sophy (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 12-13. 
2A. c. Pegis, "Thomas Aquinas," 
ed. Dagobert D. Runes (Ames, Iowa: 
Company, 1955}, p. 17. 
3Ibid. 41£ll. 
Dictionary of Philosophy, 
Littlefield, Adams and 
Thus, in attacking Medieval Platonism, Aquinas went behind 
Augustine to Plato where he wrestled with the criticism of 
this system by Aristotle whom Aquinas in turn purified. 
Jacques Maritain is to be evaluated as a part of this 
"Back to Aquinas" movement. He was not its originator but 
he was its most vigorous exponent, and he lived to see a genu-
ine renaissance of Catholic thought and life.l George Barker 
wrote in The New Republic in 1942, "Maritain speaks for the 
Roman Catholic Church in a voice that the church itself can 
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never speak in, namely, the secular voice." Charles A. Fecher, 
in commenting on this passage, adds, "Without possessing the 
slightest official or authoritative position, his influence 
upon the last generation of Catholic thought has literally 
been incalculable.••2 
3. Maritain's Shift Towards Social 
Philosophy 
The direction of Maritain's thought in more recent 
years has shifted more and more towards political and social 
1The evidences of this revival of Catholic thought and 
influence is well documented in the following volumes: 
(1) Francis Beauchesne Thornton (ed.), Return to Tradition: A 
Directive Anthology (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Cc,, 1948). 
Father Thornton taught a course on the Catholic renaissance for 
several years prior to the publication of this volume. 
(2) Joseph Louis Perrier, The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy 
in the Nineteenth Century (New York: The Columbia University 
Press, 1909). (3) The Maritain Volume of The Thomist (New York: 
Sheed and Ward, 1943). (4) From an Abundant Spring, Walter 
Farrell Memorial Volume of The Thomist (New York: P. J. Kenedy 
and Sons, 1952). ·. 
2aeorge Barker, "The Dance Before the Altar," The New 
Republic, March 2, 1942, p. 303, quoted by Fecher, PJM, p.339. 
problems. Both Mrs. Maritain's autobiography and Charles A. 
Fecher, his most recent biographer, testify to this shift. 
Mrs. Maritain says that Jacques for years 
concerned himself only with metaphysics and pure ideas; 
he passed among men without paying a great deal of 
attention to them •••• It was little by little, due 
to art and poetry, later due to social and ethical 
problems, due above all to the experience of the inner 
life, that the philosopher and his philosophy were to 
become humanized, to enter into the thick of human 
affairs and proclaim the necessity of an integral 
humanism. 1 
His earliest writings were designed to work out a 
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modern defense of Thomistic thought in the fields of metaphysics, 
epistemology, and logic. During these formative years he 
naturally gave little attention to social or political problems. 
Three events changed this: (1) The papal condemnation of 
Action Fran~aise in 1926; (2) the world-wide depression of 
1929; and (3) the growing menace of Hitler. Fecher says it 
was these events, headed by the papal condemnation of Charles 
Maurras and his Action Fran~aise movement, that drew the 
philosopher "down out of his ivory tower, to battle waist-deep 
in the blood and agony of the world. • • • Since 1940 all of 
his books, with but one or two exceptions, have dealt with 
ethical, political and social matters."2 
Before the First World War Maritain received his 
training in the writings of Aquinas. The crisis of the 
lRa~ssa Maritain, Adventures in Grace, trans. Julie 
Kernan (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945), p. 216. 
Action Franlaise movement stimulated him to receive his 
training in the papal encyclicals. Maritain had been in-
valved in a small way with this movement and when the Pope 
denounced it he submitted with prompt obedience to the Pope. 
When some of his friends accused him of disloyalty to the 
movement he made his reply in the form of a book--Things That 
Are Not Caesar•s.l In this work he makes clear his loyalty 
to the Pope and the clear superiority of spiritual to tern-
poral powers. He believes the Pope cannot err in things 
spiritual, for to Maritain, that would be like saying that 
the universe was chaotic and made no sense. 
The papal encyclicals are quoted frequently in the 
Things That Are Not Caesar's (1930) and whole sections are 
quoted in the appendix of this and other writings. For ex-
ample, in Maritain's work on St. Thomas he supports the 
instructions of the papacy commanding all Catholic schools 
to study the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas by tracing the 
lFour of his writin~s about this time reveal his 
wrestle with this crisis: {1) Une opinion sur Charles 
Maurras et le devoir des catholiques (Paris: Plon 1 1926); (2) J. Maritain and Others, Clairvoyance de Rome \Paris: 
Spes, 1927); (3) J. Maritain and Others, Pourguoi Rome 
a parlE!' {Paris: Spes, 1927); and ( 4) Prima uti? du sptrituel 
(Paris: Plon, 1927), later translated by J. F. Scanlan as 
Thin~s That Are Not Caesar's (London: Sheed and Ward, 
1930 • 
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various encyclicals leading up to the famous Aeterni Patris 
of 1876 of Leo XIII.l 
Certainly the social encyclicals of Leo XIII and the 
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more recent popes come into the thinking of Maritain in his 
writings on economic values. Maritain affirmed in the Things 
That Are Not Caesar's the doctrine of the spiritual authority 
of the church as an indirect power. He says: 
I hope to have shown in my book .•. that, in their 
teachings as Popes, neither St. Gregory VII nor Boniface 
VIII ever claimed "direct power" over the temporal (this 
theory of the "direct power" is the invention of a few 
"extremist" theologians in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries); that Bellarmine, the great exponent of the 
"indirect power" --recently raised by the Church to the 
rank of Doctor--intended only to express and in fact 
only did express the traditional doctrine of the Papacy; 
and, finally, that if Leo XIII made no explicit reference 
to the "indirect power" (there is, nevertheless, a suffi-
ciently obvious implicit allusion to it to be seen in a 
passage in the encyclical Immortale Dei), he at any rate 
said nothing which was not in perfect harmony with that 
doctrine, 2 
The above-mentioned encyclical of Leo XIII is tied in with 
a passage from Aquinas as follows in a note: 
Sum. Theol., ii-ii, 60, 6, ad 3: "The secular power 
is subject to the spiritual, as the body is subject to 
the soul." Such an analogy has ••. been suggested 
before . • in the encyclical Immortale Dei. 3 
· lJacques Maritain, Le docteuer ange'ligue (Paris: 
Descl~e de Brouwer, 1930), trans. J. F. Scanlan as St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Angel of the Schools (London: Sheed and Ward, 1931). 
2Jacques M8ritain, Things That Are Not Caesar's, 
trans. J. F. Scanlan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1930). 
3Ibid., Note #32. 
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This is the key to his attitude of the proper relation 
between the Church and ethical criticisms of the economic 
institutions of present society. The spiritual power should 
exercise a moral and restraining influence over the temporal 
order. If, for example, "the church condemns a heretical 
doctrine, an action which has an inevitable repercussion on 
the sale of books in which the doctrine is set forth, she is 
taking a measure which is not so much religious as commercial."l 
But Maritain says this temporal effect is only per accidens 
rather than per se, for the Church must exercise this restraint 
even as Paul condemned the worship of idols and it accidentally 
caused economic loss on the part of their manufacturers. 
Maritain is most anxious that the superior claim of 
the spiritual and moral be understood over all temporal 
claims, including the economic.2 He says: 
I believe that in the new era into which we have 
entered since the final liquidation of the Holy Roman 
Empire, she will cease to exercise it otherwise than in 
the form of counsels or directions, which the nations 
will always expect from her supreme moral authority. 
It should be carefully defined that the "indirect power" 
is the right of intervention which the spiritual power 
possesses over temporal things themselves from the strict 
1Ibid., p. xiii. 
2For want of a better term we will call this principle 
in Maritain's economic philosophy the Principle of Subordin-
ation--economics is subordinated, at least in principle, to 
ethics. Cf. the further discussion of this on page 170 of 
this chapter. 
point of view of moral and spiritual interests, when 
superior interests of that kind happen to be involved in 
the temporal event. 1 
Maritain found also the errors of naturalism and 
liberalism defined by the encyclical of Leo XIII, Libertas 
Praestantinimum, which says, "Reduced to its very essence, 
liberalism is the rejection of the divine and supernatural 
law." 2 The social encyclicals of Leo XIII, especially Rerum 
Novarum and the subsequent reaffirmation forty years later 
of this by Pius XI in his Quadragesimo Anno ("Reconstructing 
the Social Order") gave Maritain further directives on which 
to build a philosophy of economics. 
Charles Morgan is probably correct to suggest that 
Maritain's frequent use of papal encyclicals is not done 
with the sense of appealing to authority, but rather to show 
how the supreme teaching of the church confirms what his 
reason has led us to: 
Maritain is Catholic; it is natural and right that 
he should show how his faith and his reason, like two 
streams tributary to a single river, form the current 
of his final judgement; indeed, it would have been dis-
honest in him to have done otherwise. Nevertheless, it 
is by no means necessary to rely upon the authority he 
quotes--for example, the Encyclical Summi pontificatus 
--in order to reach his conclusion. He himself quotes 
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the Encyclical to "confirm" and "emphasize" an argument 
which he establishes by philosophical, and not by author-
itative, means. It is necessary to say this, and to insist 
111:&9.., p. xii. 
2Etienne Gilson (ed.), The Church Speaks to the 
Modern World (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 
1954) p. 8. 
upon it, in order that no one, in the belief that what 
is offered to him is dependent on an authority which he 
cannot accept, should neglect Maritain's discourse. 1 
Maritain would affirm the appraisal of a recent editor 
of the social encyclicals of Leo XIII, Joseph Husslein, when 
he says: "Like harbour bells in stormy nights, the strong, 
deep warning notes of these social Encyclicals of Leo XIII 
continue to ring out across the welter of the years."2 
Perhaps the analogy of the soul and the body is the 
key to Maritain's view of the role of the economic life in 
the total life of human society. Above the life of man there 
stands the supernatural order which man may partially discover 
through the natural law. This important Thomistic doctrine 
needs now to be examined, for on natural law Maritain will 
rest his principles of ethics and economics. 
4. The Problem of Natural Law 
Maritain uses the idea of natural law to suggest in 
his philosophy of economics, that, just as there is a law of 
nature governing every object and being, so there is a law 
behind the economic order by which it may be judged if it is 
to achieve its true order or function. How does Maritain 
prove the existence of such a law? He does not prove it, he 
1charles Morgan, Liberties of the Mind (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 198. 
2Joseph Husslein (ed.), Social Wellsprings, 2 vols. 
(Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1940), I, viii. 
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assumes j_t. In l::an and the State he writes: 
Since I have not time here t:.J discuss nonsense 
(we can alvwys find very intellic;ent 0'<1ilosopher·s, not 
to quote ~r. Bertrand Russell, to defend it most brill-
iantly) I am taking it for :ranted that we acJ::Jit that 
tbAre is a human nature, and that this human nature is 
the same in all men. 1 
'l'his idea of notural law is said by :.:aritain to be a 
heritage of both Creek and Christian thought. Ee traces it 
back tl1roL1gh Grot ins, SttDre7:, St. Thomas /-I.e: uinas, 1-\ugustino, 
2nd Jt. ?2ul. Paul is remernber>er1 ns referrint~ f;() t 1:e ·!.cntiles 
as doing o.v .noture t::t8 thin::~s which are contained in t~1e IJtCJ\7 
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even though they do not possess a written Jewish Law (Rom. 2:14). 
But it is Cicero, the Stoics, and above all Sophocles in his 
cbaracter, Antigone, who cletect an unwritten lRw, 
The unchangeable unwritten code of Heaven; 
This is not of today and yesterday, 
But lives forever, having origin 
Vlhence no man knows. 
(Sophocles Antigone ii. 452-60, George Younc; 1 s 
translation) 
The idea of natural laY/ is inseparably linked to the 
concept of teleology. Everytb.ing has a purpose, which when 
d.l.scovered, will be its way of functioning most normally. 
Hence the affirmation of norms is interwoven in every aspect 
of natural law. It is only the problem of freedom that seems 
to be inconsistent with this whole concept. ;,;ore will be said 
on this subject as we consider the role of the person in Mari-
tain 1 s thought. Yet !iari tain, almost like Descartes, submits 
the whole order of nature below man, to a fate void of freedom. 
--------------------------------- --··---
1Jacques i,Iari tain, j,!an and the State (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 85. 
This is evident in his treatment of horses: 
Any kind of thing existing in nature, a plant, 
a dog, a horse, has its own natural law, that is, 
the normality of its functioning, the proper way in 
which, by reason of its specif'ic str11cture and specific 
ends, it "should" achieve fulness of being either in 
its grov1th or 1n its behaviour •••• A horse's behaviour 
makes him a gdod horse or a vicious horse in the herd. 
\'/ell, horses o not enjoy free will-;-theTr nat11ral law 
is but a part of the immense network of essential ten-
dencies and regula.tions involved in the movement of 
the cosmos, and the individual horse who fails in that 
equine law only obeys the universal order of nature on 
which the deficiencies of his individual nature de,Jends. 1 
'This age-old problem was dealt with by Spinoza who 
concluded that man is no more free than the above description 
of the horse. The real question is what is meant by ''natural 
law" for if ever" action of a being is consistent with its , ,, 
nature, in what sense is any action a disobedience of the 
lc.w of its nature? 
l\!aritain approaches this problem when he distinguishes 
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between the Ontological and the Gnoseological aspects of natural 
law. This first aspect is the deeper ontological level which 
is identical with essence. hlaritain calls this the ideal order: 
Natural law is somethlng both ontological and idea~. 
It is something ideal, because it is grounded on the 
human essence and its unchangeable structure and the 
intelligible necessities it involves. Natural l!'.w is 
something ontolo~ical, because the human essence is an 
ontological real1ty, which does not exist separately, 
but in every human being. 2 
libid., p. 87. 
2Ibid., p. 89. 
The need for recognizing the second element comes 
at the point of human lmowledge of natural law. Mari tain 
says that only an angel who knew human essence completely 
plus all possible existential situations of man would know 
natural law completely. Although the Eighteenth Century 
philosophers believed they did lmow natural law in this 
sense, Maritain is very certain that we possess no such 
angelic knowledge. Hence the second element sr;rings from 
the fact that natural law is an unwri.tten law. He says, 
11 Man 1 s knowledge of it has increased little by little as 
man's moral conscience has developed ••• and very likely 
it will continue to develop and to become more refined as 
lone: as humanity exists ,nl The folly of Leibniz was in his 
belief that he could draw out from the i.dea of Caesar the 
historical life of Caesar. It was the same problem that 
Plato detected with his own doctrine of Ideas as he wrestles 
with it in the Parmenides. The a'JDlication of this distinc-
tion to economic values will be evident as we move into the 
relationship between the ideal and the practical. 
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Maritain is not sceptical at this point. In The Rights 
of i\'lan and Natural Law Maritain has made his case for natural 
law against all forms of positive law. There exists, he says: 
An order or disposition which human reason can discover 
and according to which the human will must act in order 
to attune itself to the necessary ends of the human being. 
The unwritten law or natural law, is nothing more than that. 2 
·-----
1Ibid., p. 90. 
2( New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943), p. 35 1 trans-lated by Doris C. Anson from the French edition of 1942. 
Bishop Fulton J, Sheen once illustrated the concept 
of natural law in ethics for an audience composed of m0mbers 
of the United States armed forces. Imagine, he said, that 
you bad two objects, a lead pencil and a tomato can. 
Suppose • , • you tried to open the can with the pencil, 
what would happen? Two things would happen. First of 
all, you would not be able to open the tin can with the 
pencil and secondly, you would break the pencil, So, 
when we attempt to attain happiness outside of the moral 
order and union with life and truth and love which is 
God, two things happen to us. First of all, we do not 
attain happiness, and secondly, we hurt ourselves. 1 
We cannot break a moral law, we only break ourselves, 
Lastly, anything required for the welfare of the human 
person is demanded by natural law, Natural law has to do v!ith 
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the end or purpose of r..an, and thus, whatever is a part of this 
ultimate end of man is a part of man's natural riGht. 
This lin.."k with natural law is seen operating in :,!aritain' s 
treatment of the right to private ownership of ,~oods. He says 
that without the concept of natural law we could never discover 
any basis for human rights. Since material goods are, by virtue 
of our bodies, necessary for life, then man has a ric;ht to them 
by nature. 
The right to the private ownershin of material r;oods 
pertains to natural law, insofar as mankind is naturally 
entitled to possess for its own common use the material 
goods of nature; it pertains to the law of Nations, or 
ju~_gentium, in so far as reason necessarily concludes 
~ for the sake of the comr.on good those material e;oods 
---------- -··-··-·--·-----
lMimeo!',raphed manuscript in the Chaplain's Newsletter 
of the Tenth Naval District, Federal Building, New Orle-ans ·12, La. 
must be privately owned, as a result of the conditions 
naturally required for their management and for human 
work (I mean human work performed in a r~enuinely human 
manner, ensuring the freedom of the human person in the 
face of the cowmunity). And the particular modalities 
of the right to private ormership, which vary accordinc 
to the form of a society and the state of the development 
of its economy, are determined by positive law. 1 
This is but one illustration of the natural law prin-
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ciple in application, however it is the basic one for i.'Iaritsin' s 
philosophy of economic value. Another argument advanced by 
liiaritain for private ownership will be examined later under 
the discussion on man's artistic nature, But first we must 
examine his concept of the person. 
5. The Role of the Person 
The problem of freedom was found to be the central 
problem in J,lari tain' s concept of nat ural law. It will be 
remembered that he· said, "Any kind of thine; existing in nature, 
a plant, a dog, a horse, has its own natural law, that is, the 
normality of _its functioning, the proper way in which, by reason 
of its specific structure and specific ends, it 'should' achieve 
i'ulness of being either in its growth or in its behaviour. 11 2 
It is only as we pass from things to persons that we enter into 
the problem or knowledge of ti:te law of one's own nature. Jciaritain 
makes it very clear that if a horse is a vicious horse instead of 
good horse that it is not a m:Jral matter, but simply the oberJ.ience 
of both horses to the law of their own individual natGres. He 
1Maritain, ~~n and the State, p. 100. 
2Ibid,, p, 87. 
says, ''If horses were free, there would be an ethical way of 
conforming to the specific law of horses, but that horsy 
morality is a dream because horses are not free. 111 
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!Jan, however, presents a different level of be in ·: one 
that is capable of determining the direction of his own action 
and responding to ~ood or evil, ~aritain says, ''The same word 
should starts to have a moral meaninp;, that is, to imply obli-
gation, when we pass the threshold of tile world of free agents. 
Natural law for man is moral law, because man obeys or disobeys 
it freely, not necessarily.rr2 The word that ~aritain prefers 
to use instead of the generic term 11 man 11 is the word "person. 11 
Let us tarn now to his reason for preferrinc; this term. 
The human person is definerl in the first pac;es of ;.:aritain 1 s 
'l'he Ric;ht s of J.ian and Natura.l Law. He says: 
It is essential, however, to throw lir<;ht on the very 
notion of the person, in order to characterize briefly the 
relationship between the human person and society. 
In each of as there dwells a mystery, and tl:at mystery 
is human personality. We know that an essential character-
istic of any civilization wort~1y of the na'11e is respect and 
feelins for the dignity of the human person. • • • Vihat 
precisely do we c~ean when vJe speak of the human :)erson? 
•.• All this means, in philosophical ter'11s, that in 
the flesh and bones of man there lives a soul which is a 
spirit and which has a greater value than the whole physical 
universe. However dependent it mev ':le on the sli;7 htest 
accidents of matter, the human )erson exists by virtue of 
the existence of its soul, which dominates time and death. 3 
-·------·------ ·-·· -----
1
Ibid,' p. 87. 
2Tb" d ::....2:__·' p. 87. 
~·.laritain, The Rights of l.Ian and Hatural Law_, pp. 5-6. 
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Notice carefully that !.:aritain hcs said that .!_!:1_ the flesh 
and bones of man there lives a soul. 'l'he finesse witl1 ':lhich 
]\caritain handles the problems of this dualism cannot obscure 
the soul substance theory around which it is constructed. Yet, 
regardless of his metaphysics, the emphasis u~on t~e dignity and 
worth of llUman [Jersonality is the chief cornerstone for his 
economic values. This must not be forr;otten. 
This concept of worth and dignity may be contrasted with 
the heritae;e that Emil Brunner has laborec'! under in Galvin and 
Jonathan Edwards, A. C. :ucGiffert says tbat the ,mrpose of 
Edwards, in contrast with sucr1 English Liberals as the Ar:ninian 
Taylor, was precisely to deny this core of ~reatness in man. 
;,lcGiffert says: 
his practical interest throughout was to humble 'c:an, 
to convince him of his total depravity and absolute bondage 
to sin, and so startle him out of his easy indifference and 
complacent self-confidence. The doctrine of unconditional 
predestination was but a corollary. It was not the ?;rest-
ness of God, b:;t the not:'l1ngness of man that he was primarily 
interested to enforce. 1 
This emphasis of Edwards (and, as it will be shown in 
the next chapter, Brunner) is in co0trast with the I" a in nurpose 
of ;,,aritain. Althouzh i~aritain v10uld not conceive of the dir;nity 
of man as existing apart from God and a spiritual universe, yet 
his positive emphasis upon the goodness and capacity for reason 
in man is evident from the following statement: 
The notion of personality thus involves !;nat of totality 
and independence; no matter how poor and crushed a person 
may be, as such he is a wf'ole, and as a person, subsists in 
-------- -------- ------------------------------ -··- ---
1 Arthur Cushman l'cGiffert, 2rote stant Thou:;ht Before 
Kant (Hew York: Charles Scribner's Sons,--r922), pp. 170-l:'i'i"; 
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an independent manner. To say that a man is a person 
is to say that in the depth of his being he is more a 
whole than a part and more independent than servile. 
It is to this mystery of our nature tbat relic.ious thought 
points when it says that tbe human person is the imar;e of 
God. 1 
This empbasis upon the supreme dignity and wortb of human persons 
will affect how r.:aritain deals with the ends of the economic 
order. Waritain says of society or any institution in society, 
such as the state or the economic order, that its chief end is 
to serve cersons. He says: 
Society • , • has its own good and its own work which 
are distinct from the good and the work of the individuals 
which constitute it, But this good and this work are and 
must be essentially human, and consequently become perverted 
if tl1ey do not contribute to the development and improvement 
of human persons. 2 
The role of the person is thus so central that :!Jari tain 
is classified by many as a Personalist in his system of philo-
sophy.3 His thought is actually more in sympathy with some 
-----·---------
lMaritain, The l_l_ights of l.lan and llatural Law, p. 6. 
2Ibid., p. s. 
3mlraritain contrasts three views of human rights--
1) a liberal-i!lflividualistic who "see the mark of hlll'lnn dignity 
first and foremost in the power of each person to appropriate 
individually the ;soods of nature in order to do freely whatever 
he wants; 2) the advocates of a communistic type of society see 
the mark of human dit;nity first and foremost in the power to 
submit these same goods to the collective command of the social 
body ••• ; and 3) the advocates of a personalistic type of society 
see the mark of human dignity first and foremost in the power to 
make these same goods of nature serve the common conquest of in-
trinsically human, moral, and spiritual ~oods and of man's freedom 
of autonomy •••• It remains to be seen who makes a faithful 
image and who a distorted image of man. As far as I am concerned, 
I know where I stand: with the tl:ird of the three schools oi' 
thought I just mentioned. 11 i.~ari tain, Man and the State, p. 107 (numbers mine). · ·------
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aspects of ideallsm than his dualistic metaphysics would suggest. 
Yet his form of personalism is ~ot to be confused with Personal 
Idealism or Spiritual Personalism. He differs also from all 
forms of Monistic Idealism in his insistence that there is true 
multiplicity. He would, like most oersonal idealists, conceive 
God as the supreme person and distinguish between a Creator and 
a creature. Alone; with genuine plurality there is cenuine free-
dom which all forms of monism have difficulty in maintaininc~ .1 
Yet he differs most from Personalistic Idealism in lc.is inter-
pretation of man's body and the pl~ysical world. 
Charles A. Pecher suggests that the most elementary 
catechism of Catholicism would suggest 11 that man is a creature 
composed of body and soul, and that the soul is immortal while 
the body is subject to corruption and death. 11 2 i'lould a man be 
a whole man without his body? Here is found crop11ing out the 
ancient controversies betfteen form and matter, individuality and 
universality, existence and essence. 
Strange as it may seem, for all of L;aritain's attacks 
upon idealism and disembodied spirits, it is within the context 
of spirit that he finds all that sugr:ests worth and dignity to 
man. An article of I.laritain published in one of the excellent 
1J,laritain 1 s excellent treatment of' the problem of freedom 
is found in Chapter XI "Freedom," in Bergsonian Philosophy and 
Thomism, pp. 252-277, but especially pages 273-277. -Here he seeks 
'EO distinguish the Thomistic idea of freedom from both Bergson's 
concept of spontaneity and the other extreme of a Calvinistic 
doctrine like Jonathan Edward's "Irresistable Grace." 
2Fecher, PJM, p, 156. 
volumes edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen reveals this spiritual 
emphasis. The article is entitled "The Conquest of Freedom. 11 
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Man is an individual who holds himself in hand by his 
intelligence and his will; he exists not merely in a 
physical fashion. He has spiritual superoxistence tlorough 
knowledge and love, so that he is, in a way, a universe 
in himself, a microcosmos, in which the great universe in 
its entirety can be encompassed thr::ugh 1mowledl$e. • • • 
Spirit is the root of personalitY. /italics mine; •••• It 
is this metaphysical mystery that religious thought desig-
nates when it says that the person is the image of God. The 
value of the person, his dignity and rights, belong to the 
order of t1Jings naturally sacred which bear the imprint of 
the Father of Being, and which have in him the end of their 
movement. 1 
Charles A. Fecher suggests that whenever ·J,laritain speaks 
of the nerson as an independent whole he immediately qLlalifies 
himself by reminding his reader that he is only "relatively 
independent." Here Fecher sees the essential distinction between 
Thomism a!"ld Kantian ethics. In Freedom in the :.~odern.'Norld, 
Maritain cautions us to use tt.e whole concept of person in ana-
logical fashion. This is his way of stressing the finite aspects 
of human personality. He says: 
The notion of person is an analogous notion which is 
realized in different degrees and on essentially different 
planes of ontological being. 'rhe human being is a person, 
that is to say a universe or v;hole of a spiritual nature, 
endowed with freedom of choice and intenderl to enjoy freedom 
of autonomy. He is no more a pure person than he is pure 
intellect. On the contrary, just as beTs at the lowest 
level of intellectual beings, so he ls also at the lowest 
level of personality. To forget this would be to confuse 
the personality of man with the personality of Angels or 
again of the Divine Persons in Whom alone (because the 
Divine Person is subsistent Being and subsistent Freedom 
1Jacques l·ilaritain, "The Conquest of Freedom, 11 Freedo.E:.L 
Its Meaning, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, Inc., 1940), pp. 635-636. 
of Autonomy) is realized in purest form--in Pure Act--
the perfection denoted by the word pArsonality. 1 
If man is unlike God and 11 Pure Personality" in this 
highest sense, this does not limit man in his capacity for 
continuous ;o;rowth and development as a person, The true end 
of man stresses not mere physical development or selfhood and 
individuality, but rather a movement towards the social self 
and man's highest good in God. "If the development occurs in 
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the direction of spiritual personality, man will be orientated 
towards the generous self and the heroes and saints. 'l'hus, man 
will be truly a person only in so far as the life of the spirit 
and liberty reigns over t'clat of the senses and passions. 11 2 
For all this emphasis upon growth in the direction of 
the spiritnRl life, however, r.;aritain returns to remj.nd ~'s that 
man is a union of soul and body, "Our whole be.i.ng is an indivi-
dual by reason of that in us which derives from matter, and a 
person by reason of' that in us which derives from spirit." 3 
'.Lo abstract from man either element is to denude him of his 
true rtature. Only for purposes of analysis can we make the 
distinction with perfect legitimacy. ~:odern thought is con-
demned most often by ilaritain because it tends to define man 
in terms of solely one aspect. A realistic philosophy of 
1Jacques Mcritain, Freedom in the ~odern World, trans. 
Richard o' Sullivan (Hew York: c·harles Scr~bner'~s1fo-ns-;- 1936), 
p. 47. 
'.lhree Reformers, trans. .J. F. Scanlan (New York: 
Charles Sons,- 1929, p. 25. 
~. "t • mj• '' d t~ n n d t J h J ~-~nr:t aln, .L _.,e .r_ erson an 118 ,_,ommon ~TOO , rans. o _n • 
( ,.--·-- ,..------ ' ¥itzseral~ New York: C~arles ~cr.LGncr'2 ~)o~s, J.~J47J, p. 39. 
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economics is thought by 1-.arita:i.n necessary to :Jrovirle for 
r:Gn his t)hysicnl needs and >·et subord.lnatc t~_c wY ole to 1~is 
spiritue_l end. 
6. Some Problems in the Economic Order 
~Arita5n's shift to social and economic philosophy did 
not 1_J1Volve, honever, a ne[;lect of t.cJeir J.nvolvement ]_n meta-
l'hysical and tr.eologicHl foundations. If there is nr.y ,-,oint 
that should be underscored for iJsritain it is his •nsistence 
thHt social, political, and economic activity should be sub-
ordinnted to the work of reason. 1 His theistic ~ersnnalism is 
the basis for all his social thinking. 
This may well be one of the ~ost naluable contributions 
of the writinr;s of I:aritain ~mc1 other Scholastics in the field 
of the nhilosoph'T of economic '!Blue. :'aritnirJ has not yet pub-
lished a separate work 0n "Scholasticism ~nd ·Economics" to 
n2ralJel ris :':icl,o1asticisr1 on"l Polltics2 or l•i s Art and Scholas-
ticisr.J. He does have sufficient material in his published 
''1ritin;_1;s, though, to give hir' 8 r;ood start tow2.rnc. :wcJ· a volume. 
Charles J. ';ials::,' s recent article rm "Economics nnd the 
Common Good" sums np tbe nositi0n :)f tt'e Scholaf-1ti.c.r:: lr. cconor:1ics 
1 
--cr. Jocr:ues aritr.ir, Science end "isrlor,•, trnn2. Bernard 
''f'll (Hew York: C:harles Scri.br.errs So"~•<JoT;--
~Jacqlles ~·,.~uritrd.n, Scf:olssticism G.Dd Politj_c~, trnns. 
:.ortimer .J. :Idler (New York-: The l:,acmilll'n C:oi:npany, T940). 
when he soys, "It is lmpossible to c1 ;"vorce economic8 from 
ethics and nolitics, 11 1 Walsh, writin~ cf the contrib11t~ons 
A nolitical sc!"entist, to economic ethics, s8id: 
Economics above ell is a practical science. It Closs 
not, ~enernlly speakinR, seek knowledce for its own sake. 
, •• "Economics deals with the individual 'ls 1--e is and 
not with an artifically sj_c:,olified 1 econom',c •wn. 1 On 
this account i"t is i"mpossible to rl:lvorce econo•ric2. from 
ethics end politics. 1'~~ Tl:e econo~ist cnn~ot fi10 the 
answer to policy questions solely wltbin the framework 
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of his own discipline, Attempts to do so--eR in the 
development of ~elfare Economics--have lcrl to a disaopoint-
inr series oi' short circuits. Human welfare in incH visible, 
and therefore policy decisions--even decisions of economic 
policy--must be r.1ore broadly ;C:BU£ied. 2 
In this need for a metaphysical Po~nrlation for economics 
l.'aritain VIOllld heartily concur. In Man _ai'~-!!~_St__:'l_l;_~ he snys, 
"There is nere an 8s8entia1 dat•1m nhich fnr surpasses every 
problem nf •::erely economic and social technique, for ; t i.s c 
moral datu.m, Bffectin.f: man 5_n llis s_piri tuBl rlepths. u3 l·.inn 
needs sc5_ence perfected by wisdom. 
ii, 'l'lle Person and the Common :1ood. 
insists that tbe nerson should never be subordinated to tbe 
lc· 1 J 1 ' "~ · ..~.llar es •. Ja 31_1, .c.Jconom:tcs 
Thou_c;_bt_ 29 (3pr:Ln··;, 1D.S4), p. 7, 
and tl~e Common Goorl," 
2Ibid,, p. 7. ~~-RichardT. 1~ly, Outlines of Ec.JYl::n~ics, 
·o. 11. ' .. :Blsh also f1as a nots tj_on sho'.'.'J.n:-.. u~se~)f --~!1-- -~~l~-£lcle ·o,_r 
(j1l·o·· or S"lt0"7<::!1rv 11 fll>'e ·~tflte _--..f' Plf--lr.c:~ ··:,'·c··)rJY··..::cQ 11 AmAricnn -
•• --'· "'-'''.~' .... _.. __ • ..JJC J __ .- •• C '-' •'--'-·l..<.U' '-'-GI 
:Sconor;Jic Hevle·::, June, lC-51. Three ~)b.D. dissertvt-:lo_n_S-1.\,rTtten 
IDT954\C-orneT1, Columbia, and New York University) are on the 
subject of a value system for ":elfRre ~conomics, thus showing 
the icportGnce oi' this nroiJlem for the economists. 
311sritain, Man and the State, p, 105, 
group. Here l<lari tain succeeds in drawing a line betv1een soli-
darism and individualism. Nineteenth century Traditionalism, 
such as represented by Lemannais, was based on the notion that 
as an individual, man is nothing without society. Georse Boas 
observes: 11 The reader will note the similarity between the 
social views of the Traditionalists and the Eegelians. The 
great difference between them was that the Traditionalists 
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were Catholics and the Hegeliens Lutherans. But both Hegelians 
(in !1Iarx) and Traditionalism (in Lemennai s) led into socialism. 11 1 
It is to be remembered, however, that modern Scholasticism repu-
diated Traditionalism. lvlaritain distinguishes the 11 body politic 11 
from the state or nation and tries to maintain that all rights 
begin with persons who compose the borly poll tic. 2 'l'here may be 
group action, but it should never be at the expense of the common 
fund of personal values. 
Secondly, l<laritain equally insists that individualism 
irresponsible to the common p:ood must be condemned. His writings 
on Housseau demonstrate this point. The attack he makes on 
laissez-faire capitalism and the classical economists also under-
scores it in economics. The common ,~ood l s never a seneral group 
will, but it ls the intelligent and genuine needs of the persons 
who compose the body politic. 
Maritain says, ''Let us not say that the aim of society 
is the individual ~ood or the mere aggregate of the individual 
1 Boas, mlhe MaJ·o_r Traditions of '<uropean Philosophy p 7 35 
-.- "' . ,, • u. 
2 See Chapter I, 11 The People and the State, 11 in Man and the 
State, pp. 9-19. 
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goods of each of the persons who constitute it. Such a society 
would dissolve society as such for the benefit of its parts, 
and would lead to an •anarchy of atoms.•••l It would result in 
the old disr;uised anarchic conception of what ;,:ari tain calls 
11 bour;:eois materialism" which permits the stronc; freely to 
oppress the weak. 
The common good is defined by ;.:aritain as follows: "The 
aim of society is its own cow~on good, the good of the Pocial 
body •••• This good of the social body is a common good of 
human persons, as tbe social body itself is a whole made up of 
human persons. 112 Therefore deviations in either rtirection 
would lead to either communism or anarchy. 
iii. 'rhe Catholic _Go!lcept of Rights and Duties. 
A basic distinction in all Catholic ethics is the 
difference between "rights" and 11 duties. 11 The natural l!HI 
basis for ethical theory is noticed, for example, in a criticism 
of Edgar s. Brightman by Professor Virgil ?.Iichel. Professor 
l1ichel quotes Brightman's Religio_us Values as follows: 11 0bli-
e;ation is binding not because a foreign power, even God himself 
legislates for me, but rather, because I legislate for myself; 
and, if I am true to my own reason, I cannot avoid nclmowledgine; 
my responsibility."3 Father ?:ichel objects to this Kantian view 
Th~Hights of l.1an and Natural Law, p. 8. 
2rb~~·, p. s. 
3Edgar S. Brightman, Religious Values (New York: The 
Abingdon Press, 1925), p. 63. -------
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of the autonomy of the 'Iloral law when he says: 
The cause :Jf moral obligation is thus man 1 s rela.tion to 
the rational order. 1,1an must deny himself, destroy his 
rationality, in order to deny all moral law. And rational 
order is inevitably forced on everyone's mind as soon as 
reason dawns, since it is an essential constitutive element 
of our human nature. 1 
This rational order is believed by Catholic thinkers to be 
identical with the will of God, though always revealed in 
natural law. Says Father Michel: 
The voice of reason in man is therefore at the same time 
the voice of the divine Author of our nature. • • • "It 
is not a sufficient answer, 11 Thomas Aquinas said lone; ago, 
"for anyone to say something is an offense against God, 
for God is not offended by us except by an action that is 
contrary to our good, 11 that is contrary to the good of our 
rational nature. 2 
lcaritain draws this distinction between tv:o opposing 
bases for human rights. 11The true philosophy of the rights of 
the human person is based upon the idea of natural law. 11 3 This 
is the way of st. Thomas. ''Another altogether opposite philo-
sophy has sought to base the rights of the human person on the 
claim that man is subject to no law other than his own will and 
freedom. 11 4 This is the way of Jean Jacaues Rousseau. It is a 
way of RatioDe.listic IndividLlalism and no Catholic could think 
of viewing man as an autonomous i.ndividual. 
\rbor, 
1
virgil Michel, Notes on a Philosophif of Conduct (Ann 
liiichigan: Mimeographed by :Edwards .':lro~hers, 1927), p. 58. 
2I bid., p. 61 ( Sumrr.a contra Genti_les, I II, 122) • 
3Maritain, The Rights of J·Jan and Natural Lav~, pp. 66-67. 
4Ibid., pp. 67. 
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Having established the proper basis for the ri2;hts and 
duties of man, l::aritain specifies these ric;hts in the remaining 
portion of his bool{, The Rights of ;,;an and ;-rat ural ~_:1!::, as--
1) the rights of the human person or personal ris;hts, 2) the 
ri,c•:hts of the civil person or political perscm, and 3) the rights 
of the social ;oerson or working person, This last namerl area 
will be discussed later in r;reater detail, for it is sufficient 
here to simply lay the foundations. 
iv, Human Equality. 
Do all persons have equal rights? The French Revolution 
with its cry of liberty, equality, and fraternity was often 
interpreted as reducing all men to the same level, Maritain 
bel;eves that an inescapable fallacy of Housseau 1 s autonomous 
man is the red•J.ction of individuals to equal units. If one 
assumes the equality of every person, then the logical conclu-
sion would lead to some kind of ''plateau'' view of society. The 
fact that there has never existed a society without class dis-
tinctions did not deter Rousseau (nor orthodox ~-arxist theory) 
from postulating a mythical state of nature in which this kind 
of equality could exist. ; .. aritain, thoush, poses the question, 
"Can men claim such eqLJ.ality? 11 
J<'irst, Uaritain says, let us examine the purely nomin-
alist or empiricist view of man. The extreme empiricist can 
see no other basis for the name "man" save the convenient assign-
ment of meaning to creatures infinltely varied. As Eeracli tus, 
the Obscure, they can see constant flux, variety, and change, 
but find no common ,-;round--no core of human nature. ITaritsin 
says, "A pure empiricist is one of those thinldnc; beinFs, who, 
as Plato said, cling to the trunk of trees and hug rocks, able 
to comprehend only what they see nnd touch. 111 This view can 
lead only to the philosophy of totalitarianism and enslavement 
as it denies any underlying unity or equality to men. 
Second, Maritain exam:',nes another false idea of human 
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equality. This is the position of the pure idealist. He says: 
For all those who unwittingly thin]{ as pure idealists, 
the unity of human nature is the unity of a suosisting Idea, 
of' a man-in-himself existing out side time, and of whom the 
individuals in concrete life are shadows without SDbstance; 
in such a view, this realj.zed abstraction is reality itself. 
• • • The inequalities sworn to be experience are not exactly 
denied, any more than is the ecnpirical world in the Platonic 
philosophy; rather they are rebuffed, pushed aside by t~r 
mind, . . . 
The idealist error on this sub.j ect does not C.)nsist in 
tllinking there is an essential equality among men. It con-
sists in seeing and affirming only that, in reducing tbe 
whole human substance to the abstract species alone. 2 
In other words he feels the pure idealist erbitrarily stresses 
too mucb unity and achieves equality at the ex~Jense of vital 
differences bein;:; neglected. The position of' the pure idealist 
is that of giving attention to essence at the expense of matter. 
The debate between St. Thomas and Duns Scot us may be recalled at 
this point. St. Thor;Jas followed /lristotle in claiminc;; that 
matter is the principle of individuation. "That is to say, it 
is by virtue of the matter, the material constitution, of s 
1Jacques Naritain, Ransominc; the 'rime, trans. ,;arry Lorin 
Binsse (New York: Charles Scrlbner' s Sons, 1:?41), p. 3. 
2
-b'd 10 11 ~.,pp. - ". 
thing that it exists as an individual witllin a 'iven species. 
It is also by virtue of matter that the species itself is 
capable of i_nf'i.nite multiplication. 111 Tllis is AC]Llinas' way of 
e. voiding loss of individuality. Duns Scot us used e. mucb more 
radical solution for the problem of individuality and differed 
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from St. Tbomas Aquinas by attributing individuation to essence 
rather than material existence. ~hereas St. Thomas sugcested 
tbat only the non-corporeal angels differ from :me another by 
virtue of their species, Duns Scotus extended this concent to 
man a.nd all other creatures, As c.1sual, '\aritain follows St. 
Thomas in holding to an ulttmate dnalism of form ;n matter. 1 :an 
is sn individual by virtue of his body but a person by virtue of 
his essence or soul. 
In what sense, then, d.oes ::raritain believe in h . .uman 
equality? His answer is in wr"a.t he calls "Christian equality" 
or simply "Christian realism." It is a careful balaC~cins of 
unity in the midst of va.riety, not as in a flatonic Idea, but 
in the concrete individual. He says: "Equality of nature among 
men consists in their concrete communion in tbe mystery of the 
l1uman species, It does not consist in an idea, but it is hidden 
in tl1e heart :)f the individual and of the concrete, in the roots 
of each man's substance. 11 2 
In order to understand this we dUst understand i.:ari tain' s 
view of the levels of apprehension. AlthouRl1 men often appear 
1Fecher, PJM, pp, 156-157. 
2
·- it i R . h ' . J,:ar a n, ansomlns t e rlme_, ~ 17. 
unequal and unlovable, deeper analysis reveals this common 
core of human nature. 11 Ee;alitarian idealism deciphe:rs tbe 
v10rd eouali ty on the surface. 
in its deepest dimensions,nl 
Christian realism deciphers it 
To say one mon is as ~ood as 
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another is to reduce man to nihilism and pessimism. But to see 
all men in Christ is to lcnow each man for what he i_s--o rational 
Cl'eature, yet an .ultimate mystery of belng, lcnovm unto God alone. 
Finally, Laritain would say, this metaphysical core of 
equality is primary and all other inequalities are secondary. 
This must not be allowed, tho~gh, to obscure the inequalities 
which do exist, Equality of opportunity, for example, is not 
the same tl1ing as c;iving ever:r man exactly tLe same. 'l'he follow-
in,c~ statements of Laritain have great sign:t.ficance on the tlleme 
o1~ philosophy of' economic value: 
Socinl equality itself imfJlies a certain dynamism, 
Like liberty, it is itself an end t~ be won, with diffi-
cu_1.ty a.nd at the cost of a certain tension of the ener;:;ies 
of' the spirit •••• It demands not only the practice of 
distributive justice in the body politic, it demands also, 
so far as this is possible, the free participation of all 
the elementary material and s,1iri tual ;;oods and the redis-
tribution of the common r;ood to persons. It demands pro<7,ress 
in social justice; the organlc development of le~al insti-
tutions; the accession, in greater or less degree, of persons 
to political 1 He; a transition to conditions r0ally CJffering 
to all an equal opportunity--equal in a proportional sense 
/italics mine7--to make each one1 s-gH'ts be or fr-uYt-, -and-· 
permitting an aristocracy born of c:>ersonal work wllich turns 
back to the common good the excellence of its works; a greater 
and greater sharing by all in the goods of culture and the 
spirit and in the interior liberty supplied by mastery of 
oneself and knowledge of the truth. 2 
-------------------------------------
libid., p. 21. 
2r bid., p •. 29. 
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In the above passage it will be noted how much l~aritain 
reflects the aristocratic tendencies of Aristotle, But this is 
tempered by e. Christian sense of service-- an aristocracy of work 
(to insure its efficiency), yet a sharinu; of all with the common 
life (to insure its proper distribution). 
I<' or the pror)er spirit of sharing ?c:ari tain turns to St. Paul 
(on whom r_e has written a commentary dedicated to Ruth Nand a Anshen) 
and transposes 11 man 11 for "CJo..r.Lst" in the famous Christolozical 
passape in Phil, 2:6-ll: 
He, though he was by nature God, yet did he not set 
great store on his equality with God: rather, he emptied 
himself by takinr, the nature of a slave and becoming like 
men. And after he had appeared in outward form as man, he 
humbled himself by obedience unto leath, yea, unto death 
upon a cross, Wherefore, God hath exalted him above the 
highest. 1 
The only difference, of course, is th8t man's equality is not 
one with God, but only with a common human nature made in God's 
image. It is the spirit of t:.1rnin,c; away hoardin,:; and rendering 
unto the fund of common good that Maritain urn;es upon all, l•'or 
every right there is a corresponding duty. 
An excellent section in the St. Paul commentary reveals 
l.iaritain' s attitude toward the relation of work to the community. 
Uaritain is commentinc; on Paul's admonitiJn, "If any would not 
work, neither should he eat'' (II Thess. 3:10), and he says: 
---------- ------------------
1Jacques i.:aritain, 'rhe Living 'l'honghts of Saint Paul, 
trans. Harry Lorin l:linsse (New York: L"one;mans, GreeTia't1dCOrii;;any, 
1941), p. 103, An excellent section in this volume gives ~ari­
tain 1 s commentary on Paul's teachine;s concerning 11 'i.'he 'remporal 
Order,'' pp. 126-132. 
Paul does not mean to require everyone to do manual 
labor, or, even more generally, labor economically produc-
tive. But the word work can be taken in a muc11 broader 
sense, includins everything which redounds from man's 
activity to LlsefLll service for the community (even the 
altogether inward activities which s•Jtt a state c:Jf life 
dedicated to contemplation and prayer). ffiaritain might 
have added philoso hy and art_,_7 In that sense each man is 
expecteo, in accordance with his condition, his gifts, his 
possibilities to play his personal part in the bl.lrdens of 
the community. 1 
Does this mean that l'aritain' s philoso1)hy of economics 
suggests a hierarchy of values in which art and prayer have a 
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position higher tl1an the :ohysical c;oods? r.caritain will :co even 
further and sugC'·est that the very function of work, when it is 
creative in the broader sense of the term, has an aesthet:Lc 
quality. This position will now be examined. 
v. Art, Faith and Economics. 
hlaritain achieved his first real recognition OLltside 
Scholastic circles with his writings on art and poetry.2 Yet 
how are religion and art involved in a discussion of his eco-
nomic views? Like the ladder of love in Plato's Symposium 
Maritain makes a triad of things, art, end spirit witl1 the Llp-
ward thrust of man's spirit r:tsinc; from things to God. Professor 
Gerald Phelan in the earliest biography of !daritaln calls ~aritain 
an e.postle to the sickness of the modern vn rld. Phelan writes, 
··------------------- -----
lrbid., p. 131. 
2
see Jacques '.aritain, Art et scolastique (Paris: Louis 
Houart et fils, 1920), trans. J. F'. Scanle.n, Art and Scholasticism 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, l93C). ---·-----
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"This disease of modern man is a disease of the mind and nothing 
below this level can effect a cure,"l 
An examination of art suggests that the artist works 
midway between the physical order and tl:e spiritual order. Art 
never thrives devoid of all spirit, ~illiam Ernest Hocking once 
said, ''Religion , , , is the mother of the arts •.•• The work 
of religion is a perpetual parentage; the status of the arts is 
a perpetual dependence. 11 2 l,laritain puts l.t this way, "The time 
comes when by dint of isolation from the highest life of man, 
art itself dies of starvation. • • • Let it founder, shout, 
blaspheme all it will, it will be cured only if it finds Cl:>.rist. 11 3 
The so-called "economic man'' is like the artist--if his 
deeper nature is a life of the s;:>irit, then he is never wl1ole 
until he becomes more than an "economic man." Leon Bloy wrote 
once concerning women: "There are but two aspects, two essential 
modalities, to which the Infinite must necessarily accommodate 
itself: Beatitude or Voluptuousness. Between these two there 
is only the Respectable Vloma12_, that is, the female of the Bourgeois, 
the absolutely damned, whom no halocaust can redeem. " 4 'I'he 
------·-
1Gerald fhelan, Jacques Maritain (New York: Sheed and 
Ward, Inc., 1937), p, 12. 
2
·Nilliam Ernest Hocking, J.'he Lieaning of God i.n Human 
Experience (Hew Haven: Yale University Press~T9T2)-,-p,J.-:r4and 
23. --
3 ' i . . . J Jacques ~ar ta1n 1 Art and ~a1th, trans, ean Coleman (New York: The l'hilosophicalLibrary, Tnc., 1948), p, 104. 
4Le'on Bloy, Pil•7 rim of the Absolute, trans, John Coleman 
and harry Lorin Binsse -nlew Yor·k-:--:Pantheon-Books, Inc., 1947), 
p. 307. 
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Respectable Woman is barren of any spiritual attainment. ''The 
woman saint may fall into the mire and the prostitute may ascend 
into lie;ht, but never will either of tllem become the respectable 
v10man. 111 
'Nriting to an artist friend, Jean Choctean, ;.laritain 
views Cbocteau 1 s desperate struggle with opium as the sarce basic 
struggle as Bloy described in women in the above. ~arltain 
writes: 
Opium gave yon an appearance of respite •••• Shall I 
condemn the opium-smoker because he is tryin,c; to free him-
self from this lying life? No, but because &e uses wicked 
means, he makes use of an evil to floe an evil; he trnsts 
in a lie to escape lies. 2 
Yet karitain does not condemn, but only pities his 
artist friend. ''Nobody, says St. Thomas, can live without 
pleasnrable feelinp;s. That is why he vlho is de."rived of 
spiritnal pleasures passes to carnal oC!es."3 Scliopenhauer some-
what reverses this order wlcen he v1rote tt.et a woman "needs a lord 
and master. If she is younG, it will be her lover; if she is 
old, a priest ." 4 Maritain urses his friend to turn from opium 
to the Sacrament: 
'i';antinr; to cure oneself of the human by means of man--
or the animals, or of' CJlsnts--is a homicidal error. Such 
an error circulates in all false mysticisms, and 1s mater-
ialized in onium, where it takes a vegetable form: the poppy 
in place of the Paraclete. Opium is most 1Jerverse when it 
sends i.tself as a vehicle of a spiritual life, and claims 
1Ibid.' p. 
2. 0 t 0 1,·,ar1 aJ..n, 
3 Ibid., p. 
307. 
P.rt and Faith, pp. 80 and S2. 
94. 
4De\Vitt H. Parker ( ed.), Schopenhauer Selections (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), p. 447. 
to lead to that Emptiness that God alone can "1rodL1ce. 
Quietism in ~ills, sacrament of the devil. 1 
A quiet stlrvey of American cult=e will reveal much economic 
activity directed closely along these lines, if not such an 
openly illec;al drug as opitlm. 
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Now Iiaritain is stlgcestlng that there sre three levels 
at w~ich J.ifo can be lived--physical, the ~rts, onrJ tbe ~oly. 
He writes: "No one comes so near tice i~.nvisible '.'Jorl<'i as the 
r_c' 01_: ''_ -, Yl 
the~•selves of no holp to tho ottninment of eternal lire, art 
o_r1d Joetr;r sre more necess8ry tlJan bread to the }'unDn r2ce. 
They fit it for the life of the spirit. 11 2 Poetry hos been 
compared by Larita.Ln to a .Jacob vvl:o limped Dfter· ld_s struc:r~le 
sa;rs Sa.int Thomas, for havi:1·-- l"novrn God 1 s sweetness :>le remains 
1.7eaJc o:r_ the side tr_,At leans on the worlrJ. n3 'l1he ~"'oet, too, gains 
his inspiration from the spiritual but works :'~n the visible medium 
of this world. Does the Christian economist "lOt <'<J likewise? 
In the seme ~ay economic goods are of value only ~s they 
aid man in ~is upward thrust towards the divine. 3ut if any 
man fixates et the level nf the ~hysical, he becomes another 
miser, and, as fsr as the common ~·ood, 8 barren bo•1rc:eois r1oma.n. 
1 ~T,I3ritPin, !•rt_?_r:_d Fe~lth, ''0 p. r- {·. 
2Ibi~., 'c. 94. 
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become when tnlki~g ~bo•·t the economic orne~? ~ere · aritain is 
f8cecl ''lith the rl.ilem·••a of s~:'ino: either too much or t.oo J ittlo. 
Yet it is not for fear oP having his irl.eas tested that prevents 
him from drawin,r: detailed blue-pri n.t s of an ideal economic orcl.er. 
L1:1ter it will be sho,·•n thet ;\rchbishop ·.iill.iam •renmln ·."'ns faced 
Order. Finally, or1lv nt the 8dvice of h_:l~ eco:n:>mists frienr:ls, 
he ,ernitted tl1e insertion of an appendix of specifics. 
An illl;.stratior. of T:aritain' s hannlin.cc of the sar.:e 
tension is found in 3chol~sticism ann Politics as he deals with 
the needs of modern democrncJ. Hn s~~'s, ''I ~ill not attempt 
to explain hero l1o~ I i~nGire this representativ~ s~rste~. l am 
no leGislator, nor inventor of constitutions. 111 Yet ~e imme-
diately adds a two-page footnote filled with specific 9roposals 
prefaced '''itr1 these remsrlcs: "Eowever, in order to :)revectt the 
suspicion that I have no definite idea of w~at such a system 
rni~ht be, T will. give, as simple indications, the fol.lowine 
details. 112 If he COL\l~rl clo tc•i.s ie1 !''r.9rce for the renewal of a 
democracy, we ,~an rest assured t•ot he coulcJ. '~Jal:e cL~ellar soecl-
f'ic su~[entions for economic renewal i.n this nation or q~y nrtion 
in which he be~Rme A student of the nroblem. 
lv · t · Q h 1 t ' · "" ' 1' t · ~.:arl a1n, o...~<? _o G s lCJ._sm o .!1~.!__~~-.l_c:?E_, p. 1J.5. 
2rbi~~-·, p. 115. 
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There is !DOd evidence that he has become rnther s8ecific 
concern5_ng 0c:>no~ics in the follorvins ~)laces: P.n cssny, 11 l)ersons 
and Property, 11 found as an oppenrlix to ~~r__e_cd_Of>:!_!'_I1_:'"l__t2~e _ __l~o:'er!J-_ 
T.:;_o~lG:_)l nrrhe :i:L~~~hts of the ~Jorkin:-: Per8·.n:" :L"' rrl::_:~.i~~c_:_:~t-_!:;~_ . .?!.T_]iti:§_~ 
_an~ __ i:~~tllrnl Ln~-;:; 2 ti1c last t:·ree cCJ.anters i·• 3c_l::2_l~o~~c_l_~-:cn_nd 
II , ' 1 " ~ t II '1 C!~lO)tcr 'TII, The j~robJ orn of .. or_ u :covcrnmen . · Also there is 
a. little sectior, called "Economic .'luralism11 in True Bum::mism. 5 
rr.ent of ,T. F. Clldhnm in h5_s Introdllction to tt•e •Jxford Conference 
Reports: 
For Christian faith, however, the good is understood in 
a way which means that it can never be fCJrrnnlBted s.s a fixed 
proe;ram of human action. 
. . . 
Christian ethics is far more concerned with persons 
than with institutions, programs or systems. • • • 6 Christian faith can create a new spirit in society. 
1Maritain, Fr~edom_ in _!:!le -•-odern 'il()_r_l_c_1, pp. 193-214. 
2naritain, 'Phe Righ~i'__I~_!l!l anJ'--_Hatural La:w, pp. 50-62. 
3,,., j t . 
_,,o_r __ a1.n, 
Chap. 
Chap. 
Chap. 
Scholasticism and ?olitics, 
VII "P.ction end ContemPlation, 11 pp. 170-193. 
viii "Catholic Action and ?oli tical f,ction, 11 
pp. 194-225. 
IX "Christianity and Earthly Civilizations," 
pp. 225-248. 
~fcaritair., !;·'an and the State, pp. 188-216. 
5 Jacques I.iari tain, True liumani sm, trans. l'. R. Adamson 
(London: Geoffrey Bles; The Centenary-Press, 1938), pp. 158-159; 
but :pp. 177-193 are also rJ.ch in economic i.deas. 
6J. H. Oldham (ad.), '!'he Oxford Confereace (Chicago: 
Willett, Clark and Company, 1S'37), pp. 29-30. ----
168 
What might be listed as ~Britain's ~oals for a more 
Christian Economic Order? These may be reduced to tbe following, 
some of which doubtless overlap. 
i. "A L!_fe Less Pre_o.£_~upiec1 by the l.iaterlal." 
'l'he earlier discussion of "Art, Faith, and Economics" 
presented the status of art rr.idway between the purely ]]hysical 
and the wholly spiritual. The desire of Earitain is to ;:ive 
human life its upward thrust toward the divine. Therefore, the 
first goal of any good economic order is to so supoly life with 
its ~hysical needs that man can afford to be less and less 
occupied v1ith the material. 
;,aritain has a beautiful introductory chapter Wilicil l1e entitled 
in 1932 11 Tl1e Grandeur and;, isery of i'etaphysics.'' A vital part 
of the tragedy of our modern world is its subordination of man 
to the machine, hlaritain says: 
It is only too clear that the ;:>assage of hl<Menity unr!er 
the dominion of J,loney and 'L'echnics is marked by a prog'I'essive 
materialisation of tbe intellect and the general world alike. 
On the other l1and, the spirit, with which our social and 
discursive activities dispense more and more, can itself 
claim to be dispensed from directing tbe fortunes of the 
ore;anic functions of human life, and enjoy a sort of deliver-
ance--at least virtually. 1 
He uses as an illustration of this principle the state-
ment of Jean Cocteau, "Photography has delivered paintins," and 
tben tries to apply it to other areas. Technic ought to free man 
1;,1aritain, The Degrees of Knowlede;e, trans, bernard \'/all 
and r;arzot R. Adamson, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), 
p. 18. 
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rather than enslave him, hlaritain says: 
In themselves technical inventions ought to open ti'e Ylay 
to a life less preoccupied by the material, but by the 
fault of man they tend rather to the oppression of the 
spiritual, Does this mean that we ou~ht to renounce 
teclmical discoveries or else give onrselves up to vain 
ret:;rets? That has never been my opinion. But reason must 
assert her huma.n regule.tive power. • . '1nrnan liberty can 
chanq,e it. 1 ----
It may be remembered that : .. aritein is a ~rest admirer of 
:Iahatma Gandhi to whom he devotes Appendix II in Freedom in the 
T!Iodern World. 2 l•lari tain does not agree with Gandhi's Spinning 
':'iheel Economy, for without science and technology the modern 
world's mass of population could never be fed and clothed, But 
Gandhi's spirit of independence and local initiative is what 
l·::aritain commends. Not B. renunciation of science, but a puri-
fication of its applications is llaritain's solution. 
ii. Increasing Leisure. and Its Creative Use. 
Here we have a second goal for an economic system--that 
of freeing man from the drudgery of life. ).[an should strive, as 
was suggested above, to work with things and yet not become a 
thing, One of the ways to Hvoid the curse of technological society 
is in our use of increased leisure. 
Leisure is itself a soal of our economy, l.Taritain has 
written: 11 By removinc; obstacles and opening t''e c'1.oors, the body 
politic, its free agencies and institutions, would positively 
libi~., p. 18 (I•'ootnote #2). 
2Maritain, Freedom in the L:odern Yiorld, i•.ppendix II, 
"The Doctrine of •ss.tyagraha' as Se"'t"F6-rthoy'":.:•. K, Gandhi," 
pp, 215-223. Also Karitain gives a section of Kan and the State 
to Gandhi, pp. 67-71, 
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facilitate the effort of the apostles of the Gospel to go to 
the ffiasses and share their life, to assist the social and moral 
work of the nation, to provJ-d~__:p_eople w~tJ:l:..J:.E3~~S21!'~-~~rthy of 
human digni~ Lftalics min!J, and to develop witl:.in them the 
sense of liberty and fraternity.'' 1 
It is Maritain' s conviction that the poets and 'Jhilo-
sophers have something to contribute to the common p;oocl, not 
merely the engineers and the ditch diggers. But ti•e life of 
the intellect takes leisure. This is not a need only for the 
poet and tl1e philosopher, though they need more leisure, perhaps, 
than the average person, but for the worker as well. The life 
of the spirit is squeezed out of a person whose life is filled 
with a continuous round of rlrudgery. 
Ylork itself should have something of the creative in it, 
for like art, it too, in Catholic terminology, is a work of the 
practical intellect. 
There is a kind of aristocracy in Maritain's spirit and 
thinking, yet it is an aristocracy of reason and 5.ntellect sub-
ordinated to the common good. His argument could very well follow 
along with Josef Pieper's view that leisure is the very basis of 
culture.2 
Perhaps no finer statement of ~Britain's view concerning 
the spirit which should subordinate economics to a higher ethic 
can be found than in the section of 'l'rue Humanism entitled, "Human 
Dru 
1;-.:aritain, ;,ran_~md the __ State, p. 179. 
2Josef Pieper, Leisure the Basis of Cult_ure_, trans. Alexander 
(New York: Pantheon Books, J.n-c.-;·1952). 
Personality and the Economic Community. 11 i.leritain says: 
I do not forget that the technical aspect of social 
life, though the most subject to necessity, is also the 
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one which changes most rapidly, and that the economic 
structure of a new Christendom may be very rlifferent from 
the scheme of which the dominate featLires of the industrial 
econom;r of to-day sugcest the outlines in the not too dis-
tant future. But the aim of t:'lis dic;ression has only been 
to SLlggest that tlc.e subordination of these technically dom-
inant forces to those of a higher ethic is what alone gives, 
as I suggested e 'noment ago, its t~·pical rr,orphology and 
ultimate specification to an economic structure, and when 
we adopt a Christian !]hilosop.hy of man, of work, and of the 
ownership-ofmaterial o;oods Zitalics min~l ~whole aspecf 
of these mo-st -ircportant economic oroblems cl1anges, so to 
speak, its meaning. 1 
Since we have already dealt with his Christian philosophy of 
man, let us deal now with !lis idea of work and ownership, only 
in reverse order. 
iii. The _ _:"_e_taphysical_"rou.nd of Private Ownership. 
Maritain traces tlle metaphysical ground for private 
ownership baci: to St. 'l'homas Aqu.inas and his u.se of the natural 
law concept. Tru.e, . aritaJ.n daes not find tl1e objective basis 
for ownership in natural law but ratr;er as a right r:ranted l._u.s 
gentium, 
!.Iari taln makes this distinction in his T~e_ _H._i::~hts ..?!:.._ i'an 
and ila~u.ral Law by saying: 
i-•'an' s ric;llt to existence, to personal freedom and to 
tl1e pursu.it of the perfection of moral life, belongs, 
strictly speaking, to natural law. The right to the 
private ownership of material goods, rooted in naturol 
law, belonss to the Law of Nations, or ju.s gentium, in so 
far as the rin;ht to t['1e private ownershL' of the cneans of 
prodLJ.ction supposes tl1e conditions ''ormall:r recwired for 
human work and for its management (which v2ries, :r'oreover, 
L. . t . uar1 aJ.n, True Humanism, 
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according to the form of o society and the state of 
development of its economy). Anrl the narticular modalities 
of this right ere detGrmined by positive law. 1 
Yet he does beJ.teve trat a right to tbe use :Jf mater•Lal 
goods is derivative from tile rights (obtainable by natm•al law 
alone) of the person. Hence, although the private ownership 
ri~cht is 1:Jrimarily j_t:t_s gentillll!, yet it is "rooted in natural 
law. 11 For the person cannot exist as a :1ersoY" wi t!Jout suffi-
cient goods for livelihood. F~ states: 
The ri.';ht to the ')rivate ownersl:in of material goods 
relates _to the human oerson as a!1 extenston of the per::wn 
itself /_italics min_(')T, for 1 enmeshGd--in TB-tt er ·a-nd-,!Jff:io-tlt 
natllral protectL)n for its exister-,ce end its freedom, jt 
must have the power to acquire and oossess in order to make 
up for the :rotection which nature does not afford. 2 
This statement of pro~erty rights is close to the •liblical 
concept ::>f property, v:hich, es~:Jecially in hebrew tlntlght, did not 
distinguish between the rights ::>f the uerson and Jo.is property. 
In the desert the Israelite would die without his herds and his 
tent. !,;ari tain finds this Biblical attitude reflected i_n the 
writin;s of Aquinas and the Popes. 
Jolm A. Ryan l'ws an excellent treatment of the role of 
property in his crticle in Essays in Thomism under the title of 
"The Economic Pbil.osoDhy of St, 'l'homas. 11 He suggests that sub-
stantially all the economic teachinss of St. Thomas can •·e found 
in the ethical section of t!Je Sumn~ ~'heoloE_ic_a_ and cRn be examined 
under seven heads: 1) the virtue of .i ustice; 2) private ownership; 
---------·-----
1 .. , . t' • ;.,.arl aln, 
2 
Ibid., 40 (footnote) • 
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3) use of wealth; 4) duties of wealth: 8lmsgivirc; aw' liberality; 
5) just price and just wage; 5) trade; and 7) us~ry. 1 Ryan notes 
that numbers 3 and 4 are treated mainly on t:>-te basis of charity, 
while numbers 2, 5, 6, and 7 are considered as comin:3 under tl-Je 
principle of justice. 
Private ownership is discussed by St. Thomas in ~iving 
an illustration of the difference between j us__r:mot i~m_ and jus 
nat:1rale. Ee says that there is noth:i.ng ln natural law that 
suggests that a field should belong to one man more than another. 
But considered in relationshi'J to jus_~::enti~ \'le find reasons 
which Ryan quotes from the Summa Tl~e__o_lo;;ica ls as follows: 
First, because everyone is more sol~citous aoout oro-
curing what beloncs to r.iraself alone than thHt v:i:.Lch is 
common to all or many, sL1ce each, shunni:-~c; labour, leaves 
to another which is the common burden of all, as haDpens 
with a multitude of servants. Secondly, bec8use human 
affairs are conducted in a more orderly fashion if each has 
his mm duty of ~~rocuring a certain t:1in:;, while there ·:wuld 
be confusion, if each should Procure thinro;s haphazardly. 
Thirdly, because in this way the oeace of men is better 
preserved, for each is content with his own. ~hence we 
see that strife more frequently arises amonr; t!cose who had 
a thing in common and undivided. 2 
Perhaps the Greater emphasis In the tenchinss of St. 
1'bomas is directed, not against communism in defense of cop:l-
talism, but rather in SL1pport of the ri,;ht of n Christian to 
renounce private c;oods for religious reascms. Here the distinc-
tion would need to be Iil&de between tbe rlgict to manac;e external 
--· -------·-----···--·---- ---·--- ---·- ----- ------··-----·---
1Jolm A. Ryan, "The Economic Philosophy of St, Tho:r.as, 11 
Essays in 'Ehomism, ed. ilobert :S. 3rennan (New York: Sheed and 
v1 a r-ef, 1942T;Il---;--239. 
2Ibid., p. 240 (S.T,, II-II, q. 57, a. 3). 
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goods and the rie;ht to use external ;oods. No monk can exist 
as a human cein~ without the t•se and consumption of external 
.c;oocls, but he ,;Jay renounce his richt to ovmership of them, 
Another yet finer noint would be the lack of clistinc-
tion in St. Tlwmas' day between the goods of consumption and 
instrur.-:ents of prodtlction. 'l''lere is nothi:1;:; in his teachinF;s 
which v10uld seem to deny t:1e right of t!1e state to c;ossess certain 
instruments of production which might be needed for the advance-
ment of the coramon good, Hence the extrer,1e capitalism villi ch 
sees any interference by the state and the belief in the complete 
autonomy of eoc;· individual ovmer is just as i'oreic;n to the inten-
tion of St. rrbomas ns the thesis of conununism. 
Indeed, under the topics of 11 Lise of ·.·ealth" and "Duties 
of ,iealth 11 there is found a discussion of the social responsi-
bili ties whi clc private ownership entails. Going hf1ck to Aristotle, 
St. Thomas a,Trees, 11 ct is evident tllnt it _:L_~~-st to hav~j2:r:_OPE)Ft:z 
privat_(3 __ bu~~-fa_ake __ t._~-~~_El_c:>_i.:_i_i_;___2__~mmo_E Litalics mind; Ollt how 
the citizens are to be brouc,ht to this mind it is the onrticular 
business of the lecislator to consider, 111 
'The link between St. 'l'homas and :.laritain' s writinc;s on 
economic philosophy is the wealth of social thou[;ht in the c;reat 
papal encyclicals. On the fortieth anniversary of ~eo XIII's 
Rerum l'Jovarum, Pius XI r0affirmed those principles and brought 
them up to date in support of the labor qu0stion i~ an encyclical 
entitled Qu~d!agesimo Anno, generally tra:1slated as 11 0n Reconstruct-
-----------" -
lr_bid,, p. 244 (Pol_i~ic~_, ii, 5), 
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in~ the Social Order.'' Since this was issued on !:ay 15, 1931, 
in the very throes of a world-wide depression,he could speak 
with feelin') these words: 
Nature, rather tl'e Creator ilimself, has given tEan the 
right of private ownership not onl.y tlwt incUvLluals may 
be able to provide for themselves and their families but 
also that the ~oods which tl'e Creator destined for the 
entire family of man'dnd, "'lay, through this institution 
truly serve this nurpose. All this can be achieved in no 
wise except through the maintenance o.f a certain and defin-
ite order. 
Accordingly, twin rocks of shipwreck must be carefully 
avoided. Por, as one is wrecked upon, or comes close to, 
what is knovm as "individualism" by denying or minimizing 
the social and public character of property, so by reject-
in0 or minimizing the private and individual character of 
this sarr;e right, one inevitably runs ic;to "collectivism" or 
at least closely approaches its tenets. 1 
It will be noticed that neither St, Thomas nor the 
papal encyclicals discuss private ownership without doin8 so 
in the light of the social responsibili. ties of property. 
"'aritain says, immediately after affirmin.•0 the need of orivate 
ownership to supply the 1naterial fOOds for the life of any 
person, that this right to ownership must never be separated 
from the higher aim of all material wealth to serve the cor.rrnon 
good, God '\ave the ,o;oods of the earth to Adam--the universal 
man. ;;,aritain says, 11 0n the other ·-,and, t<1e usc of nrivate 
property must always be such as to serve the coYmnon ·--;ood, in 
one fashion or another, and to be advantageous to oll, for in 
the first place it is to ;.Jan, to the r1LUnan species :;enerally, 
that material goods are granted by nature. 112 
-------------- ------------------------·-1 . 
Ibic:J:.' p. 231. 
9.Iaritain, The Rights of Ma~anC!.__l:l atu.E_al_L_~, CJ. 40 
(footnote). 
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It will be remembered that St. 'rhomas treated private 
ownership under the principle of justice and thereby indicates 
his concern with the social responsibility of ownership. St. 
Thomas says: 
According to the order of nature i:1stituted by Divine 
Providence, the goods of the earth are designed to supply 
the needs of men. The division of "Oods and their a:J[)ro-
priation throu.c;h human law do not thwart this purpose. 
Therefore, the goods which a man has in superfluity are 
due by the natural law to the sustenance of tlce no or. 1 
i3ut j<aritain would add a f'urtl1er reason for the right 
to private ownership--a reason besed on an artistic analogy. 
He goes back to the Schoolmen, once ap:ain, for this principle. 
Maritain notes that the Schoolmen defined art as recta ratio 
fa~tibilit:_~, the use of ri,::;ht reason in making of t''ings. Art 
is used here in its ''more general meaning of intellectual activity 
that has to do with the production of a work or the elaboration 
of material as opposed to moral activit;r whic> has to do with 
the exercise of free will.n 2 
Now if work is essentially an art of' r1akin2: th_tns,s and 
involves the use of some material, then i1ere, isaritain says, 
11 is the meta11hysical element in :Cuman !lature wt:tch it: a p:eneral 
way mal{es personal ownership a matter of necessity and ':! 1,ich is 
th , " . t . '---t u3 .e c-rouno or proorJ_e ary rlgu , He does not think this is 
the same as work viewed as a title to :oroperty, Pope Leo XIII 
lD "' "D ., . ' 'h . 0 4 5 ( s ' ' -- T -- I " ) 
.lyan, ;::_~ ... C<-,1 s.~ __ l_ oml_~, 9• ,_,~ • 1., 1_~-J. , q.~J6, a.7 . 
2Laritain, j!'£_~e_c'\.om in tb.:e :;odern_~:~o_r_ld, Appendix I, 1J• 197, 
3~b· d ~_2:_., p. 197. 
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in the J_l_e:J:>_~m lJovarum followed the BibJical concept that t:c:e 
fruits of the work shot-!1~1 belonu; to tc,e worker. That v1ould 
be a different a:Jproach, ,:,nritain tries, rather, to draw out 
the principle of use as the primary ground of owners!1ip, He 
says: 
The metaphysical foundation of private property has 
thus to do with tl'e artistic side of htu11an nature, The 
vocation of human nature to elaborate raw material according 
to rational desicn requires generally that external things 
on Vlhich ann by whicl1 t:-,is elaborE,ti:Jn is '.'lroLFht should be 
possessed as of right by the ~erson whose rational activity 
is in operatior . .•• One may say, ~owever, th.at a society 
v1ill be 'Tiore perfect in proportion as tecl'nical competence 
and effective work go hand in hand with ownership. l 
',;le have now dealt '~'Jith :.iarita:tn 1 s C~-:::.ristian ~;hilosophy 
of man and the metaphysical basis for the ownership of material 
goods. As was noted on page 171 ve have now to look at his 
philosophy of worlc. 
It l1as ;Jreviously been observed 110''! ''aritain \'lould r>ot 
confine the concept ,Jf work to merely manual VIor;:, tn sceldn,c; 
to uphold the dignity of work he finds dignity in all forms 
of human activity that eontributes to tcce common c;ood, 'This 
may be mental, religious, or physical. :Lt ;1as been observed 
that property should serve persons. let if labor itself is 
not s omethine; vri th d:i.t;nit y, t::-,en t' ,e whole world of eccJnomics 
would still be an evil thin~ at best. 
hlaritain is particularly anxious to sustain the dicnity 
of work ot all levels--both spiritual ond ~anual. The former 
1 . Ibl~,, pp, 201-202. 
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is consistent Ytith h.is Church's teac:'in;~s concern.lnr:· the non-
secular ~rders (the life of c~ntenylatfon, 9royer, Pnd scholar-
ship). On t!_o ot~:er et;(l of t:..--.e so::Ple 0 ritfL~r· '.'l.i __ shcs to s]-_ov.r 
roism cr,r1 2olitics. ;·aritsin believes t ;at in opposition t•' the 
mennlr: of work. :1-t ls i~~ortant t~at t. e Gosnel tells of 
JosepL, the husband of :.Hry, tbe !':!Other of ;resLJ.s, 28 a simple 
artisan. J·esus r>imoelf labored o.s 8 C8r,xmtor Gnd once G8id, 
"J,iy ~·'ather worJzeth bi therto 11nd I work als0. 11 
11 !Jere is tr.e foundation 0f lnbonr ethi.rs, cc"/h:Lch the onodern world 
is seekintj sncl hqs not ,''et found. 'l'he no:r][ r::-,;_cL i\ntiouity C'OSt 
despised, m8ntlal wor1~, imposes forms of reoson on nnbter; • 
profisurflt:ton of t>:e eomrr.unicetions of love.nl lienee, ·sor1{ is 
only of t~e fi~e nrts btlt of t~e ttseftll ~~ts aq ~el.l. 
v. Just5.cc Gnd t~e Go~mon Good. 
rr~:'~_8 r-1~ ~YJlt:r of labor can be lost j _ _f ''.'0r1~ 5_n Y'_Jt rr:nde 
to contribute to the com!non -·ood. If one' 3 lnbor is purel:,' for 
his personel profit or if it merely enricb'le his er::;cloyer, 
then it j_s rot l&bor Ylortlw of' the lli[;hest di':nity. 
---------------
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tribut0 to the sense o.f honor and rlj_ --~ni t~r of ever:'7 ,-;er~~on, 
,-.-h~t is invol vr-r1 in All this is f:ir.'Jt of' -:] l tho di~~rdty 
of v:or},.., the feelii""!r~ for tbe ric~ht.n :>i' t---,e ~-:l1!t!8.Y; -·;erson in 
the 1:Jorker, the ri:_:;t.ts in the nome :Jf ·.-.~}~ic·n tr .. e '.7:Jr1~cr 
stanrts before h~s e~)loyer in a relntio~s1li·~ nf _~ustice 
ns sr rrtult ~erso~, ~at ~~ ? C 1,il_~ or n~ 8 servant. There 
is !~ere 9!1 essentir:l ,::J_atu~ wl1i.c~;_ i'P.r sur:;;asses svery DPO-
blen: of ::·.erel:r economic snd socir1 t::ecl--n-i '":nn, for :Lt :i.s s 
:02E . .0J: Oatu..rE, affcctin_u m2.n j_>''t h~_s s·.Jirituol dept~;s. 1 
On DB•·e 161 ~e noticed that ~Britain ~efi~ed work 
much bron~er sense, J~cJ.uding everytlJirr· ~l1ich re~oundc fro~ 
~an's ectivit~ to t,seful service for the <'. Qt'Y'(i' l\n i t 'tT !I 2 ' ... __ . -- . ' . 
is this COn1""10n. rood? T:aritain is concer!~ed to ovoj_,-t \7~'1at he 
Revolutior~~ th~t >.7orshiped the i,_qrlivirlt1 Bl. The Ger('lf:H1 n:lories 
in t!Je s.Jirit of :·,or.rer iE o. rrOI_:l.:J but . sritoin thin1rs DrFanization 
if'f1icatecl h1 t: e fact t>· at 11 at the time of tlle French !\evolution, 
for instance, a law oromulgated in 1791 prohioite~ cs '"n att"c~ 
on .freedou [1_1Yl ~)~ t::_lc 1.'eclare.t:i.or: of t~1e Ri t s of nn t r,n_'.r 
ettem:Jt by Ylor1{ers tJ ossociDte in trade enions 8nc1 :ioin f::>r8-GS 
1:.· ~ r l. t '1l. n 
- - (__ - ' . - ' 105. 
-r. 131. 
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n 
i'n!'<nn } :~.f'G of t1-:e m~~1 t.i tur~.e. 11 .-:.-
r.rne ,_~.rhole ::;ctivit;-_r o.f YDnn and }:is i0stitutions sh-:)Ltld contribute 
to its increase. , .. ,. ] , _r_' lna ___ t.y, 
and richer, more concretely human implications, for lt is by 
nature the ':oocl huma!' life of the :nultitLvle and is common to 
botb tho whole and tte "_;~~ts, the persons i.nto whom it flows 
back and who must benefit from it. 113 
3hat does justice in terms of the common ·ood entail? 
Here we find Paritain goes into the whole list of the rights 
of the worldnr: person--rights which he t:1in}{S are equally 
essential to civic rights. These rights are strate:c:ically 
important because they ultimately determine ~he fate of the 
famil;!, which in Catholic thouc;ht, is the most important unit 
of all. He says: 
Generally speaking, a new age or civiliz~tion will he 
called upon to recognize and define the rlgl·ts of the 
human being In his social, economic, end cultural fLmctj.ons 
--~:)roducers' ann consumers' rights, tecbniciflns' rie;hts, 
rights 0f those who devote themselves to labor of the mind, 
ri: .. :hts of everyone to share in the educational and cultural 
heritage of civilized life. But the most ur~ent Problems 
are concerned on the o!'e hand with tt.e ric:l1ts of that pri-
mordial s0ciety which is the fe~ily society, and which is 
orior to the political state; on the other hand nith the 
rights of the h·,man being as he i.s enga•,ed in the functio" 
of' labor. 4 
1·, . t . ;,larJ.. a1n, 
2Ib~d., p. 
3!_bid. I P• 
4
rbi?: •• p. 
--- -----------·--
1i_an a[ld the State, p. 104. 
12. 
11. 
104. 
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Then ;·aritain s-oecifies these rights of t'1e social 
person or workinc person. We will list them as he ~ives them, 
only with numbers added: 
1) The right to work and freely to cl1oose one's work. 
2) The right freely to form vocational [~rOU!JS or unions. 
3) 'rhe ric;ht of the worker to be co•1sidered socially 
as an adult, and to have, some WBJ or 'ther, o share 
and active psrticipation in the resoonsibilities of 
economic life. 
4) The right of econom' c c;roups (unions and •:1orkin;>; 
communities) and other social groups to freedom.and 
atJtonomy. 
5) 'rhe right to a ,just wage, that is, soffic5.ent to 
secure the fam:lly' s living. 
6) Tl:e right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick 
benefits, and social security. 
7) '1'he right to Joave a part, free of charge, dependinr>; 
on the possibilities of the social body, in the ele-
mentary r>;oods, both material and spiritual, of civi-
lization. 1 
Notice especially at this point that ~e specifies tl1at the right 
to a just wage should be sufficient for a 11 living family vmr,e. 11 
This is basic in any Catholic ethic. 
The question of ways and means to secure these rishts 
of the working person is also attempted by Maritain. He c;ives 
us two principles which he believes will help to affect the 
above ideals--1) the State, and 2) a Pluralistic Society. 
The principle of pluralism is a 'ce;r :i.dea in his economic 
pU.losophy. ;,;ar:itain favors ti'le solution of problems on the 
local level rrherever possible. This principle is set forth in 
Chapter i of J:Creed<J_m_a!:l_d _t_he _:.~odern World and Chapter V of True 
Humanism. In rr footnote in I.!a.n and the State he admits its 
resemblance to R, ;r. J.·Iaclver' s 11 multigroup society" and 
1
rbid., pp. 104-105. 
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Harold Laski's identical term. But he says he developed his 
CO''lcept independently of Laski and wishes to show the different 
world-views behiJ:Cd them. 1 Perhaps hJ,s reference to the 'fennessee 
Valley Authority will illustrate this principle of pluralistic 
economy: 
If our social structure is to evolve along normal 
lines, n first step, made necessary by the requirements 
of public welfare, would consist in having the State 
start and support--as ha,s been shown cJOS si ble by the 
outstandins example of the Tennessee Valley l'.uthority--
lar;;:e scale undertakings planned and manasecl not by the 
Stete and not from the center of tne country's political 
administration, but on the spot, by private enterprises 
co-ordinated with one another and bv the various commun-
ities of the very people concerned,·· under the leadership 
of independent responsible aupointees. 2 
This personalistic and pluralistic type of economy 
would pyramid up from the bottom and eventually resL1lt in 
decentralization and 11 destatization 11 until the State would 
remain merely as "topmost umpire and supervisor, rezulating 
these spontaneous s.nd autonomous activities from the superior 
political point of view of the common "ood. 113 haritain is 
similar to :.1arxist doctrine in this concept ·:Jf a .o:radual 
withering away of the State. He concludes, "The final step 
would take Dla ce, in such a new regime, ·.'ll'en prodding by the 
State would no lon:;er be necessary. 11 4 
libi~., pp. 22-23 (footnote). 
2Ibid., p. 22. 
3 
Ibid., p. 23. 
4rbid., p. 23. 
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Ho~ever, at our present level of society the role of 
the State is more stern and necessary, It's ;Jrimary duty is 
to ensure s•.)Cia.l justice. Even in the ideal society its posi-
tion as the head of the body politic would still be needed. 
kar:i.tain says, 11 The common c;ood of the body politic der.1ands a 
network of authority and power in political society, e.nd there-
fore a special agency endowed with uppermost power, for the sake 
of justice and law. The State is that uppermost ~olitical 
acency.••l Yet the State is not supreme as it has no final 
sovereie;nty. It is an institution to execute the v1ill of the 
body politic, And even the ueople are not sunreme--for they 
ex-ist within natural law end God. l'.'lflritnin se.ys, "Nor is the 
State sovereign; nor are even the people sovereign. God alone 
is soverei;';n. u2 
These rights of the workinc: person should be the primar;r 
duty of tLe State, even more j_mportant than the maintenance of 
public order. Waritain says explicitly, ''The com~on ~ood of 
the political society is the final aim of the State, and comes 
before the immediate aim of tr~e State, which is the maintenance 
of the public order. . . Social justice is the cruci~l need 
of rr,odern societies, As a result, the primary duty 0f the 
7 
modern State is the enforcement of social justice.""' 
1~bid., pp. 23-2~. 
?"'_l?__i_d.. ' p • 2 4. 
3rb~d., pp. 20,24. 
vi. Fe!_lowship and Trust. 
Despite all of the above concern for social justice, 
yet :.Iaritain is fully m7Bre tbat justice can never take the 
place of friendship. Love is the ulti;cate power behind all 
social goods. He says, ''Justice is the primary condition for 
the existence of the body politic, but ~'rienclsLip is its very 
l "f . . (' ul 1 e-glVlns orm. This idea is further developed in the 
article by Gerald B. Phelan, ''Justice and Friendship,'' in the 
l:!aritain Volume of the 'l'homist, F'or this reason i.'aritain 
believes Communism can never attain tbe spirit of Christianity 
in the social order. In fact Cormnunism may be further evidence 
of ''the disorders and evils from which suffers the earthly 
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"t II commLml y. Thoursh '-•Britain h.es no concept of radical evil such 
as Brunner believes in, the evil ~aritain refers to is the lack 
of reason not the ''pride of reason, 112 
l:!aritain believes in the story of the Fall of Man yet 
his emphasi.s is constantly upon the rational nattlre of man rather 
than the oride of reason. Hence, there 5_s an t•nderlyin;:; dispos-
ition on the IJart of :.:aritain, and r:JOst Catholic thow•;ht, to 
place confidence in man and his institutions, 
Gerald Phelan says in his early essay on ,iaritain, 
";,!aritain has unbounded cor1fidence in God's hic;best eartllly 
creature, man--a confidence born of deep reverence for the 
dignity of the human person, 
l-b"d ~-l_.' p. 10. 
0 • • He J.s always ready to lAbour 
----··--·--
p. 131. 
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to redeem the times, though the days be evil (cf, En~. v,l6) .••l 
r.:aritain loved to quote Pascal as sayinc;, 111.'Je have not been •:iven 
the tesk of secL;ring the triumph of trut'1, but :)f fi.•~r:ting on its 
behalf.''2 This confidence and basic trust of 0ersons is the 
groundwork for any constructive soci.al "olic". 
Karitain 1 s view ~fa new Christendom, thou3h, would ·:o 
one steo further. .-.,aritain believes in 2. great FellO\'Jship of' 
Suffer in • and Service, Ee has saicl, "There is n·ud 8nd blood 
in the world, vet while our hands dabble tterein o~r hearts must 
be :.'ure, and if they ore, tr,e:' nill also ourify. 113 The finest 
expression of this need is found in 'Im•itair. 1 s "lro;jectio':l for 
ti:'1e futur·e in the essay on "Tl:e Problem of '''orld ''overnmont" 
in Man and tr1e State: 
Given the human condition, the most significant 
synonym of l:1vine: together is suf'f·,rJ.w• tor_;et:cer. '!hen 
men form a oofitic-a1. society • -.-.-fhe;c 1'/an't"t'o--accept 
com1non suffcrin3 out of love for the com:-:1on task and the 
cormnon c;ood, ••• Let us put it in crude ter:ns: 'Jerlnns, 
if the issue were '"'"de sufficiently clear to t~·e~, neople 
in the occidental nations would be read~ to accent, f'or ~he 
sake of -,,eace an''l of' n world noltt;.c~•l orpsClic<ltion ensurir.e; 
lasting peace, a serious lowerinr; of their standards ~f life 
in order to 9rovi~e neonle ~n the other slde of the iron 
curtain ~ith en eouivalcnt rsisin~ ~f thPlr stnn1ar~s of 
life, 4 
He would have econo"nics, and every other l1umsn disci::>line, 
be perfected by wisdom, He sa;cs, 11 The matter is nothing less 
7 
"'.John S. l·itiddleton, "Contemplation in America, 11 The 
Tl1omi~~' V ('l'he Maritnln Volume), p. 228, 
4." . t . '·I d -;- t'rl a1.n, nan an the Oltate, pp, 207-2U9. 
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than ~nving science ~erfected by wisdom, and t:~e criterion of 
SLwcess superseded by the ~ri ter5_o,-, _-,f ·ocr!_ o nd rlevotion to the 
:-r:oorl. nl 
Ln an earlier ch8pter in ~an and the State Daritain 
describes what he calls 11 Prophetic Shock-:.~inorities .'1 I .om 
certain that be thus classifies a man like '.}nndhi, Ee sa;,cs, 
"The first axiom and nrecept in a democr::w'' 1 s to trust the 
people. Trust the people, respect the oeoole, trust them even 
and first of all nhile awakeni:~&; them, that is, while putting 
lf t t - e · f tl · , ..:1 • ,...,. • .~.. "2 yourse a ne s rvlce o ~elr cwnan u.l(,JH c y. ilhst n world 
of difference betvwen this spirit and the spirit of c;rnicism 
and dec;rs.ding the intelli;c;ence of the COlT,mon man! 
In the field of economics this thesis would i!"lclwle 
Greater trust in the democratic processes in the control and 
operation of business, Uaritain describes this idea in the 
term ":Sconom:Lc Pluralism" found in •rrue Humsnism. He favors a 
capitalistic system which is ~eared ''towards n renewal and 
revivification of the family-type of economy and ovmership, 
under modern forms and utilisin;_-: t'le reso,~rces of ''•echanisation 
and co-operation. 11 3 The trade unions, the professional or~on-
izations, as well as the schools ?nd churches, are all oarts of 
this Dluralistic society which can by intclli;c,ence direct a 
pluralistic economy to the common c;oocl of all :'luraan :rers::ms. 
1
-b"d J_-_~_., 
.P· 209. 
2Ibid,, ~) . 143. 
These, then, have been some of the goals Maritain 
would suggest for the economic order. 
8. Summary of Maritain's Economic Views 
(1) There is need for "an economic order"--a clear 
control of society by intelligence on the local level. 
(2) This ordering of society is the work of the 
practical intellect and is to be patterned after natural law 
or Eternal Law, which is the moral ideal. 
(3) The Renaissance and Reformation disrupted the 
unity and order of Medieval society. 
(4) The dehumanization of man has resulted from this 
disruption (and subsequent technology) in the economic order. 
(5) The return to an integral humanism will necessitate 
the reordering of things to persons. 
(6) The new Christendom will necessitate a reordering 
of the individual good to the common good. 
(7) The common good is "the good human life of the 
multitude" and this involves the following rights of the social 
person or the working person:l 
(a) The right freely to choose his work. 
(b) The right freely to form vocational groups or 
trade-unions. 
(c) The right of the worker to be considered socially 
as an adult. 
(d) The right of economic groups (trade-unions and 
working communities) and other social groups to freedom 
and autonomy. 
lMaritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law, pp. 61-62. 
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(e) The right to a just wage. The right to work. 
And wherever an associative system can be substituted for 
the wage system, the right to joint ownership and joint 
management, and to the "worker's title." 
(f) The right to relief, unemployment insurance, sick 
benefits and social security. 
(g) The right to have a part, free of charge, depending 
on the possibilities of the community, in the elementary 
goods, both material and spiritual, of civilization. 
(8) These rights will be secured by a pluralistic 
society on the local level and the direction of the state in 
a supervisory capacity. 
(9) Yet social justice is always dependent upon 
friendship and Christian love. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EMIL BRUNNER'S PHILOSOPHY OF 
ECONOMIC VALUE 
l. Introduction 
Jacques Maritain found man's highest purpose to tran-
scend not only the realm of economic values, but to lie beyond 
all values obtained by human means in this life. Although 
the Roman Catholic may truly maintain that the Church shows 
an untiring interest in man's earthly life, nevertheless her 
highest goal is the preparation for the life to come. Pope 
Leo XIII said in an encyclical in 1885: 
The Catholic Church, that imperishable handiwork 
of our all-merciful God, has for her immediate and 
natural purpose the saving of souls and securing our 
happiness in heaven. Yet in regard to things temporal 
she is the source of benefits as manifold and great as 
if the chief end of her existence were to ensure the 
prospering of our earthly life. 1 
Historically the Catholic Church has clearly held that the 
chief end of man is not his material prospering or even the 
most blessed human existence. 
Martin Luther attacked the other-worldliness and 
asceticism of medieval monasticism, and he deserves credit 
for turning the attention to man's present duty to his neighbor 
lcharles S. Devas, The Pope and the People (London: 
Catholic Truth Society, 1903), p. 65. (Immortale Dei, "The 
Christian Constitution of States.") 
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instead of a life of mystical devotion to obtain some future 
reward. A. c. McGiffert says, 
When Luther asserted the religious value of even the 
most secular employment, and declared that piety finds 
its highest exercise not in serving God, who does not 
need our service [italics mine], but our neighbor, 
who does, he contributed mightily to the progress of 
modern civilization and well-being •••• In denying 
the identity of religion with asceticism and other 
worldliness, he removed the greatest barrier in the 
way of the modern spirit, and made its growing pre-
valence possible. l 
Working within the Protestant heritage, and sharing its 
present-world emphases, Brunner nonetheless approaches the 
affairs of economic justice with great pessimism concerning 
the role of reason and the possibility of building Christian 
institutions in any realm. The work of a modern neo-orthodox 
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is not one of mere humanistic concerns, and Emil Brunner shares 
Maritain's rejection of any ultimate this-world interest. 
One of Brunner's recent books deals with this dimension 
to man's life. Eternal Hope is dedicated to two of his four 
sons, Peter and Thomas, who preceded their parents in death. 
In a striking chapter on "The Resurrection" Brunner implies 
that the element of hope is the characteristic feature of human 
lA. C. McGiffert, Martin Luther, the Man and His Work 
(New York: The Century Co., 1910), p;). 384-385. Brunner 
would not say God does not need our service, but rather that 
we are called to serve God by obedience to his Divine Commands 
of service to our neighbor. Self-realization ethics would 
see this, however, as too great a restriction of the concept 
of service. Can we not serve God also by the development of 
the self? This is only another indication of a basic conflict 
in Christian ethics. 
existence. Just as the death of the individual posits a 
problem for personal values, so the possibility of the 
annihilation of the human race appears to be the crucial 
problem in humanistic ethics. We are driven, through our 
need of hope, to an expectation of a Coming Kingdom, for we 
find that "the menace of nihilism to-day, of a despairing 
philosophy affirming the meaninglessness of life, is a new 
phenomenon in world history making the inquiry into the basis 
for some vital hope appear as a matter of the most immediate 
urgency.••l 
Brunner admits that Western man resists any attempt 
to destroy his faith in the present. He says: 
We all live, even though in theory we have abandoned 
them, on strong chiliastic ideas of a good time coming 
for man, to be attained somehow or other. It is only 
with difficulty that we can adjust ourselves to the 
thought that humanity must have an end, just like the 
individual man, who must inescapably die. 2 
This ultimate destruction of life in this world does not 
destroy faith in the ultimate meaning of God's work. Brunner 
says: 
Regarded from a purely this-worldly point of 
view, nothing is more probable than that this cosmic 
episode comes to an end just as it began. From the 
point of view of faith, this wears a different aspect. 
By faith we know that history does not end in nothing-
ness, but in the coming of the Kingdom of God as its 
consummation .•.. The ultimate comes to it from the 
lEmil Brunner, Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1954), p. 14. 
2~., p. 152. 
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beyond, the transcendent, just as the Risen Lord appeared 
to the disciples from the invisible world Jf the resur-
rection, without there being a nexus, an uninterrupted 
line, from the one to the other. 1 
Therefore, in this common expectation of a transcen-
dent end for man, Brunner follows Maritain, in spite of the 
greater attention which Luther and Calvin gave to the secular 
life and the religious possibilities of an economic vocation. 
Certainly Brunner would argue that no Reformer denied man's 
spiritual transcendence. 
As was observed in the last chapter both Maritain and 
Brunner inherited an unresolved conflict in the history of 
Christian thought. The relation of faith to culture and of 
man's economic life to his spiritual is a part of the back-
ground for the work of both men. 
In the chapter on Maritain it was seen that the upward 
thrust of faith in the modern era took the form of a Catholic 
renaissance which led to a revival of Thomism. Brunner's 
writings can be examined as a part of a similar movement of 
theological revival in Protestantism. 
Perhaps both movements are indicative of the seeds 
of "eternal hope" in modern man as he struggles for faith in 
the midst of a growing sense of futility and frustration. 
2. The Theological Renaissance 
A virtual theological renaissance has developed in 
the twentieth century. Evidence of this is found not only 
libid., p. 154. 
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among popular authors but in philosophical writings as well. 
Fewer philosophers are willing to confine their work to the 
task of mere logical analysis, and most treatments of the 
history of philosophy are now including good sections on 
medieval philosophy and the new supernaturalism. Since the 
days of World War II there seems to be a movement among 
philosophers to re-examine the more basic questions and 
commitments of religion. 
John A.Dinneen in The Modern Schoolman recently 
points out that even the austere realms of logical positivism 
seem to be giving ground. Whereas A. J. Ayer in his earlier 
writings could say, "If some one still wishes to say that 
ethical statements are statements of fact, only it is a queer 
sort of fact, he is welcome to do so ••.. My own view is 
that it is preferable so to use it as to exclude ethical 
judgements,"l more recent statements reveal his willingness 
to accept truth meaning for value judgements.2 Hunter Mead'S 
lA. J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1954), p. 233. 
2
" In his most recent collection of essays, rrofessor 
Ayer avows the emotive theory of values as explained above 
to be an over-simplification. He qualifies in many ways his 
former statements and takes pains to deny that morals are 
trivial or unimportant, and that nothing is good or bad, right 
or wrong, and that anything anybody thinks right is right. 
With regard to freedom of the will, furthermore, A;Yer will 
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not assert that it is a mere illusion, for •to say that my 
behavior can be predicted is not to say that I am acting under 
constraint' (A. J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays, p. 284). Thus 
while Ayer and positivists write on, one thing becomes apparent: 
the unqualified positivism of a decade ago is no more." John A. 
Dinneen, "The Course of Lo~ical Positivism," The Modern School-
~' XXXIV (Novem~er, 1956), pp. 20-21. 
opinion that philosophical maturity always involves a move-
ment more in the direction of realisml is contrary to the 
dramatic shifts of thought seen recently in c. E. Joad2 in 
England and Eliseo Vivas3 in America. Since World War II 
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there has been a return of philosophy to the values of theology 
and faith. 
Theologians are also reaching out toward philosophy 
and the social sciences. Hans Hofmann says Reinhold Niebuhr 
has recast the traditional role of the systematic theologian. 
It is true that not only of the beginning but of 
the whole of Niebuhr's life work, that he j_s the 
preacher--not the scholar interested in research for 
its own sake, and still less the pure apologist .•. 
We shall expect from him no theological system •••• 
Nor shall we consider him as a philosopher, nor as a 
sociological analyst who would offer us so-called objec-
tive, scientific knowledge. Vie sha 11 always remember 
that Reinhold Niebuhr is the preacher who stands on the 
line of battle between the gospel and the world. 4 
lMead's words are, "The present writer has yet to see 
a case of the latter type; all the changes he has seen have 
been from idealism to naturalism. One hesitates, however, to 
draw the implications from this which the •tough-minded' insist 
should be drawn--namely, that it proves idealism an artificial, 
unnatural way of looking at the world which can be imposed on 
people only if they are caught young. The fact that idealism 
is sometimes abandoned in maturity, whereas naturalism seldom 
if ever is, suggests to many naturalists that their viewpoint 
represents the more mature and more common-sense attitude." 
Hunter Mead, es and Problems of Philoso h 2nd ed. (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 195 , p. 10 . 
2c. E. M. Joad, The Recovery of Belief (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1953), and A Critique of Logical 
Positivism (London: Gollanz, 1950). 
3Eliseo Vivas, The Moral Life and the Ethical Life, 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950). 
4Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, trans. 
Louise Pettibone Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1956), p. 11~. 
The or,c;anization of such study c:roups in America as the 
Conference on Science, Philosophy 8nd Reli,;ion that has been 
meetinr; since Second World War da;rs, Tr.e ':etaphysical Society 
of America (openly sympathetic to the .i oint interests of 
philosophy and theolor;y), 1 and the very helpful exchange of 
papers :;oing on constantly in an organization such as The 
American Theological Society (whose membershir> is composed 
jointly of' teachers of theolo,;y B.nr'l '[Jhilosophy) are evidence 
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of this renewed interest in the deeper problems of metaphysical 
reality and a more rational basis for faith. 
Daniel Day ':iilliams has graphically sketched tlJe signs 
of this twentieth century theoloi'ical revival in a chapter of 
his recent book, What Present-Dav Theologia~s Are_1:l1in_kinl;j. 
The chapter title is, "The Theological Renaissance." He appre-
ciates especially the contributions of the ecumenical movement 
to this resurgence of theological interest. ThP stimulus of 
differing traditions helps each rrroup to deepen its own tradi-
tion. Says Williams: 
l'Nitness the election in 1956 of !'ntber G. P. Ylubertanz 
to tbe oresidency of this group. Father Klu.bertanz also 
served that year as president of his own American Catholic 
Philosophical Association. The recently organi~ed Metaphysical 
Society of America counts among its membership such men as John 
Wild, Newton B. Stallknecht, a aast president, and Robert S. 
Brumbaugh. At their annual meetinn: in 1956 "Professor Raphael 
Der.Jos of Harvard University maintained that there could be no 
ethics without religion, for religion to him is that part of 
human experience that is concerned with values and finality. 
Professor Paul Tillich of ~arvard University maintained that 
metaphysics and theolosy are coextehsive opuroaches to one and 
the sac1e ultir.Jate reality; metaphysics grows out of the same 
existential roots that theology views as the manifestation of 
God" 'l'he J:ode!'!2._S_cho_olman, XXXIV (November, 1956), p. 22. 
Not since the Protestant Reformation has there been 
so widespread a movement for the radical re-examination 
of theolo.cdcal traditions as there is at the present 
time. 
The ecumenical movement is largely responsible for 
the present world-wide cor:Jr,:unication between different 
Christian view-points, The World Council of Churches is 
continuin[; the work of the c~reat ecumenical conferences 
with its study programs to which theolordans of all 
po.rticipating churches contribute, l 
Nels F. S, Ferr~ has written, ''At Evanston many 
recognized the need for a deeper American theolog;y. , , • 
The embarrassment at Evanston and the request from these 
European leaders coincide with a p:eneral turn to theology. 
~'o religion there is a rush, The more thoughtful in this 
rush are incrrasingly devoting their attention to theolo=:y. n2 
Among the most thoughtful and provocative of these 
European influences L'pon our American theological re-naissance 
is the man whose concept of economic value we wish to explore 
in this chapter. 
Certainly the work of Emil Brunner (1889- ) is to 
be viewed as a part of this tremendous theological revival 
in the twentieth century. Born at ·:linterthur near Zurich, 
Switzerland on December 23, 12.89, Brunner attended the schools 
and University of Zurich and went on for further training to 
------ ----- ·-------- --------------- --· --------------
1Daniel Day Williams, What Present-Daf Theologians __ _!l._!'e 
Th~~ing (New York: uarper and Brothers, 1952 , pp, 36-3~. 
2Nels F. S. Ferre, "Where Do ':':e Go From Here in 
Theology? 11 Religion in Life, Winter, 1955-56, p. 3, 
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Berlin, Germany. He taught French in EnGland for a "ear but 
returned to his own country for service at the becinning of 
World War I. He served for a time as an assistant in a 
Zurich parish but became pastor of the Swiss Reformed Church 
at Obstalden near Zurich. He served this parish for eight 
years except for an interruption of a year when he came to 
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America to study at Union Theoloeical Seminary in New York City. 
Brunner's return to Switzerland with this training 
enabled him to be appointed lecturer at the University of 
Zurich. Two years later he p,ave up his parish at Obstalden 
to become Professor of Systematic and Practical Theolovy at 
the s::1me school. His preaching, however, has continued once 
a month in the Fraumlinster pulpit in Zurj_ch. Recently v:hen 
he left Switzerland for a two year appointment as Professor 
of Christian Ethics and Philosophy at the International 
Christian University, Tok7o, Japan ( 1053-1955) he nublished 
his first book of sermons, consisting of selected sermons 
~~iven from this pulpit. These sermons have been translated 
1 
and published in English as The Great Invitation.~ 
Brunner's departure from Zurich for a brief tenure 
as a visiting professor was not someth1.ng new. He was 
Professor of Systematic Theology at Princeton Theological 
Seminary from 1938-1939 and left only at the autbreak of war 
in Europe. He has lectured frequently thronrchout Europe, 
Englancl, e.nd the United States. One o;roup of lectures given 
lEmil Brunner, The Gree.t Invitation, trens. harold 
Knight (London: Lutterworth Press, -1955) ~ 
at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, in 192S were published the year 
following with Douglas Horton doing the translation of "The 
Introduction'' and was probably his first book to appear in 
English. This book, The Theology of Crisis, 1 was ~ ~efense 
of Barthian theology in the American scene at a time when 
Barth's thoucht was not senerally known or appreciated here 
in this country, Brunner 1 s two larger previous writings, 2 
for example, were not translated into English for several 
years, so that Brunner's ':>Osition was for some time largely 
known tru-ough such smaller works, 
If Brunner were to state exrJlicitly the key foundation 
for all. that he is to say regarding economic vaJ.ue, it would 
have to begin with some statement about the Person of Jesus 
Christ. Constantlv Brunner rejects any attemnt t;o base ~ 
religious faith on the Bible (Bibliolatry), a Church (Eccle-
siology), or a Confession. There is but one foundation fol' 
Brunner 1 s world-view--the experience of fai tL in Christ. 
In 'Vhe.t he would consider the ver:r '1eart of his 
Dogmatics II, the section on "The Foundation of the Christian 
Faith," he explores this theme. Fe savs, ''The Christian ~aith 
---------- ------- ---------- ----------------------------. 
lEmil 3runner, The Theology of Crisis ( Nev1 Yorlc 
Charles Scribner's Sons:-----r929). · -----------
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2Emil Brunner's Religionsnhilosophie evan-:;elischer 
Theologie ( 1926), for example, v:as not transle.ted unt-iTT937. 
Like1nse the more im,Jortant Der :attler ( 1927) was not avail-
able in English 'mtil 1934. It-is sijrnificant that this letter 
work, his first major systematic treatise, is ~is work in 
Christology. 1'Tis capacity :-:: "- Reformed churchman to unite 
the Lutheran emphasis upon Christolo,-:;v with his Reformed 
biblicism is one of his commendable characteristics. 
is simply faith in Jesu.s Christ. Therefore J;he whole of 
Christian theolo1v is simply the explication of faith in 
Christ. 111 Brunner is anxious to avoid both the extremes of 
the Liberal and the Ortbodox in their views of Jesus, 
,Tesus Christ ;.s ~- "eve1ation of God in time: a breakin.c; 
thron;ch into l1istory of somethinG from withoLJt, The liberal 
denies this break-through i'1tO bistory and the ort/wdox iden-
tifies faith in Christ with belief :in the Biblical records of 
,Tesus. But Brunner has rere a norm for all h1man conditio'1s 
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--for the Word became flesh and is prior to ej.ther J;he Biblical 
record of this divine event or the Liberal's ethic constructed 
around rrerely another relie;iously insnirinc; personality •2 
The ma;ior theological movement in t"'" f'irst half 0f 
t'le twentieth century '0as been the 'rheology of Crisin--sc)metimes 
1Emi1 ·srunner, The Christtan T)octrine of Creation and 
Renemptton, Dogmatics Vol. LI, trans ·;"LiJTve ':TyonO~oncfon·:·---·-­
Lutterworth Press, 1952), p, 239. Cited herea.fter as Don;rnatics 
II. -----------
2The exploration of the work of Srunner in the con-
troversy among New Testament scholars cancernincr the older 
problems of "the Jesus of history" and "a Cbrist C"lf faitb 11 
or the newer escllatalogical controversies :rowin:; ont cJf 
Albert Schweitzer's Quest far the Historical Jes~s and seen 
in such men as Uarti l-1>:\"e·r-ner and Hud-oTf-8"iiYfn1"anl:1 .. T s not 
the problem of this 4issertation, Br11nner 1 s concern ts 
to protect the l1istor:Lcity af JesLw since that is '"h2t gives 
Christianity its uniaueness apart from all nl1ilosopllical 
religions, Tlle narm for Brunner dl. scoverabJ.e ln tbe Crorist-
event io never sc;methinr-; fully rational. Yet we should nat 
for a tJoment underestimate the centrRlitv of this Cbristology 
for all that Brunner is attempting to do·: 
1 calla~ Dialectical Theology or Barthian Theolo~y. In a 
wider sense it is referred to as simply Continental 1heology.2 
Developed in the soul-searchin,~ of a o;roup of young 
Svriss Reformed ~Jastors reacting agai:r1st the ~rov!i_;:r,~: I·~odernisu, 
the Theology of Crisis received its world launchinp 'n 1918 
II 
by the publication of Karl Barth's ])er~()_::r~e_rbrief_ ( C o_~m~n_t_"'E.Y. 
()_!1_H()_E_l_B;n_s.) v1hich by 1929 l'nd -;one through five editions. 
Adolph Eeller refers to this event as one in v1Lich Karl Barth, 
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as it were, rang the cllurch bell Clown em all morlern theologies. 3 
''.'iho were the men around Barth anrl wll .v did tbi s new 
Crisis Theolo-;y con~e into being? David Cairns l•ns r'escribed 
its earliest inception as follows: 
A few personal details about Barth and Brunner may 
not be out of place. Together with 'lduard Thnrneysen 
they consti_tuted a -:roup of young ~wstors in adjacent 
parishes in Switzerland in the years directly after the 
war, and to,"ether they made 11 a great discovery of the 
---·------------ . -- -· ·-- ·--- ---·-·-----··------
1Though E. E. Aubrey cautions, ''It is not quite correct 
to refer to it as Barthian theology since there are other r'lin-
lectical theoloc:ians who are not in strict agreement with Karl 
Barth" Edwin Ewart Aubrey, Pre sent Theolo;;ical 'l'endencies (New 
Yorlc: Harper and Brothers, 1936), p. -.~--·-··· ·--·-·-·----·----
2The term "Continental Theology" would not evo'l be 
correct today with new movements springinc; up on the "Conti-
nent." Carl ilichalson quotes E. L. Allen rs saying in the 
British Vleekly, 11 The signs are that the phase ln theolocical 
deveTopment associated with the names of Barth and Brunner is 
drav1in'.~ to a close and that from now on we shall have to reckon 
with existentialist philosophy and Bultmann' s interpretR.tion 
of the New 'l'estament. 11 But Michals on adds, "I cannot ar;ree, 
however, with E. L. Allen's extravagant roview. 11 Carl l!ichalson, 
Review of An Existentialist Theolo~y, by John Lacouarrie, The 
Drew Gateway, XXVI 'CSpr~fng,---1956)-,-l28-13l. 'rhe edi.tors ofthis 
IS-8-ue.-o]' ·1rhe Drew Gateway call the Kerygma and Llyth theology of 
Rudolf Bultmann andOscar Cullmann "e controversy vrhich accord-
inc; to our students in Germany has at least tamporarily eclipsed 
there the problems of Crisis Theology as formulated b;r Karl 
Barth and his opponents." Ibid., p. 157. 
3Adolph Keller, Karl Barth and Christian Unity, trans. 
'"-Ierner Peter smann and l.lahTrecr:;!a-nro-([1'; --~ 1Te\v-Y'or!f':Tlle·-:iacmillan 
Company, 1933), p. 33. 
real meaning of' the Word of God, 11 to 11se Brunner 1 s 
phrase. 1 
Cairns believes it was Thurneysen who first furnished Jeader-
ship for the ;sroup. However, Barth's prophetic and emphatic 
nature sncl Brunner's more precise and csreful ressoning soon 
threw them into prominence. Yet it was clesrl:v Karl Barth 
?lho dominated the period from 1919 to 1929. A recent article 
by J. Robert Nelson states: 11 The fact is, only for the period 
of 1919-1929 did the two Swiss theolo;:;ians make common cause. 
'rhev quarreled sharply soon thereafter over the fundamental 
questions of the continuance of God's revelation in history 
and of man's ~iven capacity to receive the divine revelation. 
And for more than twenty years there have been serious 
theological differences between them. 112 
Emil Brunner speaks of 11 a more Lmexpected source, a 
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place still farther removed from the main theoloco;ical thorough-
fare--to the quiet Boll of the two Blumhardts. 11 0 All this is 
only another way to say that there was a quiet 1round swelling 
that finally erupted with Barth. The man ~iven the highest 
credit by Brunner was llermann Kutter. Brunner says: 
1Emil Brunner, God and J,!an, trans. with Introduction 
bv David Cairns (London: Student Christian ':ovement Press, 
19.36), p. 35. 
2J. Robert ;~elson, "Emil Brunner, 'i'heolof;ian Y:ith a 
1Jission, 11 Motive MaBazine, March, 1954, n. 4. 
3Emil Brunner, "Continental European Theolo·:;y, 11 tr1ms. 
Olive Dutcher Doggett, The Church Throu::;h Half a Century, ed. 
Samuel I.!cCree C avert nnd Henry P1 t'ne-y ""'~Tan Duseii-l"-Nev1 York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. lill-142. 
Althou~h some of us from our youth had had contact 
with this iource of insifht rye still needed a mediator 
who could build for us a bridge between thlR aoazing 
reality and the thought of our time, This nan, os 
stronrr in faith as he was vic;orous of mind, was Hermann 
Kutter. 1 
From Kutter these Svliss Reformed pastors learner] what it means 
to start with tr,e living God as a reality and ma);:e this the 
pivotal point for all thought. It was out of "this spirit of 
Kutter's that Karl Barth's preface to the second edition of 
his Ri)merbrief was written, 11 2 
But bac]{ of these more immediate influences upon the 
Crisis 'l'heology there stretches a continuous line of Ch1•istian 
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thought--from Paul tbrough Augustine, to Calvin and Kierkegaard, 
and finally to Barth and Brunner. Walter Horton calls it 11 a 
line passing from St. Augustine to Karl Barth b~i way of Calvin. H3 
~alter Eorton looks especially to ~ugustine as the model 
on which the Theology of Crisis built. He refers to the task 
as one of cutting loose the eternal Vlord of God from all worldly 
attrition, Horton says: 
Augustinianism is always a theology of crlsls, and 
it recovers vitality in every time of crisis, when the 
main businesc of Christian thought is to cut the eternal, 
transcendent element in Christian faith quite loose from 
entanglinH worldly alliances, that it may save what is 
salvable in a sinkinr: world order, and not be dragged 
down with it, So St, Augustine cut loose tl1e City of 
God from the sinlcing city of Rome; so Salvin cu.t loose 
the true church of God's elect from the sinldnc; church 
-------·-------
1Ibid,, p. 142. 
2rbid., p. 142. 
3Horton, Theology in Transition (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1943), p. Xli. 
of Rome; so 3arth is cuttinc loose the eternal ~ord 
of God from all those human and tenporal embodiments 
with which it hrcs been identified in recent c·:estern 
tho1wht, and which are now founderin,c: rifht and left 
bef'ore our eyes. 1 
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Paul 'rillich uses the Greek word diastasis (which means 
11 cutting 11 ) to describe this task of the Church. '"'illiams 
describes Tillich as stating 11 that in the German situation 
it was the confessional theology, with Karl Barth as its 
leader, which alone was ~:tble to cut the faith free and create 
an effective center of spiritual resistance. 11 2 He was referring 
here to the menace of Adolph Hitler. 
But before the days of norld 'liar II a difference in 
the temperament of its leaders soon led to a rupture of the 
unity of this movement. This break needs now to be examined. 
4. The 'l'heoloc;y of Compromise 
· · --- ·c!i-reak ;ii tnBar-tb.l __ _ 
'rhe closeness of the relationship of Brunner to Barth 
has often been overstressecl. Actua1_1.y if we trace the lives 
of the two men we find that their paths did not long intersect. 
1Ibid., pp. xiii-xiv. 
2
'.'lilliams, What Present-Day Theologians Are 'l'hinkinf' 
p. 21. Strangely enoucGh BarthlsopposTtion·t·o-the-1'hird Re ch 
did not transfer to his opposition to Russian communism as a 
recent conservative writer points out. Barth, 1n a speech in 
1949, "represented the East-West struG;,le as a power-politics 
conflict between Russia and America in which the latter was 
equally responsible. The Christian r.mst oray for the destruc-
tion of the 'Western Antichrist• •••• Communism is not anti-
Christian, but a-Chrtstian. 11 Paul Kine; Jewett, Emil Brunner's 
Concept of Revelation (London: James Clarke and Compa-nii; LTD, 
:LC'\54) ;·p; 9. 
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Brunner left Zurich in 1912 to attend school and was bacl{ only 
from 1914 to 1919 when he sailed for America, By the time he 
returned, Barth had left Switzerland to sccept the call to 
teach at the University of Bonn. This is brought ollt by 
E, L, Allen when he quotes Brunner as sayin;;:: 11 I have been 
acquainted with Karl Barth--though onl" slic:htl ;r-- since 1917, 
I have never been in close relationship with Barth (as's 
often said), 111 J, Robert Nelson tells of spending an eveninc: 
with Brunner in 1948 in which he inadvertently connected Brunner 
with Barth. Brunner immediately corrected him.2 
The break came as Brunner tried more anrl. more to c1efencl 
his theolorcY from charges of transcendence and Barth refused 
to accept the statements Brunner thouro:ht ~ecessary. J. Robert 
Nelson places the date for ti~e rn!'ture soon nfter 1929. 
Barth mainteined at one time that nrunner \'las no longer 
tho mRn who once stood shoulder to shonlder vii th him in an 
attack on modernism, but at another point Barth shifted and 
said "that it ;_s l•e who 1~8s changed, casting off tLe •e,~gshells' 
of nnbiblical thought, while Brun:-1er has reftised to -row into 
a full-fledged dialectical bird. 113 
Evldently 13runner .finall_ :r rl_ccirle(l t8 Coree -: shov.r r"l_o':!~ 
bv i2suinr~, ~s it ~ere, an t~lt5_matum, Jike Luther, ~nly in 
1:;::::. -,-;. ~-Jlo!l_, .:-... GLlj_.c-"18 to the ~ll"'_O'.L"l~.t ·Jf ~r'i 1 ~r1J_nner 
Cre8t_i or: ___ _f~_~_c1~ __ '·race ( lifr:>_:.; York:-PJ1ilos 0yh:rcal--tii:)r_D_r~.::- }:··nc.; --' 
1951)' p. 6. 
2J. Hobert I:elson, Mo_tive I:~:r;a:;,_i__l1_.::_, Larch, Hl.S4, ''· ~-
3David Coirns r "I:~troductioP, !I 9-~~c~-~~~-~·1_~:.!::' Ji. 19. 
this ~Bse there were r~ly six theses. These dealt ~ith the 
subject -,f' "0_GtL1ral revelation, ~nd he felt b.~rt.t: ·:'ol.~ld be 
obligecl "So :11:?J.ntain 8'1Ch stntement. To the.sR six t>eses 1-_-~-e 
co11 1_~ bo dafePded hy Scrinture, Luther, nn~ ~~,_vin. Thot 
tho nntitheses r_~_ra,_vn U"!J b:r ?runner. 
1
'/hcn ( roun:hly s-i_nce 1~)?0) .,rnnY'er sud'"le"~-1l_~;r be:';Bn 
to ~reclaim openJ.y 11 the other taslr r-f ~heoloev,'' t~e 
"point of contact, tt etc., T c8~1o :;_t l::norJn t~1Dt "ihat0-.;le:r 
rr5GJ~t ha-~·rocn_ r:'-0 1.·1d not and woul'i YJ·.Jt. "-.'~rne '::it"b t!-1is. 
, In '1is esssy Brunner h8s nrovorl thnt 811 tl1rt ""' 
seemed to ~~v0 ~.eo~nt fifteen :Tears o~o togethe~ ~itb 
me h.~s merelv enrtbJe6 hir:-~ to retn.~~~, "·itr "' 1 ' -1-r0 :·"oro 
imnetus tJ thnt ~]"e')l-;cnr 0f c.o:r:Yr>':lmisA /{-t:;.--, 1_~ -'~-· ~""ine7. 
, • Tt 1-,<")~ 1~'"',.1f1r:_r1_FJ_n_-t;8-f_O_r_e __ t1_;8f-·--;;;·()th8-:> r:slJ 0.t. Z11ri~}J 
provoked someone out ~hAre ~-!' "ermG.n:r terPibl~r by Plmost 
tr-e same ·~'ethode that J?.riJn~er is :~sing novv, 2.nd ''e 
::1Gnnr,erl to make ths.t :·~8_r o_p~"P.flr for z:e~tur:i.e.s as nn 
int-Jl Arflnt d;_nrupter of Chr5.st-t_ctn "n~-t~·-. I ~'1 "'0t ,_.~ <:h 
t,-, ro:o~p£Jre r:;ysel.f y_rj_th thf:-1_t n:Pn_, 1--lllt. ,_.__.~.e,-, m:r t"V,t)pc·htr 
~o to Zurich J: fird th2t I ~an tlnrle~st 0 ~~ ~s <")n~er 
rarnarkablv ~ell. 1 
Brunner's own interpretatior·_ of tbose over1 ts is 
a~rec closely ~ith the ~oint of vieD ve ,resnnt. • On A 
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1 
---Euil ""runner e.nd Ksr1 B:Jrt 1~, H" tt;r81 ~~heolo:,y, tr2 ns. 
Pster PrneY~ke1 (London: G-e0ffrey Blcs :-ri~-10-C:Giit_l_lr-;·r ~)ress, 1946), 
nn. 7J-72. 
breathes a sigh of relief! At last! If these statements are 
maintained, then we can bury the hatchet."l But upon reading 
further into Barth he is found to be inconsistent. Brunner 
says: 
But this statement was followed by disappointment. 
Suddenly, all that he has been saying--and that had 
to be said--on Rom. 1:19 disappears. Without warning, 
as it were, that which Barth had stated ••• no longer 
has any significance. The "original" truth becomes the 
"future" truth, from which, by means of the historical 
revelation, the revelation in the Creation, which was 
on the verge of being recognized, is again wiped off 
the slate, and nothing remains but the historical reve-
lation. Why? 2 
Brunner thinks Barth fails to make a clear distinction between 
knowing and being. 
Brunner is thus unwilling to stand with the lofty 
tradition of uncompromising transcendence with Barth and quite 
gladly stands within a Theology of Compromise because he 
believes that God must be related to the world and faith to 
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knowledge. This is another way of saying that Brunner believes 
that theology has at least something to do with philosophy. 
5. Brunner's Concept of Natural Law 
Brunner's view of ethics is profoundly affected by 
his interpretation of natural law as opposed to the concept 
of the good as obedience to the divine command. To Brunner 
ethics is neither the unrolling of a natural law nor the 
lEmil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, trans. Olive 
Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946), pp. 78-79. 
2!£1£., pp. 79-80. 
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arbitrary making up of a body of positive law. Brunner views 
Christian ethics as a moment to moment response to the divine 
will. 
Paul Ramsey follows Brunner in the construction of an 
ethic based on Biblical and theological foundations. To illus-
trate his view of Christian ethics Ramsey seeks to distinguish 
it from that of Hobbes and Rousseau. He says: 
The differences between this contract [Hobbes's social 
contract] and Israel's covenant arise mainly from the fact 
that Hobbes describes the artificial creation of earthly 
sovereignty .•.. Hobbes's ruler comes into existence 
as ruler when individuals all at once pledge one another 
to submit themselves to him; he himself takes no part in 
making the contract; whereas Israel's ruler himself ini-
tiates the making of the covenant, setting people in a 
juridical situation, placing them in a contracting position 
before him. Moreover, in fabricating political sovereignty 
Hobbes is forced to assume a prior sovereign autonomy of 
the individual which has nothing in common with the biblical 
view. 
In "social-contract" language, this means that the 
God of the covenant was precisely the opposite of a con-
stitutional monarch. What he promulgated was legal and 
righteous altogether; there was no law external to himself 
[italics mine] or whose source was the people's voice in 
accord with which he must rule in order to remain truly 
a lord. 1 
Ramsey continues by describing how Rousseau ascribes 
an unqualified sovereignty to the general will. He quotes 
Rousseau as saying "The general will is always right and tends 
to the public advantage,"2 
lRamsey, Basic Christian Ethics, pp. 375-377. 
2The Social Contract, Book II, chap. iii, p. 25, quoted 
in Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 378. 
Thus Ramsey is suggesting that Christian ethics views 
both Hobbes and Rousseau as advocating the unqualified obedi-
ence to a sovereign--in the case of Hobbes to a monarch, in 
the case of Rousseau to the general will. 
Both Ramsey and Brunner shy away from any attempt to 
subject God's will to something external to himself. In 
answer to Plato 1 s question, "Is it good because God wi;Lls it 
or is it good and God wills it?" both would affirm the former 
and deny the latter. Here we find natural law theory growing 
out of Greek and Roman philosophy in conflict with Brunner's 
Christian ethics. 
Brunner is really going back to the point-of-view of 
Plato in asking whether goodness is something that can be 
taught or only caught. Teachers of ethics will testify that 
knowledge of ethical rules is not sufficient to produce the 
will to obey them. In Brunner's view the Moral Law is always 
a secondary stage in moral experience. Natural law theories 
are a rigid freezing of the Divine Command. Bergson would 
say it is the ~ vital caught and held so that the vital 
spark is no longer present. 
A passage from Brunner's Dogmatics I will serve to 
illustrate the above point: 
But man, in his sinful perversion, has transposed 
this order; or, rather, all he has retained of the orig-
inal revelation of the Divine Love is the abstract Moral 
Law, and this is an ambiguous form. The Law is not the 
original element, but it is something which has "slipped 
in between" (Rom. 5 :20). But to sinful man it now seems 
to be the primary element, that is, until he has learnt 
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to know the revelation of Christ. The world before, 
and outside of, Christ, therefore, knows the Law of God 
only as the Moral law of the love of our neighbour, but 
not as the command of the love of God. l 
The reason why Brunner does not wish ethics (including 
economic ethics) based upon a natural law is that no matter 
how refined or advanced such a law may be, it places the wrong 
emphasis upon human action. This is not the order found in 
Biblical and Christian ethics. 
The Biblical commandment of the love of our neighbour, 
both in the Old and in the New Testament, springs from 
the proclamation of the divine generous love which comes 
first. To put the command, the task, first--that is the 
misunderstanding. In the message of the Bible the gift 
comes first and the task second. 2 
In his second volume of Dogmatics Brunner attacks 
natural law theories as a form of the Deism of the Enlighten-
ment. The whole problem of the relation of God's world to 
God's action is denounced in modern deists, among whom 
Brunner includes William James and Edgar s. Brightman.3 
Brunner says: 
But Pantheism is not the only danger; there is also 
Deism. This consists in laying so much stress on the 
independence of the created existence that the world is 
regarded as so independent of the divine activity that 
it is self-sufficient •••• However difficult it may 
lEmil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God; 
Dogmatics I, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The westminster 
Press, 1950), p. 197. Hereafter cited as Dogmatics I. 
2I!2.1.£., p. 198. 
3Brunner's footnote reads: "A Deism of this kind has 
been presented by William James, A Pluralist Universe, and by 
c. [sic] S. Brightman, The Findin~g~o~f~G~o~d~_,,r,~B~r=u~n=n~e=r~, Dogmatics 
II, p. 150. 
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be for philosphical thought to avoid the "Either-Or" of 
Pantheism and Deism, both these rational possibilities 
are ruled out by the Christian doctrine of Creation. 1 
Brunner consistently opposes the concept of an ethic 
founded on natural law as well as one founded on positive law. 
Whereas positive ~ leads to a complete relativism where "to 
begin with relative justice is to lose all solid ground under 
our feet before we have taken the first step,"2 natural law 
is a commitment to a rigid system of rights in which insuffi-
cient attention can be given to individuality. Brunner says, 
"The rigorism of abstract legality is in all cases alien and 
dangerous to life. Real life, as we know it, requires beyond 
the rigour of the law a certain flexibility and adaptability 
to the individual case."3 The illustration he uses for Chris-
tian justice is Paul's relationship to the runaway slave, 
Onesimus, as reported in Philemon. The slave is entrusted 
again to his master but with the admonition to receive him in 
love. Such love is not something demanded or enforced. Rather 
it is a response to a common Father in mutual love. 
What rises before our eyes is the picture of a Christian 
fellowship of love, which leaves far beneath it anything 
that can enter into systems of justice. The institution 
lrbid. 
2Emil Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, trans. 
Mary Hottinger (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945), p. 101. 
3I£1£.. 
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or order of slavery is dissolved from within and replaced 
by the order of fellowship in love without any appeal to 
a just mundane order. 1 
Yet when we come to Brunner's more recent Gifford 
Lectures we seem to detect a greater regard for a natural law 
concept (as indeed for all Greek philosophical concepts) than 
was found in his earlier writing. Here his setting for what 
he has to say on justice and law is placed over against the 
menace of totalitarianism and communism. Now he seems at 
times to equate natural with divine law. He says: 
As a matter of fact, the development of law and legal 
practice in the Western Christian world has, on the whole, 
not followed the line of biblicism, but has tried to make 
the jus divinum bear upon the legal reality by the concept 
of jus naturale or lex naturae; or, more exactly, by iden-
tifying this concepr-Df ancient philosophy and jurispru-
dence with the Christian idea of jus divinum. During 
fifteen centuries this jus naturale, in its Biblical or 
Christian interpretation, was the foundation of Juridical 
thinking in Europe, until the age of the Enlightenment 
the Christian interpretation was replaced by a rational-
istic one, and, in the time of romantic historicism and 
naturalistic positivism, the whole idea of jus ~aturale 
was abandoned, and jurisprudence and political theory 
became devoid of any kind of normative principle, law 
becoming a matter of mere political power. 2 
Brunner calls the dissolution of the idea of natural 
law an "unfortunate development" and tries to show how a 
Christian interpretation of natural law sees in it a necessary 
step toward Christian love. He wri tea: "Justice presupposes 
a divine order of belonging, of whatever kind this belonging 
may be. This is the meaning of~ naturae, both in the 
1!!21£.' p. 107. 
2Emil Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation, 2 vols. 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948-1949) II, p. 108. 
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pre-Christian and in the Christian sense. But within the 
Christian faith this order of belonging is not an order of 
"nature"--in the pantheistic sense of the word--but of God's 
creation."l Brunner warns that this "belonging" is to be 
understood in a normative sense, independent of human laws. 
Then it is possible to conceive of 
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the idea of "human rights". It is only in quite recent 
years that we have rediscovered the necessity and bearing 
of this concept. By it we mean that there are things be-
longing to man as such, rights which precede the state, 
which the state has to acknowledge, but which it cannot 
create, "birthrights of manhood" founded on God's creation. 
It is ,this conception which distinguishes the lawful state 
from the totalitarian state. In the moment when these 
aboriginal human rights are denied or abolished by the 
state, the totalitarian state is there, at least in 
principle. 2 
At last it would seem that Brunner has come almost 
full circle. Whereas in The Divine Imperative (German edition, 
1932) he seems to see almost solely the negative and legal 
aspects of natural law, in his 1948 writing he appears to 
be finding a place for this concept within the Christian 
framewor!{. Actually, he is probably maintaining the freedom 
of the Divine Command right along, but he appears now to have 
greater regard for the possibility of codifying of a "minimum" 
portion of God's will in regard to basic human rights. 
Here we can see a basic agreement of Brunner with 
Maritain (and also Temple), for all three are skeptical of 
the attempt of John Dewey to build a body of law on pragmatic 
1 Ibid., p. 109. 2 Ibid., pp. 110-111. 
and positive grounds. Brunner would say that the secular 
state can survive but one generation the Joss of its Christian 
faith. 
6. The Doctrine of Man 
In a previous section we saw that the concept of the 
sovereignty of God was the central motif found in the writings 
of Augustine and the Neo-Calvinists. It iS around this motif 
that a corollary doctrine develops in Brunner's thinking--
namely, his doctrine of the sin of man. For Brunner this be-
lief is an intensely personal matter for he says that the 
history of his own life is one of continuing sin. He found 
as he grew older that his sin was not overcome but merely 
shifted to more subtle areas.l 
The belief that man's sin is centered in his spirit 
and not his body is perhaps Brunner's chief clash with the 
idealistic picture of man. Sin is not merely a principle or 
limitation, nor is it an aspect of man's finitude. Brunner 
says: 
Of course, Greek thinkers know something of moral 
evil, as do the idealists of more recent times. Kant 
in his doctrine of radical evil has given a picture 
of human reality which is anything but inspiring or 
lnHistory is never the history of salvation from sin, 
but rather the history, and partly the evolution, of the sinful 
man who changes the forms of sin but never really overcomes 
sin. This is the teaching of history as a whole; and I trust 
that every man present will tell me that it is the history also 
of his own life, as I confess it to be mine" Brunner, The 
Theology of Crisis, p. 102. Bishop William C. Martin once 
quoted a British divine as saying, "Mankind never discovers 
a new sin nor forget:3 an old one." 
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elevating. No serious interpreter of human nature can 
overlook this dark side of human reality. Neither Plato 
nor his followers have simply identified real man with 
the divine idea of man. But when they tried to account 
for this difference or opposition between the idea of 
man and his reality, they did not find any other reason 
for it than his animal nature. 1 
Yet if it were the animal nature of man that consti-
tuted his sin then it should be in relation to our more 
physical acts that man is most aware of the fact of his sin. 
This is not true. Man is a red-faced animal, but his moment 
of greatest shame is not, as Schopenhauer supposed, connected 
with his sexuality but with his pride. Brunner sees the sole 
source of sin in man's spirit. He says: 
That seemed to be the solution of the problem and riddle 
of man: that man is not merely spirit but also an animal 
with instincts, ••• This conception of evil remains, 
however, on the surface and does not do justice to the 
dismal sinister phenomenon of evil. This character of 
the dismal, which is inherent in moral evil, is not due 
to sensual animal nature, but has its origin and its 
seat in the spirit. 2 
Likewise, one of the errors of naturalism has been 
that of assuming man to have no other dimension than his 
material existence. In a chapter of an earlier volume Brunner 
lays the foundations for a "Christian Anthropology" which he 
later expands into his major work on this subject, Man in 
Revolt. In this first treatment, which he entitles "Biblical 
Psychology," Brunner says: "The naturalistic psychology in 
lEmil Brunner, The Scandal of Christianity (London: 
SCM Press, Ltd., 1951), p. 0. 
2Ibid. 
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essence, apart from some happy inconsistencies, regards man 
as an object, as a natural being, and in the last resort as 
a mechanism. 11 1 Its error is an overemphasis upon man's 
individuality. 
At the other extreme is what Brunner calls "idealistic 
psychology" which at its worst identifies man with an !'.bsolute 
Mind and denies his true individuality. At this point Brunner 
stands with the whole realistic tradition in theology in 
describing the role of body in man's constitution. Brunner 
frankly identifies man with his body. He says: 
Man is created out of nothing, he belongs as such to the 
world. That is the great stumbling-block for idealism. 
His finitude and absolute dependence on God's will belongs 
to the essence of man. Man is created a bodily being . 
• • • Thus the body is not that which should not be, that 
which does not properly belong to human beings, the lower 
principle, which as such is the source of evil •••• 
Man l§_ body. 2 
Brunner says at this point the Biblical psychology is 
in agreement with materialism and naturalism. Yet the Bible 
says more. Man is also a spirit. He is created as other 
creatures, yet man alone is created in God's image. Yet even 
in saying this Brunner does not allow man a shred of indivi-
duality apart from God. He says: 
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He is not only created through the ,,.,·ord of the creator, 
but for the Word of the creator as one who can hear, one 
who can be--nay, who is addressed. Man has spirit only 
in that he is addressed by God. It is on this that the 
image of God in man rests. • Therefore the human self 
!Brunner, God and Man, pp. 153-154. 
2l!2ll.' p. 154. 
is nothing which exists in its own right, no property 
of man, but a relation to the divine Thou. It is no 
isolated self, but has its reality only in the relation 
to the divine Thou that addresses it. 1 
What then is the source of man's sin? This problem 
is dealt with Biblically in the story of the Fall. Brunner 
uses this story but is careful to noint out its mythological 
and not literal nature. Chapter vii of Man in Revolt is 
devoted to a discussion of the difference between what he 
calls "the origin of sin" and "the contradiction in man." 
To take the Biblica 1 story of the Fa 11 too literally tends 
to separate my present sin from the sin of the race. Brunner 
says: 
When we renounce the historical view of the Creation 
and the Fall we are set free from this dilemma, and 
we are able once more to see the contradiction in man 
as an actual conflict. Man as sinner is in permanent 
[italics mine] rebellion. 2 
However, it is doubtful if Brunner's obsession with the doc-
trine of man's sin is anything that grew out of Biblical 
exegesis. Rather, as has been indicated, it is the result 
of an analysis of his own condition and the tragedy of modern 
man. 
Brunner's analysis of man contains some points of 
contact with that of Dr. Karl A. Menninger who also views a 
fundamental dichotomy in man which he has described in Man 
1~ .• p. 155. 
2Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), p. 169. 
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Against Himself.l But this approach of Dr. Menninger con-
cerning the anguish within man which can lead to all different 
forms of suicide is not Brunner's main concern. Brunner's 
thesis is that man is not merely in revolt against himself 
but in revolt against God. In fact just when man thinks he 
is accomplishing his own greatest good is the point at which 
Brunner fears man is involved in the greatest sin. 
This brings us back to the old conflict between reason 
and faith, for Brunner can view reason only as an autonomous 
act of man's pride in seeking to deny his dependence upon God. 
Brunner says : 
Sin is not a "not yet", but a "no longer". Therefore 
it is not sensuality, nor weakness, but defiance, rebel-
lion •••• "Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned" 
(Ps. 51:4)--that is the essential, and the exclusive 
view of the Bible. It is thus that sin is described in 
the story of the Fall. Sin is disobedience to God, and 
is due ••. to distrust and defiance. The story of the 
Fall reveals the fundamental cause for this breach in 
communion: the desire to be "as God". Man wants to be 
on a level with God, and in so doing to become indepen-
dent of Him~ 2 
This linking up reason with the concept of rebellion 
is one of the major premises which Brunner assumes. It is 
an attack upon the whole idealistic tradition and especially 
the thought of the Enlightenment. Brunner says, "If man is 
what he is thought to be by the modern mind, and what he was 
thought to be by Greek philosophy, then in his essence man 
lKarl A. Menninger, Man Against Himself (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938). 
2Brunner, Dogmatics II, p. 92. 
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is a rational being."l What is wrong with this? Brunner 
identifies reason with Descartes' Cogito ergo sum and calls 
it "autonomous truth, the identity of the Ego with itself, 
self-certainty in the sense of independence of everything 
which is not myself."2 Thus, if reason is autonomous, the 
conclusion drawn by Brunner is that its very essence is sin 
which shuts man off from God. He concludes: 
But now, it is one of the fundamental tenets of 
Christian anthropology that this conception of man, so 
far from being true, is the fundamental lie of man as 
emancipated from God, of man as claiming God-likeness. 
This autonomy of man, this attempt of the Ego to under-
stand itself out of itself, is the lie concerning man 
which we call sin. The truth about man is that his 
ground is not in himself but in God--that his essence 
is not in self-sufficient reason but in the Word, in 
the challenge of God, in responsibility, not in self-
sufficiency. 3 
Brunner wishes to avoid two pitfalls which he thinks 
Barth fails to sense. One is the pitfall of "total depravity 
of man" and the second is the pitfall of determinism. The 
first danger is detected in a statement in Man in Revolt to 
which is given a footnote on Barth. Brunner says: "On account 
of the corruption of the original Creation there is the danger 
of depreciating or secularizing the specifically human element 
which has remained even in sinful man, that is, of forgetting 
that even fallen man is still always in the sight of God, and 
that even in sinful existence the 'theological' nature of man, 
lEmil Brunner, The Word and the World (London: Student 
Christian Movement Press, 1931), p. 67. 
2rbid., p. 68. 3~., p. 68 
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that is, the nature which is related to God, is rna nifest." 1 
This can be seen to be but another of the aspects of the con-
troversy between Brunner and Barth concerning the immanence 
and transcendence of God. Brunner says Barth points with some 
satisfaction to the outcome of German Idealism in Feuerbach, 
Strauss and Marx and sees no distinction between idealistic 
and naturalistic anthropology. "To him, indeed, the humanum 
as a whole is a profanum, and man, 'even within the created 
world, is something trifling and insignificant' (Credo, p. 30). 
In this view Barth is clearly moving away from the standpoint 
of the Reformers."2 However, Brunner does not interpret the 
trace theory in terms of a hidden image of God in man, but 
rather he sees in man's freedom and sense of responsibility 
the essential "theological" element in man. Man could not 
sin if he did not stand in this relationship to God with the 
possibility of response to a divine command. Hence, man is 
never totally depraved or without freedom. 
Brunner's discussion of this other aspect of sin, the 
loss of freedom, appears less satisfactory. In a chapter on 
"The Problem of Freedom" he admits that "freedom ought to be 
the common ground on which the Biblical and the Humanistic 
thought of man should meet."3 Yet, he says, "In point of fact, 
it is in the problem of freedom that they differ most widely 
lBrunner, Man in Revolt, p. 171. 
2~., p. 171 (footnote). 3Ibid., p. 256. 
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from one another." 1 Immediately we come into the whole problem 
of man's bondage to sin and his release solely through God's 
grace. Just as Augustine fought against both Manichaean 
determinism and Pelagian freedom, so Brunner views his struggle 
for a Christian interpretation of freedom as a necessary chal-
lenge to "cut it loose" from both modern-day mechanism and 
liberalism.2 
The sinner in the Augustinian tradition is not free 
to sin or not to sin, he is free only to sin. Brunner says, 
"A sinner is a man who is no longer able not to sin. Thus 
freedom is indeed the presupposition of every sin, but of no 
single sin can it be said that it happens in freedom, but 
only that it happens under the compulsion of sin.•"3 Thus 
Brunner seeks to keep unresolved the paradox of freedom and 
determinism. Man as a sinner sins complusively. Yet man as 
a creature of God has freedom in that he can respond to God's 
commands and live in a dimension of responsibility, or else 
he could never know himself to be a sinner. Brunner has come 
a long way from some of the more deterministic aspects of 
.L .!.!?1s! • 
2H. D. Lewis, Professor of Philosophy at the University 
College of North Wales, Bangor, has made an interesting analysis 
of Barth and Brunner in relation to ethics. He uses for a motto 
on the title page the statement from Erasmus--"hating Pelagius 
over much." H. D. Lewis, Morals and the New Theology (New York: 
Harper and Brothers, n.d.). 
3Brunner, God and Man, p. 157. 
Augustine and Calvin. The question might be: Has he come 
far enough? 
One last observation here has great importance for 
the direction of Brunner's philosophy of economics. This is 
his belief in a demonic element outside of man. Three short 
propositions from his chapter on "Angels, Spirits and the 
Devil" in Dogmatics II will suffice to set this before us. 
(1) The Christian Faith is bound to admit the exis-
tence of a sinful supernatural power, and indeed of a 
purely spiritual sinful being, to Which we can ascribe 
what we may call "Satanic" sin, in contrast to human sin. 
(2) Hence, because Satan is a supra-human reality, the 
work of redemption of Jesus Christ is a real conflict, 
and redemption is a real victory. (3) On the other hand, we have no reason to doubt that 
there really is a great host of good angels, who serve 
God and are always at His disposal. 1 
These propositions, however, have far less rational 
grounding than similar doctrines in Roman C2tholic theology. 
Brunner admits the mythological element in the Biblical 
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accounts and certainly rejects the fundamentalistic literalism. 
Yet this chapter seems somewhat appended to his theology. He 
seems to be saying that the demonic in man, tragic though it 
be, is not sufficient to account for the rebellion of Creation 
against God. 
Brunner, in closing, compares his doctrine to that of 
William James' sick-souled individual. Brunner says, "It is 
not simply characteristic of a certain type of human being--
lBrunner, Dogmatics II, pp. 140, 145, and 146 (numbers 
inserted are mine). 
the divided self, the sick soul (William James)--to be man 
in revolt. To be 'in revolt' ~to be a sinner."l Brunner's 
question would be, Can a whole self exist? 
7. The Problem of Society 
The foregoing discussion of the nature of man and his 
existence as a sinner will have its effect, to be sure, upon 
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Brunner's conception of society. Although he feels that the 
only true society is that community of love which results from 
the individual responding to God's love in faith, yet behind 
all human response is a sinful human person. Hence, even in 
man's highest cultural and social institutions there is the 
fact of sin deeply rooted. 
Certainly this basic thesis that man, even the 
redeemed individual, always acts within a sinful society, is 
established by an examination of Brunner's writings. Just as 
he has shown that simply to move up the scale froffi the fleshly 
to the intellectual does not mean an escape from sin, so now 
he shows that a movement from individualism to collectivism 
(or perhaps, better expressed, from hermit to philanthropist) 
does not mean a movement away from sin. He says: 
In so far as, from the standpoint of the \'lord of 
God we are always sinners, the whole of our "high life" 
is tainted with this "fleshly" character •••• 
But we have practised the art of concealment to such 
purpose that we have ourselves fallen victims to it. 
Without being fully aware of it we use the rich treasures 
and possibilities of our spirit in order to deceive our-
lill;!.' p. 124. 
selves about this inmost un-peace. The creative spirit 
in particular gives of its inexhaustible reserves for this 
end. 1 
Our involvement in the sin of society is a part of 
the meaning of the statement that "man is a sinner". Man 
creates culture only to use his creation as a means to his 
further pride. These social structures are not merely human 
creations for they bear a Divine and natural stamp (Brunner 
and Luther used the terms "callings" or "orders"). Yet, 
since in any specific historical form they are the work of 
man, they bear the taint of sin. Brunner says unequivocally: 
All forms of human society, not merely the State, 
but also marriage and the Church, irrevocably bear within 
themselves the inherited curse. Every one who Jartici-
pates in them participates in sin [italics mine ••.. 
There is no human institution which serves society which 
is not at the same time opposed to the Divine Law. 2 
If one objects to this by saying that an attitude like this, 
say toward marriage, implies asceticism, then Brunner would 
simply rejoin that the monastery would be just as subject to 
sin as the home. 
It is a very curious thing that Brunner finds in this 
fact of sin the most unifying point of our common humanity. 
In a chapter called "The Contradiction" in Man in Re'tolt 
Brunner uses the term "Solidarity in Sin." Adam is an 
allegory of this common human state. He says, "1.Vhen we learn 
lBrunner, Man in Revolt, pp. 254-255. 
2Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, tranc. Olive 
Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), p. 338. 
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to know ourselves, we learn to know each as 'one like our-
selves.' • In sin we are bound together as a united body, 
just as we are bound together in the Creation, only with 
this difference, that--and this belongs to sin--we deny this 
solidarity in sin."l 
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One illustration that Brunner uses for this is the 
figure of the strawberry plant with its interconnecting net-
work of vines. No single stalk that takes root can be separated 
without recognizing its interlacing nature. Man is similarly 
interwoven with the sin of society, and the sin of all against 
God is deeper and of a more radical nature than most social 
analysts suspect. 
The sin of society leads Brunner to his concept of 
culture and tradition. He devotes his first few chapters 
in the second volume of his Gifford Lectures, Christianity 
and Civilisation, to social sin with his usual searching 
and penetrating vision. Denying the Aristotelian thesis that 
man is a product of society ["Man is by nature an animal in-
tended to live in a polis. He who is without a polis, by 
reason of his own nature and not of some accident, is either 
a poor sort of a being, or a being higher than man." Aristotle, 
Politics (Barker translation), I, ii, 9.], Brunner stresses 
the other side of the picture. He says: 
lBrunner, Man in Revolt, pp. 139, 141. 
We start from the statement that human culture pre-
supposes human man. It is not culture that makes man 
human, but it is human man who makes culture human. 
This order of things is given with the Christian faith. 
Man comes first, not civilised life. Man becomes human, 
not by culture and civilisation, but by understanding 
his human destiny. 1 
Culture, that is real culture, is a product of man's 
divine outreach. Brunner says, "What we call culture is a 
product of man's self -transcendence." 2 This is nowhere better 
demonstrated by Brunner than in his whole treatment of the 
role of tradition. Just as it is man's link to God that 
constitutes his true humanity, so it is man's link to his 
past that gives him his human capacity. "Tradition is inheri-
tance, first in the very banal economic sense •••• Tradition 
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is, so to speak, cultural memory, the living preservation of 
the past in the present."3 Here is the deep truth in the 
position of Roman Catholicism and all strong church traditions. 
Yet Brunner finds the core of man's being linked to God in 
Christ through the New Testament witness, not in some given 
institution. 
Like Maritain, Brunner views the Renaissance as a 
falsification of the true living tradition (seen for instance 
in the replacement of Medieval Latin by Classical Latin), and 
lBrunner, Christianity and Civilisation, II, 132-133. 
2~.' p. 26. 
3Ibid., p. 30. Notice especially the discussion of the 
importance-of inheritance rights for the handing down of tradi-
tion in this chapter, pp. 41-42. 
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he opposes the Christian tradition to the classical. In 
separate chapters on Science, Technology, Art, Education, 
and the State, Brunner hammers out the thesis that none of 
these wonderful cultural achievements can survive for more 
than one generation the loss of their spiritual mother. Each 
time they cut themselves adrift from the Christian faith all 
these achievements of man turn back upon man. These chapters 
may well be said to constitute some of the finest writing 
Brunner has done. 
8. Christian Ethics versus 
Philosophical Ethics 
Mention of these chapters in the above section leads 
to a need for an examination of the criticism Brunner gives 
to the value-scale of ordinary philosophy. The ethics of 
self-realization and the whole Platonic-Aristotelian tradition 
conceive of values in terms of realization of the self on 
higher and higher levels. Plato's myth in the Phaedrus of 
man as a charioteer with two winged steeds, one a noble and 
one an ignoble beast, is shattered by Brunner's analysis. If 
man's intellect and even spirit is subject to the corruption 
of sin then to move simply further up such a scale of values 
is not necessarily an increase in values. 
Paul Ramsey uses a diagraml similar to Plato's famous 
figure of the line to explain and defend Brunner's attack on 
lRamsey, Basic Christian Ethics, p. 114. 
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the Greek scale of values. The vertical line represents the 
Greek scale of values moving upward from lower to higher values. 
The horizontal line represents Christian growth from self-
centeredness (egoism) on the extreme left to neighbor-centered-
ness (altruism) on the extreme right. Now Ramsey contends 
that Christian ethics is more concerned with movement toward 
the neighbor than it is with the particular location on the 
vertical line. It must be added that Ramsey hastens to say 
that once the orientation of the Christian is turned toward 
his neighbor then the sharing with the neighbor of whatever 
level of value we happen to be capable of realizing is a 
natural step. An upward movement toward higher values is 
then permitted and even encouraged. Ramsey and Brunner both 
seem to feel the major hurdle to achieve is neighbor-centered 
love and not some form of higher values. Yet, whether neigh-
bor-centered love can be so completely disengaged from a Greek 
scale of values is seriously questioned by some philosophical 
ethicists .1 
How does Brunner suggest that Christian Ethics substi-
tute the Christian for the Greek scale of values? His basic 
argument supporting a contrast of Christian Ethics with 
lsee a critic ism developed a long these lines in Peter 
A. Bertocci, "Ramsey's Basic Christian Etl1ics: A Critique," 
Crozer Quarterly, XXIX (Jan., 1952), pp. 24-38. Bertocci 
says, 11 It is very important, in other words, not to sever 
the person from his values, as if values were something added 
on to a metaphysical unity of mental activity. There is no 
more reason, a priori, to prefer the metaphysical structure 
we call a human being to that of a stone, or a fish" (p. 37). 
Philosophical Ethics is given in chapters iv and ix in The 
Divine Imperative. Rather than viewing ethics as a branch 
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of metaphysics or axiology, Brunner says, "We can only rightly 
represent the whole of ethics as a part of dogmatics, because 
it is concerned with God's action in and through man."l But 
why connect ethics and religion? First of all because in 
Christian literature it has always been so connected. "The 
whole New Testament is an indissoluble blend of 'ethics' and 
'dogmatics.' This is true also,more or less, of the great 
confessional works of the Reformation."2 Any ethics that has 
no basis in religion would be considered idolatrous and 
groundless by Brunner. He says, "A •religion' which respects 
no 'law', and an ethics which has lost all sense of the Holy, 
are both products of the Fall: both show what happens when 
man is severed from his Creator.''3 
Ethics is broadly defined (void of Christian concepts) 
as "the doctrine of the science of conduct, which is distin-
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 85. 
2Ibid., p. 84. Again Brunner's higher estimate of 
Calvin is S'fiOwn when he says, "This is also true of the greatest 
--and,indeed, the only genuinely reformatory--dogmatic work 
of the Reformation: Calvin's Institutes" (Ibid., p. 84). 
Luther and the successors to both Calvin and Luther fare less 
well, for Brunner says, "Whereas in the dogmatic theologians 
who succeeded Calvin--both among Lutherans and Reformed--this 
union is replaced by a terrible emphasis on theoretical dogmatics 
as an independent subject" (Ibid., p. 592). 
3Brunner, Dogmatics I, p. 181. 
guished from all that is accidental and not based on principle 
by ultimate principles which characterize it as 'right•."l 
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Is there then the possibility of constructing a genuine science 
of ethics apart from religion? Brunner does not think so. 
Here we need to reca 11 his use of the terms "God apart from 
Christ" or "God outside of Christ."2 Luther used the term 
Deus nudus or absolutus, and Brunner suggests that all these 
terms convey the thought of God as Irrational and Numinous, 
an abstract Absolute, and a God of Law. This is the God of 
nature apart from Christ. Brunner says: 
It is God as He meets us in Nature and in the 
natural course of the world. God is thus--in the world, 
outside of Christ. He who wishes to understand God 
from the point of view of the world cannot help seeing 
Him thus. God meets sinful man in the world as the 
wrathful God, as the Majesty which condemns and 
destroys. 3 
God does not supplement a human scale of values--
he is the sole source of values. Strictly speaking, "God 
alone is Holy; but since He proclaims His Holiness in His 
creation, and declares that it belongs to Him, He 'hallows' 
it. Then it is not only God who is Holy, but those upon 
whom He has laid His claim."4 This is the beginning of a 
doctrine of Election which Brunner is anxious to develop 
without its predestinarian aspects found in most Augustinians. 
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 82. 
2Brunner, Dogmatics I, pp. 172-173. 
3Ibid., p. 173. 4~., p. 164. 
Brunner will not admit the problem of the Euthyphro or any 
possible conflict between the Good and the Holy. Therefore, 
he would see no need for a recent writer to reinstate their 
union.l There may be some question of the implications for 
the supreme value of personality in Brunner's Election 
interpretation, as seen in the following statement: "All 
human beings belong to God; but 'His own', in the qualified 
sense of the word, are only those who 'receive' Him in His 
revelation."2 
The fear of an unqualified identification of "the 
good" with "the holy" is that of a loss of a rational basis 
for the good. Although Brunner seems anxious to free the 
good from any hint of "caprice," he feels no apparent conflict 
when he identifies it with "the will of God. 11 He says, 
In the Christian view, that a lone is "good" which is 
free from all caprice, which talces place in unconditional 
obedience. There is no Good save obedient behaviour, 
save the obedient will. But this obedience is rendered 
not to a law or a principle which can be known before-
hand, but only to the free, sovereign will of God. The 
Good consists in always doing what God wills at any 
particular moment. 3 
The formal definition Brunner then gives for Christian 
Ethics is: "Christian ethics is the science of human conduct 
1Robert s. Brightman, "The Reunion of the Good and 
the Holy," Religion in Life, XXIV (Winter, 1954-1955), 
pp. 83-89. 
2 Brunner, Dogmatics I, p. 164. 
3Erunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 83. (Italics mine.) 
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as it is determined by Divine conduct."l Christian ethics 
is in agreement with idealistic ethics at least in its rejec-
tion of relativism and lack of any norms. Brunner concludes, 
"A 'scientific ethic' constructed on the lines of natura 1 
science would never become an ethic at all, but it would remain 
embedded in a morass of biology or psychology and certainly 
in sociology."2 
9. Brunner's Premises fo~ Economic Values 
We may summarize Brunner's view of man, society and 
how they affect economic values as we think of his view of 
God and the world. Brunner claims to stand within the 
Christian view of life. 
Man is a creature, composed of body and soul, who 
has been created in the image of God to live in a world 
essentially good for man. The whole order of nature, includ-
ing man, is subject to the will of Deity. God wills certain 
orders in which man must live out his life. 
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Man's sinful nature, however, is in continuous rebellion 
against God's orders. Rebellion against God's will and his 
orders is not only the rebellion and sin of man as an indivi-
dual, but a demonic rebellion greater than any human sin. 
Hence, Brunner can say with Luther that man is helpless before 
this Satanic evil except for the grace and power of God in Christ. 
libid.' p. 86. 21lli_., p. 87. 
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Brunner may be expected, therefore, to have greater 
pessimism in his economic philosophy than a man like Maritain. 
Whereas 14aritain places trust in a Christian church, Christian 
education, and Christian businessmen, Brunner cautions us 
against the sin which corrupts man even in these orders of 
man's activity. Brunner's approach, therefore, is more 
hesitant and suspicious than Maritain's crusading spirit 
which would seek to bring all of life under submission to 
the Divine Truth of the Pope. 
Brunner's definition of good, is obedience to the 
will of God and this cannot be charted in advance. Here he 
differs from natural law. Brunner has a way of salvation and 
Christian action. He believes in the Church and a ministry 
of the Biblical means of grace. But always man remains a 
sinner in potential or open rebellion against the Supreme 
authority of God. 
Let us see how these assumptions affect his view of 
economic problems. 
10. Brunner's Principles for 
the Economic Order 
i. The Need of a Philosophy of Economic Value. 
Brunner is not only one who views reality from the 
standpoint of a Christian theist, but as a dualist he is pre-
disposed to attack both the positions of extreme material-
ism and extreme idealism. Brunner views idealism as a philosophy 
which allows its ideals to take the place of a firm grasp 
of the realities with which it should deal. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, to find that he considers the economic 
order as one of the areas needing the study and help of a 
Christian ethics which no idealistic philosophy can supply. 
He feels there has been a serious neglect of an adequate 
recognition of this need in the past. 
The idealistic ethic of the nineteenth century, he 
believes, was simply out of touch with life as it is actually 
lived. This separation of thought from life is evidenced by 
the fact that nineteenth century religious thought practically 
ignored the greatest upheaval of social life in modern times: 
namely, the rise and victorious expansion of capitalistic 
economics. This is considered strange in that the economic 
life is "that sphere of life in which the strongest natural 
interest of man--that of the maintenance of life--is felt, 
and in which the antithesis between the interests of the 
individual and those of the community appears in its basic 
form."l Hence economic life is filled with ethical problems 
which no full-bodied ethics can ignore, except to its peril. 
The early Christian movement certainly did not 
ignore economic life. Brunner says, "The Bible--the Old 
Testament and the New--places the economic problem in the 
very centre of its thinking; the prophets, as well as Jesus 
and the Apostles, explain the law of love mainly by using 
lrbid., p. 395. 
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illustrations drawn fros tte econonic order.••l 
Brunner a;:~rees with ! .ari tain 1 s 8naly·sis of t'r~0 evils 
of the :;resent econOi~ic order ss bnsically stemmicc; frJ: a 
disassociation of the economic life from its service to ''the 
cor,1mon :jood. 11 Christ5_an ethics can aid the L:ldividual Cl'~istifln 
to overcome even this major si:-1 of our nresent culture. 
_:_)runner says : 
LThe Christian/ should be a',Jare tl:::at the divinely 
wil 1 ed meanin·~ of the economic or~er is not the nrofit 
of the individual, but the "common good, 11 the :naintenance 
of the t:uman life ::;f t1-:e conrmunity, anr1 tbis :znowled~e 
ourtt to determine his desires and 1-:is actiors •.•• 
His faith nnd coura~-e are renewed Tiher 1-e renli2es t'lnt 
he is callerl to serve the life c>f the conmtP1ity, and 
that tl1is call ~eans that he is to ~o h5.s ordin8ry iaily 
work as B service to his reir;hbour, Bnd to the Glory of 
~ c1 mb II • • • t II ' • ,_ • h t " 1 t ~ " 
.xou. 1 .e economlc splrJ. , ·n1.~Tc1· :_-~_s .so _ _.os ~l e o '.-oa, 
may indeed be a force which oppresses hir1 in the form 
of t~e ''spirit of the ase,'' and even tries to cepture 
h~s soul, but 1t •s not e blind W8te w,lcb he is imnotent 
to NlSist. 2 
DruLner ; s enoue;h -,f sn oxiste•·,tialist r:nrl nersonalist 
to feel thot tbe major need in economic life today is to 
restore D sense ~f rlignit~r nnd ~eanln to the :Jerson and his 
l.sbonr, as :;e.briel Lnrcel 1-:as broll~ht 'Jt.lt so weJ 1_ .: 11 ~ertain 
Only b"' a re-examinati:m of the nature of econo:n1c life ond a 
rca;mraisal of it in the lic;bt of the ·ospel ,,r Jesus C!n>ist 
cnn !':8r,_ P_,,·ain set tbe econcnaic order i.>1 its ~~rQnPr pers~qective. 
\bi:~., p. 395. 
') 
·"Ibir~., pp. HC-411. 
3 r: . • 1 ·• 1 ,. {' • t ]J • t t n S 
.. dll)r:Le. 11arce , l~~en ~·CO.l:ts _,um2n.L _.y, -rar:s. ·,_r. • 
Fraser (I.ondon: RavilJ PreS:9-;T9-52Ti-lie~i.-nv 'ann HavinG, trans. 
Katherine Farrer (London: Dacre Press~--194\?T.---------
i:lrunner may be comtnended for J~avinc:· sl:etcir~ed t',.e :"lath 8t'eBC1 
for such an econom]c philoso;)hy, 
iL The Created Economic Order. 
:CTunner, like ~ 7 • -1- • LarJ.vaJ.n, believes i1• a Created Order. 
How tLis differs from netural law1 concepts 83 we find it in 
Roman Catholic thought is found chiefly in the less inclusive 
pre-determined asnects of 2runner 1 s Created Orrlers. Yet both 
positions would stand firmly a"ainst all extreme relat1visms 
which deny tlwt any basic order can be found outside of man. 
Brunner also dislikes the term "natural law" as l·e sssociates 
tl1e irrstional, len1listic and harsh as.9ects of bare nature 
in "God apart from Christ. 11 Also Bru.nner would di sa,c:ree with 
the rc.ethod Maritain uses to 1iscover tllis "natural lau. 11 For 
Brunner the only mode of kno•:1ledge of Di_vine \/ill ;_s through 
Revelation, and this J.s never completel:"-' ~iven in nature apart 
from the Christ-event. 
This Created Order is the scene in which man must live 
out his life, Hence, to discover the Good relevant to man it 
is necessBry always to examine the "Order" in v1hich l'e finci.s 
himself. 3runner sketches this meaninF in the 11Introduction 11 
to Book III "The Orders" of Tl~e _ _P-i_vi~e___I!np_erat:i,_ve. He says: 
The existinr; reality £ii/ the sphere i.n wbich the 
Good is to be realized; tbat is, this nctual reality 
13runner believes lex naturae corcent<' ir, the fifteen 
centuries thev served as thebasJ.s--rGr Jaw if' E~<rone vrere 
never rl.evoirl of Christian ar;d Biblical roots. Yet >.irunner 
clearly prefers j_tiS divin~ to ..i_~ E:D:.t.u_ral_El_ as he shows in 
Cl~r::L_i)tia~H~;,;:_£l.nd Civ_ilisatJ.on, II, pp, 107-113. 
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defines for us O"r course of action, :~Iere >le see 
not ;nerel;r -narticnlar s~nheres o.t' l :i.fe 'N~~-;in vr~~i.c1~ ',·.re 
are to <let, but orders in accordnnce Ydth ,-:ilich ··1e 
have to act, because in them, even if only in e fra~­
~enterv and indirect way, ~ad's Will ··acts ~s. Hence 
we crll them "Divine orders.'' 1 
Arnow" these Created Orders are 1) t;~,e orders of 
society, 2) sex and the family, 3) the economic order, 4) 
the state, 5) the arts, Pnd 6) the c11urci~" 'i'he ti:ircl nf 
these is subject for special examination <n this section. 
t3rurmer defines the ec~nomic order os "the '•rocess by 
l"hich r;aterial r;oocls, needed to sup:Jort life, are YJrodcwed, 
distributed, and consu!'1ed. 112 Notice tr:ere ;~s no :~nention here 
of the term "scarce c;oods," alU:ouc;h J~Jrunner l["ter ,~iscLrsses· 
the need for technolo:;y and the ca;Jitalistic svstem as r~ade 
necessary by the pressure :Jf 'lopulation in our "resent world. 
:Sven if certain evils are attendant u,JOn tecl:molo~:y rt•d the 
CB J~italistic syr:tem, Brunner wishes to i)e B realist at this 
point. By this v1e mean that Brunner has no illusions about 
the ~,,ossibi 1it;r of suo,llyinc= t)-;.3 v1orlc' 1 s needs by the •:1ethods 
of e GBndhi spinnin,c; wheel or a Sout}·:ern one-nu 1 e farmer. 
'."'thPt Brunner calls "the bri:cht sid~e" of economics is 
this sspect of it as a UreBted Order. ~e says: 
Since God hns created !CD~ ns n coraoreal beins, Be 
b?s Blso created him fls a being need1tY" ~n econor,Jic order, 
and capable of creatin~ sn economic order. Thus the 
economic order for~s part of the nri~inal Divine order 
in creet1on; as such, like all Divine order, 5t is 
2
'b. 1 ~-~·' p. 396. 
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qt the same time a 11ivine lnw. 
to create an economic order. l 
an is c ourna.n r~ e r)_ 
Ac;ainst all asceticism or atte:,:pts to de:~rade tice ,,,,ysical 
:Jrunner Vlould enl:_Jhasize this rloctrine. In fact 11 in 5_tself 
tlle economic order is ethically neutral, s1f;ce on tts 
technicsl side it has to ,1o •:rith :naterial 'TOO''s, not vrith 
ecot1omic ~r~er is a means of sharin~ 11 tl1o Divine wor1z nf 
~)rescrvntion ••• every sug~~estio~ thPt the ecol:'_omic o-rder 
is 1 J.ovl 1 0r 1uns_,;;iritual' -is ·::1Decl_ :)Ut. ~:~_~o.r.~?_0ic ___ ~C.-~~~i__t__:1:,_ 
:r'_i;;_'r>tlz __ c::l21dtJO,c_t_e_d_,_i_s_ ])iv_:i,~e- Ser_~i_c~ Litalics mind", 3 Brunner 
cred.its Luther witt:_ restorin~- this concept of Christj_anity 
throuc:h his 1 de a of "the Callin,c; 11 after its '<Fleet :' r, the 
monastic ideol of' the :edicval 
~ 
,"1., ..... 
'' )_, 
, r~- .~n c:-~>Jos:i_t~_.;:n J.i' tLe -5_b} -t_t:-Dl ~~t:)r:.1 :J.f ",:.1Je Garden 
0 
"~-1~1,·1., p. 
;:,, b • cl 
--- l' •• p. 
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.~· D orr.e 
c"~Qor.l. 
Or~er ~hi~~ ~8rraun~s the ec~~omic life. :ir;nce, .-.,Jl tbis 
The 0CO~<)!::ic lifo, 
lS re~o:r~e0 ~s t~~ ~t]r8o e·~taiJe~ 
nn.-J the So 0 :i.oJ Orrler, tl•.':-'~'in. ~r~r 
8-n-cf Bi-l).th·er· s·,- -} ·0~;~ ·:). }_ ·1.8. 
r~ ~T ~· :1. n II B·~-
7\Jtt.iq ·.3r 
::=· --;!]~1- ''i}lj,8}: 
1 :_':r'l11T'(\r:r. -Tustico 
1: r.:··: '( )~ .. ~- ~ ~ T :·.:,-r~-D·n·r 
br_; 
order ~,erverted by ~nn 1 8 sin. 
0 
Jresent-c!B? .::e·l'l;sn--hut to r-·.<:J._n.",_. An.-1 ·~st·, --ll'"'1'nnr:r 0oes nJt 
'8 stn~es: 
For tJ.i.OS8 to w;·!or: the Y)hras~ 11 C1:ri,::j_nf=ll S:L~1il .; ;•,r1~,~"'.'1 t.('8 
8 rePlit?, ~-.his cDnr:ot ~~"Yl. +:h8t -i+~ ls c?u" ;J":Jl.eJu· J:::o 
ti"'e wj_l_l 0•'"' t}-.e -i_sol_f:lteG i::rl.ivirJ_q~-~. }.1 o-~1s:r ~-r ·'nrt-~.­
Clll nr, v?}•.en t1-v~ s·"1~'~er-lnclivi'1 1 U1l e:-1 e,~·-ents i:; the 
0C-'JYJort:ic s:Jhere stn·nd 011t r:ore cleo.r1.'T t-,1 ...... 1"" r-ver 
bcfor~. 8Vil ?~>·Jo:-Jr~ ~~:-:rin:::!ril:· in ·its c~)l_l_-.~etive 
v-,rc-" '' ''l"l. 'lllt o • J ) 
·----- ... . \ ' ~ -' "- . --
l~~oertrJuh·: (the 
-~-_o: ____ ----- -· ..:;;... ~--
t·,e ':'_earir:.-~~ 'l_f' tl1c 0('.C.H:O-:-::ic ;:_ .. rler frnm t!_JP ·""·Oint ·-,f '':Lr:'·} ··1:: 
fsitl1 tn bein·~ denied. • This system i3 ~011trsry ~o tho 
s~irit ).('service; --i_t is 0ebflsed a:c,r1_ ~·r~c-esr:o'-1n:LbJo; j_~-::Jeed, 
~.-:e ma;r -·~·J fl~rtl"'er and sn~r: lt ~-s i_x•rr:2~qo .. ,~-s~i.bi:t5.t.' .. "" rJove}CJ:Jed 
• t · t II ( .. - ' 1 " 4 0~) l!J o r s .Y s e~1 ::_:?__:.~~., ;_-·. __ .... u • 
2Ibid,, D, 409. 
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Now the sin of our society cor,sists in the last tva only. 
Unlos2., of co11rse, vre co·1sider tl-;e non-produ.ctive r)ersoll who 
consumes but does -~~-at contribute to the com:- or. c'ooc1. ~~runner 
conslders this mania for econol"ic '~oor'l.s end ;Jov:er to be the 
trul~ 11 daemonic spirlt 11 of our culture. Its slo· an i.~ 
11 econonics for tl10 s2l:e of economics" ::~n_rl 11 i~lan 5~s nr eco~"l_omic 
of Cht"trcLe8 stndy book it is r1 escribed. ns Ethics j_n a ~jusiness 
SocietY.l It _i_s t 11n st:if1in~ _)ressure of' 8 1~1one~,r cu.ltu.re 
·-----"'--· 
that values ~eterial ~oods 2nd crushes those rreAtive vocr-
tions that w::>uln lesd to sn enrichment c)f JJ. f'8 Pt hi 1wr 
levels. 
Brunner cor:clnrles thi_s r'lescri ltio•l of tre :'ervers5.on 
of the economic ~rder with a very real quention: 
It is, indeed, inevitable that the first eff8ct of 
this Dicture shoulrJ be to av:aken n sense iJf horr:Jr, not 
merely in the soul of the believer, but in 8Very one 
who still has a soul in this soulless economic world. 
The expression 11 ~onster,'1 vhich Sombort frequently uses 
of CapitaJ.ism, is no BXB!)_'ger~_t:l_o!1. '.iithi.n thi.s soulless 
economic "order, 11 1.'Jhich destroys ~·ers~nal relat~,o·--s ~-nd 
rev'lrses the orcler of nature, is ;t :JOSE:ible to do any 
"work" which rises above the worlct of thi.n·,:s, 11 work 11 
which is 0fferert 8S a service to tJ1e community, and is 
done for the glory of God? , • , Is it not o fact that 
at tl:-lis 11oint th.e colJective sin, the c:Jnposi.ti_ooo to r;od, 
in this system, j_s so ~o~erful, in the ne~ative sense, 
that the individual cannot nrevaiJ. against it? 2 
l 
I\-Iarr:LJ.is ':Y. Chi10.s anri ~0 11 ,~]e<1i1 C2ter, Ethics in 
!'1__3_Ll_s}.nefl_:s_:3.o_c_iety (Nevi Yorlc HRl'per and 1orot'1ers; lSl..'\41". 
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Brunner's views concerninc; property car. be sunL""B d up 
by sayin~ that he 3ives a vigorous dofense of 'ropertv ri~hts, 
ospocially those thinss which a man •~ses and works with, but 
at no tine is there to be property held as an isolated, CJoll-
responsible entity. 'rhe n!.r.rBse he constantly uses, therefore, 
to convey l1is conce.ot of ''roperty is 11 property-in-cormnunity." 
Property first of all has to do with c sense of 
personal freedom, Every person is a consumer and needs 
material ~oo~R to exist. His security is also contingent 
upon a continuous flow ~f these necessary ~oo~s. Hence, 
Brnnner sB :rs, n A certnin economic inde1;e1:.dence is a -,yrerer~ ui-
could declare himself subject to no man in sairit, IJut the 
ordinary oerson needs freedom in order to keep his own sense 
of di:~ni ty and self-respect. J:i'or t11is reason tbe --·rouert:,r 
on whir-11 justice for tlcc i.ndivid:w.l •1<orsnn sl1:.mld lay Testest 
claim is on that ~ronerty which is nea~est his '1ersonoJ needs: 
The more closely property is associated with the 
person, tl1e more necessar.v it ls for the sal:e of free-
dom, lJot '>nly '"r clothes and "'ouseholrl rcoods. btlt a 
house of nur rr•n '•as a positive significanr-e r;r tl1o 
freedom of personality. A h011se fosters the ~rowth nf 
the person; the hu"';e block of flats check ; t., '\ver'rCJne 
knows what the free oossesaion nf land ~eant and still 
mesns for the development of a free, spiritually 'nde-
pendent agricultural class. ~very substitlJtion ~r 
collective property for privste oroperty becomes a 
moral danger when it affects oroperty which is closely 
bound up with the person. 2 
1 Brunner, (.;hr_,i._sti~Y1-~~_y_a_n_:~_savilisatio_n_, U, o, 87. 
2Brunner, ,J_~s_t_iS!.EJ. _an~ th_e_ S()d_c}_O_r.-?:<3.1".• r:>. H·9. 
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I t'~ ' t II - lt' It • ' • n 118 cnap er on .ea n ~n Gl.S 
Brunner says, 11 A similar relation to that which exists hetween 
mHr- anrl soil1 obtains also betv1een man 0nd "is ll:o,se and his 
tools. n2 The l:l:lble recognizes the rj_c:ht to :oroperty Bnn the 
rhetoricnl flourishes in Acts to the contrary may be re,-;arded 
B.S statements of an ideal spirit of love rather than an accom-
plished fact. Jesus and tl1e :::>rophets rec:arded icate-r:i.Rl -ood.s 
and •Jroc;Jerty as·a natural consequence of man's cres~cureli.ness. 
'rhe BlbJe is not ascetic and the interpretati 'Y ,,_r St. Francis 
of Assisi is hardly recommended as a norm. '3runner in this 
Biblico.l anRlysis'0 stands i.n the line of Christian nnolo;dsts 
with Clement of Alexnndria (ca. 150-220 A.D.) 1vhose essay, 
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''The Ilich :.1an 1 s Salvatio1~,'' sdmonishes the m:_)re ~mporta~t 
ottitude of spiritual detachment from riches rather than the 
actual renunciation of all wealth. 4 
1Brunner has here Vlhat mi8ht be call"d 8 11 Hight-to-
Property-by-Use" theory, He says in another pl3 ce, "The 
claim of just _-;ossession, however, is r··.ost nearly fulfilled 
,,'.'hen it is based on future l.sbottr. Tll.e mac who menns to 
,,.,ork the land ts ~10st ;iustified in owninp it. In the Christlan 
view of justice, l2nd 1 belonc;s 1 primarily to the ma.n v1ho tills 
it, and belon~s, moreover, ir- ~roportion to his willin~ness 
and ce]acitv to till it, It·:Ls unjust when a man owns land, 
but does not till l t, and wl,en the n:an v1ho tills :L t cloes not 
ovm it" (Ibid., p. 151). Brunner is bere snee.kin'' ln ~ ~eneral 
way, for ne viould re adilv aclm:l t t:'le r'i. st i nctio~ betr:een n 
simple a"-rsrian and a complex i.ndustr:.e.l economy. 
2Brunner, Chr:_~~tianity and Ci v_1lisa_t_:i:..on, J I, 87. 
37 ·a' rl 'J Ol ~-, _t_• ,_. 
4waldo Beach and H. Richard ::iebuhr, ,:;rLt'istian Ethics 
(:leVI York: 'rhe Ronald ;:>ress Company, 1955), Cna))Fe-riTTOn __ _ 
ClemeYlt of Alexandria inclt,cles the above nentioned esse.v jn 
fuJl, pp. 79 and 94-98. 
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The rir·::"lt to orin propert~r inp1ies a corollnr;r rj_r)'lt--
the rj. c~ht to cl:t spo se of ·;roport y. 3rnnnor makes the 5. ntere st in:~ 
anRlysis that aJ.J culture and trarli tio'1 ''RS itc' ori:~iYl '.n the 
prncticc :;_f inherl tPnce of nroperty. l.Ior~ern soc:tet:r, wbich 
has severecl home ties lNhen couples ~-,arry and leave home, ~as 
acldecl to :Jtu' breclz with tradition and ·s'·'e '"'-~t. 'l' 1.•is ·,rivi-
lege of inheritance is the whole "uroose of man's eccmomic 
relation to fntl_'!_re ... ~~eneratior-:s and j_s, -:.n l)rP_nr.er' s e:res, the 
final proof of 11 propertv-in-community. 11 Rrtlnner s~vs: 
The Lntin Dord, trndere, nears ''to n8SS on''; those 
of the older generat:Lon pas·s on to the younc;er what they 
have receiver] themselves, Tradition is :inheritance. 
first in the ver;r banal economic sense. ·'here there 
is no nassing on of material values from father to son 
and grandson, there traditio!' in a spiritual sense will 
hardly persist. Culture ~resupposes continuity within 
its mcter:i.al foundation. ·,·/here the State by death duties 
and other taxation destroys this m~terial continuity, it 
will also in the lonr rttn destroy the sense of spirituel 
tro di tion, 1 
Tbe "Sychic effect of i.nheritrmce is far r:ore profound than 
the actual material assistance which noy be •nvolved. Yet no 
nerson con snv that he is ''self-made'' for we qre all products 
of ti;e toil of prev;_ous generations. T',is sense of' cohesion 
is the Christian ansVIer to the sir. of the econor.1ic order. 
The discussl.oD of "propert:v-in-conmunity" founcl :i.n 
!!l.e_pi_-v_i_ne Ir,'peratlve ( pe;:es 404-~00) tries +.a present the 
bolsnce between individualism and colJ.ectivisrn. C'he economic 
order i8 coJr,pBred by Brunner to the dr•.mken ;Jeasant described 
by }\'~Brtin Luther, who, when he "is hel.ped r_)n his b.orse on 0ne 
-------------- -- . ---- ·-------·. 
side, promptly falls off on the other. Brunner says, "We 
will not formulate an ~ priori conception of private property 
or of collective property; all we will do is to assert the 
idea of 'property-in-community' as the critically regulative 
principle, over against every existing legal economic order, 
and apply this first on the one side and then on the other."l 
In other words, following through Luther's illustration of 
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the drunken peasant mounting the horse, Brunner is saying that 
when individualism runs high then the Christian emphasis will 
be upon the collective and social responsibilities of wealth. 
But when there is a greater danger of communism and collectivism 
then the Christian church will stand as a prophetic voice 
calling for the rights of the individual to private property. 
This is nothing but the Hegelian dialectic seeking to avoid 
the extremes of either thesis or antithesis. 
In summary, we can state the following principles of 
Brunner's view of economic value thus far: 
(l) The economic order forms part of the original 
Divine Order in creation. There exist many Callings or 
Orders in which men and women live out their lives as a 
union of body and spirit (cf. p. 235 ). 
(2) Economic life is a necessary part of Christian 
ethics since it is where the greatest tensions are experienced 
between the interests of self and community (cf. p. 233 ). 
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 405. 
(3) It is impossible to act in the economic order 
without sin, and yet economic activity, rightly conducted, 
is Divine Service (cf. p. 237 ). 
(4) Thus it is both possible and necessary for man 
confessionally to serve God ~ his neighbor even in these 
perverted orders of Creation (cf. pp. 239-240 ). 
(5) Private property rights pertain to the freedom 
of the individual without which his spirit of freedom and 
self-respect is endangered. Every substitution of collective 
property for private property becomes a moral danger when it 
affects the goods most closely associated with our person 
(cr. pp. 241-242). 
(6) The right of inheritance is the physical basis 
for the continuation of cultural traditions, for man is 
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human only as he is rooted in God and his cultural past. 
Therefore, the State must never deprive man of his right to 
dispose of his property as he sees fit less interference 
destroy this linkage of generation to generation. (cf. p. 243). 
(7) Yet, all that Brunner says about private property 
must ultimately yield to his belief that all property is 
"property-in-community" as a critically regulative principle 
(cf. pp. 234 and 243). 
All that Brunner has said thus far concerning service 
to our neighbor through the economic order and "property-in-
community" is made more explicit as we see him move into the 
areas of personal rights (the right to command one's own body 
and the right to work), the right to economic goods (just 
wages, just prices, and fair interest), and the right of 
labor to organize. These applications need now to be 
examined at greater length. 
11. Brunner's Application of 
Economic Principles 
i. Personal Rights. 
There is a different kind of right that pertains to 
man more as a child of God than as a creature, yet it is 
somewhat different from property rights.l These are his 
personal rights and freedom from exploitation by others as 
a mere object. 
The right to my own person is the antithesis of any 
form of slavery. Brunner says, "The will of the Creator, 
however, has alloted to every man his life, his body and 
limbs as his most primordial, most direct 'due•."2 This 
lRight (or justice) is defined by Brunner solely as 
correspondence to the will of God. He writes, "vlhat corre-
sponds to the Creator's ordinance is just--to that ordinance 
which bestows on every creature, with its being, the law of 
its being and its relationship to other creatures •••• When 
we say that it is 'unjust' to treat a child in the same way 
as an adult, or 'unjust' to deny to a human being the respect 
due to his personality on account of his race, the ultimate, 
deepest reason for such a verdict is the fact that God, the 
Creator, has created every human being in His image and that 
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it is His will that the child should be respected as His cre-
ation in a way befitting its specific mode of being ••.• The 
rights of man are rights which, so to speak, God gives men at 
birth •••. In the last resort all justice means these con-
stants of creation .as a basis on which every human bein~ receives 
his due" Brunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 89. \Italics 
mine.) 
2~.' p. 58. 
is the right, as it were, to the property of one's own body. 
Since man is a union of soul and body, when a man is owned 
by another his most fundamental unity is destroyed. Uhder 
slavery it is not a man's own soul, his will, which commands 
his body, but the will of another. 
There are many forms of slavery in the modern world 
in addition to the old slavery of pre-Civil War days. A man 
may be a slave to a machine, to a business, to a mine, or to 
a State. The danger of all collectivism is the loss of 
personal freedom. The mere freedom to vote, if a man does 
not have economic means, is insufficient. Economic freedom 
includes personal freedom and the right to work. 
Brunner believes a Christian anthropology denies the 
common thesis of both the Marxist and the capitalist--the sole 
reality of the material. Brunner calls the dispute between 
these two economic philosophies merely one as to who shall 
have the money. Christian ethics does not condone either 
the Marxist "myth of the working man" or the "aristocratic-
c lerica 1 class -system of the Middle Ages" dominant throughout 
the nineteenth century. Brunner says: 
The first solution corresponds to an anthropology in 
which man is essentially spirit, imprisoned in a body. 
The second, materialist, solution corresponds to an 
anthropology in which man is essentially a body, and 
mind or spirit merely a concomitant by-prc4uct of the 
body, producing in its turn the so-called ideologies. 
Both solutions are equally unsatisfactory and unrealis-
tic. 1 
lBrunner, Christianity and Civilisation, II, p. 61. 
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It is a parody on our modern economic system that 
man should need a right to work as one of his basic personal 
freedoms. The ancient world never knew the meaning of loss 
of man's connection with some means of livelihood. Techno-
logical unemployment, financial booms and the cycles of 
depression, are found only in our modern monetary society. 
Brunner says: "Unemployment reveals the curse which lies 
upon modern European economic life more plainly than any 
other 'fact. Before the nineteenth century . • • the duty 
of work was emphasized but not the right ."1 It is interesting 
to note that William Temple was publishing his Men Without 
Work about the same year that Emil Brunner wrote the above 
lines in The Divine Imperative. Who will say that the world 
is yet free from the dangers of this curse! 
ii. The Right to Economic Goods. 
Property rights and personal rights have been dis-
cussed in the two previous sections and it has been evident 
that in some ways the two areas overlap. Property rights we 
have thought of in terms of real estate, house, land, and 
household goods. Personal rights have been dealt with pri-
marily in terms of the elemental freedoms from slavery and 
unemployment. What is the area to be dealt with as "The 
Right to Economic Goods"? 
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, pp. 393-394. 
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Brunner uses the term "economic goods" as a broad 
term to include any of the fruits of labor. He recognizes 
that simply to hold property in the formal sense, such a 
a house or land, would not necessarily imply the flow of 
material goods which we need to live. Especially in a modern 
society the questions of wages, interest, and cost of living 
are essential elements in a just economy. The key term here 
is perhaps that of distribution of these economic goods. Here 
we are at the heart of the ethical aspects of economics, for 
these all have to do with relations rather than mere produc-
tion. Brunner says: 
The finished "goods," however, the final product of 
labour also constitute a social fact, and therefore an 
ethically important fact. This final product embodies 
the claims of all the different co-operating factors--
those contributed by the soil, by the use of the "tools" 
(Capital), and by the achievements ::>f physical and 
intellectual labour. When we spedh. of the "Social 
Question" we are thinking chiefly of the method of dis-
posing of the products of labour, of the distribution af 
incomes which is closely connected with the actual 
distribution of goods. Behind the various methods 
employed to dispose of the economic goods--property, 
interest on capital, wages, profit, etc.--there lie 
burning ethical questions, on the answer to which de-
pends the welfare and the just ordering of Society. 1 
Interest.--The problem of interest is traced by 
Brunner back of the Medieval solution (traced in the previous 
chapter on Maritain in this paper) to the Biblical teachings. 
Brunner denies that the term "interest" in the Mosaic laws 
of the Old Testament has anything to do with our modern use 
lrbid., p.397. 
of the term. Those laws had reference to the lending of money 
to the poor who were always in danger of ruin. (Then "ruin" 
implied slavery.) Our use of productive capital does not 
appear in Biblical days. Nevertheless, Brunner makes a dis-
tinction between present-day capitalists and entrepreneurs--
the latter not only invests money in a business but also time 
and management. Therefore, the return of an entrepreneur 
ought to represent not only interest but wages. The return 
on investment by an entrepreneur is clearly approved while 
the interest on capital is classed by Brunner as "unearned 
income." He says: 
Interest on capital has primarily nothing to do with 
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the income of the entrepreneur; only the former is unearned 
income, not the latter. Hence it is incontestable that 
interest on capital is unearned income, and that is the 
point which renders it ethically dubious. To call income 
unearned does not necessarily mean that it is undeserved. l 
The concept of capital as savings is recognized by 
Brunner. "Saving means the postponement of consumption. The 
whole of material culture rests on this foregoing of immediate 
consumption •••. The great moral dangers doubtless involved 
in saving cannot alter the fact that it is a presupposition 
of all higher culture."2 The capitalist (one who has saved) 
"has a right to claim an annual return for his self-denial 
and the service he renders." 3 
lBrunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 159. 
2 
.!.£1!i.' p. 159. 3rbid., p. 160 • 
Although interest is upheld as a necessary and just 
part of our present economic order, this does not mean that 
it is without moral dangers as viewed by Brunner. In the 
first place there is the problem of a just rate of interest. 
The Council of Geneva, under Calvin's influence, limited 
interest to a maximum of five percent, on the logic that this 
would replenish the original capital in twenty years or one 
generation. Brunner refuses to set a limit and feels that 
this must vary with the needs of the economic community, as 
capital is an absolutely necessary part of modern production. 
Man's legal right to interest does not erase his moral 
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duties. Again extending his concept of "property-in-community," 
Brunner concludes: 
The lender of capital has a just claim for a return, 
but it must yield to the claim of the worker for a just 
wage. The economic order, as divinely appointed, is not 
there to satisfy demands for high rates of interest, but 
to nourish the community and to provide it with the 
necessaries of life. 1 
This may at some points involve a high rate of interest, even 
at the expense of an adequate wage, for the first rule of 
economics is that the goods for life be produced. Brunner 
says: "From the standpoint of its justice, interest will 
always come second to the claim for wages in its various 
forms, while from the standpoint of economic necessity it 
will always acquire an undue ascendancy. 
economic system is paralysed."2 
• [or else] the 
2rbid., p. 163. 
Brunner's specific suggestions for the Christian on 
interest taking will be mentioned in a later section. The 
whole approach of Brunner to each of these economic problems 
is that of distinguishing between the legal and the ethical. 
The Christian is called to act with love to God and his 
neighbor even within a sinful legal order. 
Just price and just wage.--Brunner's approach to 
economics is at no place brought into sharper relief than in 
the contrast in his teachings concerning these two problems 
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of economics. He denounces that which is the basis of both: 
any mechanical or rigid rule that is applied without ethical 
or human considerations. For instance concerning a just price, 
the classical solution of supply and demand on an open market 
is unsatisfactory since it fails to determine the real needs 
of the person who is buying. The adage, "Buy as cheap, sell 
as dear as possible," would not absolve the seller of his 
responsibility to the community. At the other extreme, a 
state-controlled mechanism would be equally unsatisfactory as 
a method of determining real needs. 
Brunner can see only two important considerations for 
justice in the question of price: (1) "A certain stability 
of supply and demand is actually in the urgent interests of 
the community,"l and (2) "above all, the freedom of the market 
from artificial control by monopolies.••2 Even the Biblical 
prophets recognized the evils of monopoly as it then existed. 
1Ibid.' p. 167. 
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The complexity of the problem is partially that there 
are two aspects to the question of just price--a subjective 
aspect and an objective one. Some theories, such as the labor 
theory of value, approach the price structure as though some 
objective standard can be found for determining the just price 
of any commodity. On the other hand the very existence of 
advertising suggests that the flexibility of consumer demand 
gives to prices a subjective factor. Brunner seems to fear 
the whims of a buying public as much as he fears inflation 
and high prices. Recognizing that there is no limit to 
human desires as a standard of real need, he says, "An eco-
nomic system is sound when the main necessaries [italics mine] 
are produced or offered for sale in sufficient quantities, 
whatever be the means by which this result is reached."l But 
he ends lamely by admitting: 
This idea, understood in a very relative fashion and 
confined within definite limits, can serve as a guide 
for a just economic order. For the rest, we will admit 
that the problem of prices can only be brought within 
the scope of justice with great difficulty. That is 
not surprising, for it lies on the extreme circumference 
of ethics, and on the border line of pure technique. 2 
On the other hand, when it comes to wages paid to labor 
Brunner immediately responds to the importance of the wage's 
effect on personality, and he is unwilling that wages be left 
to the impersonal fate of the price mechanism. He says, 
"Wages too can be brought under the heading of price as ex-
lill£., p. 168. 2ru£., p. 168. 
change value for labour. Labour will then be regarded as an 
object of exchange, and its justice will be as controversial 
as that of price. Hence the first proposition of a doctrine 
of just wages must run: Labour must not be regarded as sale-
able goods."l 
Labor unions have arisen as an attempt to offset the 
disadvantage of the individual worker. Using again the test 
of monopoly and its consequent destruction of freedom, Brunner 
says that the labor union is "equal in power to the employer, 
and hence freed." 2 Also the trade union enables labor to rise 
above a mere quantitative thing to a qualitative dimension. 
"This trade union movement is, more or less unconsciously, 
sustained by Christian motives, a thing which cannot be said 
of the socialist-communist movement."3 Brunner does not con-
sider the possibility (perhaps non-existent in Switzerland) 
of labor itself becoming the stronger monopoly. Would not 
Brunner, if he were consistent, have to approve some state 
controls to prevent either the monopoly of capital or labor 
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from endangering the common good? How to control the economic 
order for optimum efficiency while avoiding the power structures 
leading to either a labor or a capital monopoly is Brunner's 
unresolved question. His preference for protecting the wel-
fare of labor runs into conflict with his admitted realism 
in allowing the priority of capital. 
lrbid., pp. 168-169. 2 Ibid. , p. 169 • 
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Because of this dilemma we might question Brunner's 
assumption that the price mechanism is less important ethically 
than the wage mechanism. His assumption neglects the desir-
ability of a cheap and plentiful flow of consumer goods for 
the welfare of labor. Even good wages can be quickly offset 
by inflation prices. This apparently is not considered in 
all of Brunner's writings. 
12. Christian Solutions to 
Economic Problems 
There seems to be a gradual shift in the emphasis 
Brunner makes concerning the economic order. In The Divine 
Imperative (German edition, 1932) the sin of the economic 
order and the fact that the Christian is always involved in 
this sin in all economic activity receives primary attention. 
His later writings, Justice and the Social Order (German edition, 
1942) and his Gifford Lectures (1948-1949), seem to move more 
toward a rational and positive solution of concrete problems. 
Brunner at first believed that the sin of the economic 
order makes it necessary for the Christian to "sin boldly" if 
he is to engage in business. Brunner says: "During the whole 
history of the Christian era, even at the time of the Refor-
mation, the profession of merchant was regarded as one of the 
last to be adopted by earnest Christians, since it was held 
to be a calling involving its holder in grave mora 1 danger." 1 
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 419. 
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Brunner recognizes, as has been shown, the difference in 
modern business from the attitudes of the Reformation or 
Biblical times regarding such things as the taking of inter-
est. Nevertheless, Brunner believes the moral tension still 
exists. 
The moral tension with which modern business confronts 
the Christian is the reason Brunner suggests that we must 
distinguish "business" from "love." His interpretation of 
the Sermon on the Mount serves to illustrate this difference. 
He says: 
The commandments of the Sermon on the Mount hold 
good to-day just as at all other periods in history; 
not as a law but as a guide to the Divine Command ••• 
These commands mean exactly the same as the injunction 
that every one should exercise his calling as service 
to his neighbour and to the glory of God, whether he 
be capitalist or proletarian, manufacturer, workman, 
or professional man. J. 
However, when we are practising the ethic of the Ser-
mon on the Mount, we are not fulfilling the strict economic 
requirements to stay in business. Brunner, therefore, denies 
that there is such a thing as a Christian business man. This 
point-of-view in his earlier work, The Divine Imperative, is 
clearly set forth as follows: 
It is unfair and absurd to ·require a Christian 
business man to conduct his business "according to the 
laws of the Sermon on the Mount." No one has ever con-
ducted business on these lines or ever will; it is 
against all the rules of business itself. The "office" 
of a business man belongs to a specific order which is 
1JE.i.£., p. 434. 
not that of the relation between one person and another . 
. • . He ought to know that, even if he tries to be a 
just and upright business man, he is still very far from 
being a "Christian" business man, but that even his busi-
ness activity is a bit of this wicked world. 1 
Knowledge of this fact, however, does not absolve 
anyone fulfilling an "office" from trying to resist the sin 
involved and helping to the best of his power to mitigate its 
evil by practicing love. 
What are some of the ways in which we may practice 
love through our "office"? First, we may consider our work 
as a divine calling. Brunner is consistent in claiming that 
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not all work is worthy of being called a "divine" calling. He 
says: "That kind of work, and that way of working, is commanded 
which best serves human life •••• Work which is not in har-
mony with this ideal cannot be performed for the glory of God, 
nor does it possess the 'dignity' of labour." 2 By unworthy 
work Brunner does not mean "lowly" occupations, for he habit-
ually refers to the "dairymaid" of Luther and the "shoemaker" 
of the Early Church Fathers in contrast to the Medieval con-
ception of the calling of the monk. These "lowly" occupations 
may be lived as "divine callings." Brunner says, 
Our "Christian shoemaker" must--first of all do the 
proper work of a shoemaker, although this involves him 
in direct contact with the unjust world of money, busi-
ness, competition, the class-war; and indeed this spirit 
is not new--it is the unpleasant spirit which always has 
been and always will be characteristic of the busine:s·s 
world as a whole •••. It is of the mercy of God that 
he may still do his work "to the glory of God" in spite 
lrbid., P. 434. 2Ibid., p. 388. 
of everything, it is the mercy of God that God takes the 
the responsibility for all that he cannot alter. There 
may very well be extreme cases where the contrast is too 
great, where a "calling" can never be regarded as subject 
to the grace of God; in such instances a man who is in 
earnest about doing the Will of God can no longer partic-
ipate in such action. 1 
At another point, Brunner calls these "unworthy" vo-
cations as "sham services," saying, "It is, however, possible 
to claim that there are sham goods (sham values) and sham 
services--I need only remind you of the spheres of extreme 
luxury and of vicious pleasure • • • which, if controversy 
arises, must give way absolutely to those which have been 
proved to be necessary as vital or spiritual values."2 His 
test for a worthy calling is that of a service to human need. 
This would rule out immediately the spheres which damage or 
corrupt human life. 
A second requirement to practice love through our 
"office" is for every person capable of rendering service to 
society to work. Brunner sees some validity in the socialists• 
view that only manual work counts as work, and some truth in 
the deeper view of Tolstoy and Gandhi, that even intellectuals 
should spend some time on manual labor in order to earn their 
"daily bread." Brunner's rule is, "Every person capable of 
rendering service is under an obligation to render service."3 
But Brunner would here recognize a third principle. 
lrbid., p. 254. 2rbid., p. 257. 
3Ibid., p. 406. Although Brunner is here denouncing 
"the unearned income, economic luxury, or a parasitical ex is-
tence" (ill£.), he does not limit service to economic service 
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Third, not equality but "an incomprehensive inequal-
ity"l affects our work for society. Brunner opposes the kind 
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of equality that tries to reduce all men to equal digits. Not 
only are we unequal in our talents but there is need for 
organization and a fixing of responsibilities in a business 
structure. Brunner cannot believe that economic democracy 
will lead to anything but ruin. He says: 
An unconditional, axiomatic belief in democracy might 
have still more disastrous consequences in the economic 
sphere than in the political sphere. Behind it there 
lies the rationa listie desire for "equality," which denies 
the Divine order in creation, according to which the human 
community cannot exist apart from energetic and powerful 
guidance by individuals. 2 
Brunner subscribes to the view that structure and 
hierarchy are the natural orders of any society. Just as his 
analysis of the family concludes with the thought that the 
father is the head of the house and must exercise his "office" 
by ruling it, so in economics there is a hierarchy of respon-
sibility and power by necessity. This power may be abused in 
one of two directions. One extreme is an oligarchic misuse 
solely. In his view the physical side of life, though a part 
of the natural order of man, is not man's highest dimension. 
Thus the artist, the poet, and the saint render a service of 
tremendous worth to the common good of humanity. Brunner 
observes, "The immediate purpose of all economic activity is 
to provide the individual and the community with the material 
goods which are necessary for life. But this purpose is not 
all. Man is not an animal, incidentally capable of using 
technological appliances. The fact that it is man who acts 
in the economic sphere means that this primary economic pur-
pose cannot be separated from the general aims of humanity. 
Man does not act in an 'economic' manner simply 'in order to 
eat,' but in order that he may live, that his human life may 
be preserved." (Ibid. , pp. 397-398). 
1~., p. 407. 2Ibid., p. 1H4. 
and at the other extreme is an ochlocratic misuse. The first 
may be defined as "the exploitation of the functional sub-
ordinates in the interests of a selfish plutocracy or a 
tyrannical bureaucracy." The second danger is ochlocratic, 
and this is defined as "the fanaticism of equality which has 
no use for any kind of subordination." Brunner says, "Nothing 
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is more ruinous to the community of work than this egalitarian-
ism." 1 The Christian department head will realize that "higher 
power, as involved in higher office, means so much greater 
responsibility for service."2 Brunner reminds us that Luther 
once wrote a tract on this aspect of leadership. 
Finally, there are the problems of leisure and luxury. 
These two are not identical, for all men require leisure in 
order to keep their basic human nature. Western culture has 
a work-fanaticism which makes "it fair to say that Western 
man, from sheer absorption in work, no longer knows what it 
means to live •.•• Where the Sabbath-rest disappears, the 
human character of life also disappears."3 Thus Brunner be-
lieves the problem of leisure has already become one of the 
major problems of our civilization. It goes back to the basic 
premise with which he started, namely, that both work and 
leisure must be brought within the framework of the Christian 
conception of man. He says, "By the Christian idea of vo-
cation all work is personalised as well as communalised.''4 
lBrunner, Christianity and Civilisation, II, pp. 66-67. 
2Ibid., p. 63. 3Ibid., p. 70. 4Ibid., p. 66. 
If by luxury any excess beyond mere necessities is 
meant, then luxury is not condemned by Brunner. To prohibit 
all surplus would destroy culture. Brunner says: 
We ought not to forget that the demand: first of 
all procure the necessities of life, and only then (after 
this has been achieved) the higher goods of civilization 
and culture, if literally interpretedr would lead to 
absurdity. Civilization and culture, with its goods--
science for instance--is indeed the very presupposition 
which enables men to procure that which is necessary for 
life. 1 
Freedom for research, art, education, and all the 
elements of a higher culture require inequality and some 
element of luxury. Brunner's term for all this is "scope." 
He says: "Being what we are, as human beings, a certain 
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amount of scope is a simple necessity of life; but in admitting 
this we do not justify for a moment what simple folk call 
luxury, and every conscientious Christian will make a rule 
to set the limit to that which is necessary for himself as 
low and not as high as possible."2 The acid test will be a 
polarity of human need and our vocational need. "So long as 
people round us are in distress it is wrong to claim for our-
selves and to enjoy more than we need to fulfill our vocation 
--in the broadest sense of the word." 3 Hence, Brunner avoids 
asking the Christian doctor to sell his instruments or the 
medical student to give away his tuition money, for how then 
could they fulfill their vocation as a Christian doctor? Even 
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 437. 
2~., p. 487. 3Ibid., pp. 436-437. 
the process of education, in this sense, is recognized by 
Brunner as involving this principle of luxury. 
Brunner's comments concerning the Christian's taking 
of interest is illustrative of this point. There may be 
times when the taking of interest legally due should be waived 
in the interest of love.l Brunner wishes us to act as indi-
viduals responding to the Divine Command at every point. The 
same rule applies to any Christian professional man, say a 
doctor. Simply because he has skill that constitutes a kind 
262 
of monopoly does not justify his extracting an exorbitant fee.2 
It is likewise true of the Christian employer. Although he 
might hire a worker for a low wage it is not beyond the scope 
of Christian love to pay a just wage instead. 
Brunner does not suggest that we wait for private 
charity as a solution to major social problems. The Christian 
can act through his institutions for the securing of greater 
social justice, sinful though these institutions, like the 
individual, may be. Brunner says this is what he calls "the 
right to adjust." 
The right to adjust is an obligation, not of indivi-
dual charity, but of social justice. The community is 
then as it were under military law and laws come into 
force which would be operative in a state of siege •••. 
The person of the wealthy is not degraded if he is called 
upon to perform this duty of adjustment, and private 
property is not abolished thereby. 3 
lBrunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 163. 
2Brunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 412. 
1srunner, Justice and the Social Order, p. 172. 
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Such action by the State is to be engaged in, however, only 
as an emergency measure in grave economic peril such as a 
major depression. Brunner distrusts power in the State or in 
any other monopoly. 
The only continuous adjustment must come from the 
Christian as he seeks to express love within the economic 
order. This order will always remain sinful. Only in an 
eschatological sense will there ever be a perfect society 
and then "in the Perfected Kingdom there will be no economic 
order." 1 Thus the Christian is not ultimately concerned only 
with social justice. He is to serve God in the world but not 
because of this world. Brunner can say then that "the inter-
est of the Church for the social order can only be an indirect 
one."2 Yet life within this present world will only be improved 
as God's grace is mediated through human persons witnessing to 
His power to overcome the powers of sin. Brunner may thus 
conclude: 
The attitude toward work is ultimately a religious 
question. Experience shows that even within the present 
economic system it is not impossible--though it is 
difficult--to do one's work as service for God and men.3 
lBrunner, The Divine Imperative, p. 400. 
2Brunner, The Church and the New Social Order (London: 
Student Christian Movement Press, Ltd., 1952), p. 7. 
3Brunner, Christianity and Civilisation, II, p. 66. 
13. Summary of Brunner's Philosophy 
of Economic Value 
Emil Brunner represents the Augustinian line of 
Christian thinkers whose main concern is with man's future 
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state leaving the entire realm of the here-and-now as secondary 
only. Augustine, according to Marcus Dads, contemplates the 
ruins of Rome's greatness and distrusts the security and sta-
bility of any earthly government, no matter how strong or 
wisely governed. "The old system is crumbling away on all 
sides, but in its place he [Augustine] seems to see a pure 
Christendom arising. He . . shows them how from the first 
city of God, or community of God's people, has lived along-
side of the kingdoms of this world and their glory, and has 
been silently increasing." 1 For this reason Brunner views 
the response of the Christian within the economic order to 
the will of God as a day-to-day response. Man must serve not 
his ideals, as John Dewey would rationally and pragmatically 
conceive them, but God's will, which may often be at cross-
purposes with man's desires as he lives in a sinful economic 
order. 
Thus, Brunner may be summarized as follows: 
(1) The basis of all good is the will of God and this 
is not predictable except in a given historical moment concern-
ing ~ own ethical duty. 
1Marcus Dads, "Editor's Preface," The City of God by 
Saint Augustine (2 vols.; New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 
1948), I, xi. 
(2) Man is a sinner yet he can respond to God in the 
personal relationship of an "I-Thou" situation--the Divine 
Command. No person exists except,as. a Creature and subject 
to such commands by his Creator. 
(3) God has revealed himself in Christ in whom the 
Absolute Holy God is also the God of Love and Forgiveness. 
This revelation is the source of all Christian love. 
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(4) The economic order forms part of the original 
Divine Order in creation. There exist many Callings or Orders 
in which men and women live out their lives as a union of body 
and spirit (cf. p235 ). 
(5) Economic life is a necessary part of Christian 
ethics as it is where the greatest tensions are experienced 
between the interests of self and community (cf. p.233). 
(6) It is impossible to act in the economic order 
without sin, and yet economic activity, rightly conducted, 
is Divine Service (cf. p.237 ). 
(7) Thus it is both possible and necessary for man 
confessionally to serve God and his neighbor even in these 
perverted orders of Creation (cf. pp.239 -240). 
(8) Private property rights pertain to the freedom of 
the individual and are a just due to man in view of his bodily 
needs ( cf. PP. 241 - 242) • 
(9) The right of inheritance is the physical basis 
for the continuation of cultural traditions, and the State 
must never deprive m3n of his right to dispose of his property 
as he sees fit (cf. p. 243). 
(10) Yet, all that Brunner says about private property 
must ultimately yield to his belief that all property is 
"property-in-community" as a critically regulative principle 
(cr. p.234 and243). 
(11) In the Perfected Kingdom there will be no 
economic order but this Kingdom will never by realized within 
history. Hence, the economic life is not the final end of 
rna n ( cf. pp. 262 - 263) • 
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